EurAsiaReview.com: The Horn Of Africa States: Fears About New Bloc – OpEd

First, defining the Horn of Africa is crucial in this analysis. It is the Horn of Africa, the region that shoots out of Africa in the East towards the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Sea and the Northern Indian Ocean in the form of a horn.

It contains four countries namely Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, together the SEED countries. It does not include Kenya, or Uganda or South Sudan, which belong to the East Africa Community, but now could be called the Central Africa Community as it has adopted the DR Congo as a member. It also does not include Sudan, as it is part of Northeast Africa and is related more to Egypt than to the actual Horn of Africa States.

Second, the region or the SEED countries can be blocked together as they have so many things in common. They together have a long history dating back to the advent of humankind, the same weather, the same people, although languages may differ, but generally the region is rooted in its Cushitic essence. There are, of course other populations in the region, but the general population belong largely to one ethnic background.

The first fear, therefore is based on the fact that it occupies a vast territory of some two million square km and enjoys a large population of one hundred and sixty million people, most of them from the same ethnic stock. An organized region with all these advantages, would naturally appear a risk to those who currently take advantage of its disturbed governance.

The second fear is related to it being the source of the Blue Nile, which provides fresh water to countries like Sudan and Egypt, and particularly the latter which considers the Nile a national security issue and hence important for its survival. This causes the two countries to conspire against the region, all the time, sometimes using the Arab League and others only the Gulf Co-operation Council countries and sometimes the international community. It was why institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and even the African Development Bank refused to finance the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or the GERD. It had to be financed locally from the region, and now they are against the filling of the Dam.

The third fear is again related to the location of the region. It lies astride one of the most important seaways of the world, particularly since the opening of the Suez Canal, which shortened the distance between the United Kingdom and the then jewel of the British Empire, India, by some 40% both in travel time and costs. It is now even more important because it carries about eleven per cent of the oil and gas exported to Europe and the Americas and some ten percent of global trade. The waterway passes through the waters of the Red Sea, the Bab El Mandeb Straits, the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Sea and the Northern Indian Ocean and here is why it is again important because a large part of the trade that goes to Southern Africa also passes through the waters of the Horn of Africa States in the Indian Ocean. An equally important element in the location of the region is related to the aviation world, for the region is almost located in the centre of air travel between Europe and Australasia.

The fourth fear is related to the neighboring countries of the region who include themselves in the Horn of Africa, when they are not. One often encounters the Greater Horn of Africa, which is not actually a region that exists but which is put forward to include countries like Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and even Uganda into the formula, to extract some assistance from the donor world. Actually the Horn of Africa States does not need a lot of assistance for it can feed itself, if it was left alone. But wars and man-made famines usually assisted by these countries and their backers add onto the problems of the region, which does not give a chance to the region to breathe and handle its own affairs, more logically and professionally. The region is not without knowledge or good people or the relevant technologies. They were able to preserve meat or butter without refrigeration and store grains for years in underground silos long before many of the civilized people of today. They still do when they are left alone.

There is also the sixth fear of many of the countries of the East Africa Community and more particularly Kenya and Uganda, who fear being alienated and their securities undermined. Other regional blocks such as the East Africa Community or the Central Africa and the Great Lakes Community have their own security architecture. This should not be at the expense of other regions such the formation of a new Horn of Africa States regional block. Definitely, the formation of a new block would change the current architecture of the region, but there is no reason why they could not live together and make arrangements together for each to support the other.

Perhaps the most significant of the fears against a regional block of the Horn of Africa States is the fear that it would undermine the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), an organization which puts together countries that share little with each other. IGAD consists of the countries of the Horn of Africa States and other countries that mostly belong to the East Africa Community. One cannot be loyal to two regional organizations that have differing goals, values and missions, which demonstrates why this organization, despite being around for decades, has failed. It is a dysfunctional organization that has only consultative but no effective powers. There is no need for its existence, but its staff would definitely oppose to its dismantling although it does not serve any purpose. It is an NGO financed by Europe, which does not need to be in the way of a Horn of Africa States regional block.

The last fear comes from those who believe in the fake nationalisms of the past. If they were truly patriotic and nationalistic, they could have settled the misgovernance of the region long ago. But is known that they are clans and tribalistic, loyal to their small clans and tribes rather than to anyone else. But they still pose a threat to the formation of a Horn of Africa States region. They may be complimented by military men whose colleagues passed away in the wrong wars among the countries of the region.

But the Horn of Africa States is in progress and will see the light of day in the not too distant future.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

“Cutting Trees is Like Amputating Part of My Body”

The title of the article comes from what an exemplary farmer, Mr. Michael Andemariam Hadera, said. In an article by Amare Weldeab that was published in the February 19, 2023 issue of Haddas Ertra, the Tigrigna daily national newspaper, I read about the activities and future plans of this exemplary farmer, who lives in Arberebu’e, on the Asmara-Massawa road. Here, I will provide the key points from the extensive interview to introduce the actions taken by and the intention of Mr. Michael Andemariam and share my general observation of the reforestation and afforestation programs in Eritrea.

Eleven kilometers on the Asmara-Massawa road, you encounter an eye-catching scene on the steep slope to the right of the road. The cliff is terraced, the gorge blocked, the ponds filled and the barren land cultivated. The land has been transformed into such an attractive scenery by the diligence and creativity of Mr. Michael, the exemplary farmer. Mr. Michael has a diploma in agriculture and had worked at the Ministry of Agriculture’s branch in Anseba region for six years until he went to Sawa in 2008 for his national service.

Arberebu’e, Mr. Michael’s home village, is mountainous and not suitable for farming. However, he took an initiative in 2003 to level the land and plant trees. Since then he, along with his family, has invested a lot to change the nature of the area. He has undertaken various initiatives to enhance soil fertility and water infiltration in the mountainous landscape.

Mr. Michael said that upon his return from Sawa, in collaboration with his two brothers, he constructed three bridges as well as ponds that cost half a million Nakfa. Initially he planted 200 orange seedlings that he brought from Hamelmalo Agricultural College, but they didn’t grow due to shortage of water and associated problems. Having learned from the experience, he decided not only to grow fruits but also to raise animals. Mr. Michael now grows fruits such as guava, apple and orange and raises animals, including goats, sheep, cows and camels. He has also levelled 3550 meter square of land to grow animal feed.

Sustainable agriculture and agroforestry play a key role in combating environmental crisis and food shortage by increasing crop yields, diversifying food and income sources, and improving the ecosystem. Mr. Michael intends to build agroforestry by growing high valued trees and shrubs alongside livestock production. To sustainably manage the land used for crop cultivation, it is important to adequately address the increasing concern of enhancing the conservation of biodiversity on lands surrounding the farm.

Mr. Michael is operating in a mountainous area. The steeper slopes on the farmland add to the cost of maintaining the farms, and there are high production and reproductive costs. Notwithstanding its cost, mountain farming has contributed a lot to sustainable development. Mr. Michael has diversified his agriculture by integrating tree planting and animal husbandry in the harsh and difficult environment.

A century ago, 30% of the total land area of Eritrea was covered with abundant and diverse flora. However, mismanagement of land during the century of colonization, the thirty year of war of liberation and recurrent droughts reduced areas covered by vegetation to merely 1 % in 1997. Mr. Michael is carrying out intensive afforestation activities. Tree planting has been his top priority in mountain farming. Since 2007 he has planted 13,735 seedlings — 6185 eucalyptus, 7500 sisal and 50 black pepper. The trees have a lot of potential to rebuild the resilience of the farming system through the conservation of biological diversity and the provision of essential ecosystem.

In Eritrea, reforestation is becoming a popular strategy to protect the country’s remaining forests and to restore degraded lands. The government has taken several steps to encourage the people to plant trees in areas where they live. The summer campaign, a national program commonly known as kremtawi maetot, is one of the significant initiatives of the government that started in 1994 to encourage secondary school students to play their role in restoring the environment by planting trees and performing other environment friendly activities. Reforestation serves many purposes. It improves the quality of air, enhances soil and water conservation and provides an important habitat for animals. When forests are destroyed, wild animals lose their habitats and move away. As part of the efforts for the restoration and conservation of the natural environment, the Forestry and Wildlife Conservation and Development Proclamation was issued in 2006.

Mr. Michael, who is very much aware of the importance of trees, said, “Trees are beneficial for you, your country and the world. The life of all living things depends on trees.” He has taken a quarter of a million Nakfa in loan to cultivate the area while he continues to give his national service. He waters the plants by fetching water using jerricans loaded on camels. In the future he plans to introduce an irrigation that can work in a mountainous landscape.

Besides the topographical challenge, Mr. Michael has to protect his plants from being eaten by animals. He has planted 7500 sisals on the margins which are serving as fence. Speaking about the usefulness of sisals, Mr. Michael said, “They have many benefits. They prevent soil erosion, their rods are used for construction and as fire wood, their flowers attract bees, and their ever green looks make for a good scenery.” The sisals are also preventing people from cutting trees. Commenting on the people acting irresponsibly, Mr. Michael said, “I see a person who cuts trees as amputating part of my body. Any person who cuts trees without the knowledge of the concerned body is destroying the life of all creatures.” He called for a revision of the methods of patrolling and the rules and regulations to protect trees.

Mr. Michael’s project is a family farm project. As such he is not motivated exclusively by profit. This is particularly important in mountainous areas, where the time and other resources required for their maintenance are generally high. Family farms are largely operated with low external inputs. In addition to his personal vision and ambition Mr. Michael always has a family on his side. He said, “My wife, my three sons, who are now mobilized for the defense of the country, and those who are at home motivate me to work.” According to FAO’s working definition, family farming is a means of organizing diversified agricultural practices that is managed and operated by a family and is predominantly reliant on family labor, including both women’s and men’s. In Eritrea, family farming is one of the most predominant form of agriculture.

Farmer-led initiatives in restoring the environment and practicing diversified agriculture are important. In expressing his plans for the future, Mr. Michael said, “Nothing comes before a country. When my sons return from their duty of national defense, I plan to further develop and expand afforestation and bee keeping and to plant 2000 seedlings per year.”

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

MiddleEastEye.net: Shadow games on the Red Sea as scramble for Sudan’s ports intensifies

Foreign operatives appear to be living on small islands in the Red Sea, patrolling the waters around them and banishing the locals.

Billion-dollar deals are being made and then unmade. The whole world is coming to African shores, with dreams of power and profit occupying their thoughts. In the shadows, away from prying eyes, a game is being played.

‘We were attacked by some foreigners while we were fishing near Agig port. They were white and I believe they were Russian’

Fishermen in Sudan’s deep south told Middle East Eye that they were attacked and expelled from their waters by armed foreigners off an island close to Agig port, south of Port Sudan near the border with Eritrea.

Eyewitnesses in these southern areas of Sudan’s Red Sea coastline said they were sure there was a foreign military presence on islands inside Sudanese territorial waters.

One of the Sudanese fishermen, who asked not to be named for security reasons, told MEE that he believed the armed attackers were Russians, adding that he saw them taking samples from the land.

“We were attacked by some foreigners while we were fishing near Agig port. They were white and I believe they were Russian because I saw Russians in other parts of the region and they looked very similar,” the fisherman said, adding that they could have come from another western nation.

No-one seems to be quite sure who these people are and what they are doing in Sudan. Officials from the Tokar locality – the nearest town – did not respond to questions from MEE.

But the presence of armed foreign fighters comes as the scramble for the Red Sea coastline intensifies, with a series of international players intent on establishing a foothold in the region.

Scramble for the Red Sea

Sudan’s 750-km long Red Sea coastline is attracting widespread foreign interest, with the ambitions of a number of international players dovetailing with the country’s febrile domestic situation.

The US, Russia, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, Turkey and others are all vying to control Sudan’s ports, a situation that is beset with conflicts of interest at a time of great political, economic and military insecurity.

This competition has exacerbated the conflict in Sudan between civilians and the army, with the internationally brokered framework deal signed in December – which looks to set Sudan on a two-year path to elections – meeting fierce resistance on the streets.

The battle for the Red Sea is also part of an ongoing game of thrones between Sudan’s two most powerful men, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti.

Burhan, the country’s de facto leader, is head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while Hemeti, his deputy, is leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

Military presence

The local and international competition along Sudan’s coastline is now a military one as well as an economic one.

The US and Russia are openly competing with one another, and are putting pressure on different parts of Sudanese society as part of that rivalry.

In a recent visit to Khartoum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the previous agreement between Sudan and Russia to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea was going forward, explaining that it was waiting for ratification from the Sudanese legislative assembly.

“You know this agreement has been signed earlier between the two countries and is only waiting to be legalised,” Lavrov said.

A former senior military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they believed the Sudanese army and RSF were standing with Russia and China, but that they were facing pressure from international players headed by the US.

“Bashir gave the Russians permission to build a military base in the Red Sea region in 2018 after his historic visit to Moscow,” the source said, referring to Omar al-Bashir, who ruled Sudan from 1989 to 2019, when he was ousted in a democratic uprising.

“US Africa Command put pressure on the army and the Sudanese transitional government, so they froze the agreement in 2021. But let me tell you: the Sudanese military mentality in choosing its allies has not changed from Bashir’s time.”

Hemeti’s sea base

There is also competition within the military, as Hemeti’s RSF looks to establish a strong foothold in the region.

Satellite photography seen by MEE and published here shows that the RSF has tried to build its own military base in Dungunab and Auteri, two small ports over 150km north of Port Sudan. The plans failed because of local resistance.

A document obtained by MEE through some local leaders showed that tribal conflict erupted after the land in the two areas was given to the RSF for a military base.

According to the document, the commissioner of the Gabait locality, where the two sites are located, ordered a halt on the allocation of a piece of land in the area for the RSF.

A local leader from the Bishari tribe said that the RSF has been providing a lot of financial and developmental support to the people of the area. They added that the militia succeeded in pushing local leaders to accept an RSF base in the area.

“The RSF has not just made a lot of services in order to put the locals on their side, but even provided a lot to the leaders themselves, which partly pushed them into accepting the establishment of the base,” the Bishari leader said.

“However, the commissioner has intervened and stopped it. It is also traditionally prohibited for someone from outside the region to take over public land owned by a specific tribe unless that tribe gives them permission,” they added.

Deals with other places

In December, Sudan and the UAE struck a $6bn preliminary agreement to develop and operate Abu Amama port on the Red Sea. The deal includes the construction of an airport, a big agricultural scheme, and dozens of railways and roads to link the Nile to the Red Sea.

The deal, signed by the Sudanese government and an Emirati consortium including the Abu Dhabi Ports Group and Invictus Investment Company PLC, which is owned by the Sudanese tycoon Osama Daoud Abdellatif, has been questioned by the local community and employees of the Sudan Sea Ports Corporation, a state body.

A leading member of the Bishari tribe, the traditional owners of the area around Abu Amama area, said it wasn’t clear what the deal would bring to the local community other than simply a loss of land.

“We have no problem with the development of our area to improve the life of the people and modernise the region, but we want guarantees and transparency, which is not present in this deal as it was signed without our consultation,” the source said.

Mohammed Ahmed Alawad, deputy chairman of the Sea Ports Corporation, told MEE that the deal was still in its initial stages and that it would be reviewed by the corporation’s technical teams.

“The technical teams of shipping, finance, legal affairs and others have to review the agreement once we receive it from the government,” he said.

China is also involved in the great game of the Red Sea. Haidob port, 80 km south of Port Sudan, was built by China Harbour Engineering Company and is part of China’s 21st-century maritime Silk Road.

The port, which cost $141m and was opened in 2020, is allocated for exporting livestock – including camels – to China and the Gulf, according to its manager, Mohammed Alhassan.

Haidob is expected to be the “biggest port that will export camels from Africa to China”, Alhassan told MEE.

China also has two ports in Bushair, which are around 30km from Port Sudan. They are intended for the export of oil from Sudan and the landlocked South Sudan.

Sudan is now also trying to resolve complications relating to deals signed during the Bashir era. One involves the suspension of a deal with a Philippines company. Another involves a $4bn deal signed with Qatar in 2018 to improve Suakin port in northeastern Sudan.

However, a source at the sea port said the agreement seemed to have been frozen after the ousting of Bashir in April 2019.

“The agreement was preliminary and it seems that it hasn’t been developed after the revolution, as politicians in both Doha and Khartoum seem to have no interest in it after the political shift in Sudan,” the source said.

A December 2017 deal between Sudan and Turkey for the reconstruction and restoration of the historic Suakin island on the Red Sea coast also alarmed Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Reports said that the Ottoman-era port of Suakin had been leased to Turkey for 99 years, seeing the island revived as a tourism hub for Hajj-bound pilgrims.

In the wake of the Sudanese revolution, the agreement was reportedly ended by Sudan’s new government, but Turkey denied this.

Middle East Eye visited the island and saw that construction by the Turkish Development Agency was still ongoing.

As well as being the gateway to Sudan and the wider region – 90 percent of Sudan’s trade passes through Port Sudan – Red Sea state is also the richest gold-mining region of Sudan, with Russian, Turkish, Egyptian and other mining companies operating alongside Sudan’s Ariab Mining Company.

Just another of Sudan’s glittering prizes the world’s powers are fighting over.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

NLTimes.nl: Hundreds of Eritreans in the Netherlands victims of smuggling network

Thousands of Eritrean migrants have been mistreated in Libya by an internationally operating human smuggling network, according to Dutch Public Prosecution Service (OM). In the process, they were mistreated and imprisoned by the people smugglers and their relatives were extorted to pay ransom. Today, hundreds of the victims live in the Netherlands. 191 witnesses have testified to the Dutch prosecution about the human rights violation.

The victims want to remain anonymous out of fear of retaliation by the regime and possible negative consequences for their Eritrean relatives. “There were three large sheds on the compound, with more than 2,000 people in each shed,” one of the victims told TV program Nieuwsuur. “Some sleep at night and others during the day, because there is not enough room for everyone to sleep at the same time.”

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Human rights violations range from violence to rape. Victims reported being beaten with garden hoses and sticks, which were recorded on video. Furthermore, Eritrean women were taken from sheds by smugglers and raped, which was sometimes also filmed, according to one of the victims, NOS reported.

According to OM, the human smuggling network have earned millions of euros from the fact that they called the relatives of the Eritrean migrants in the Netherlands to pay a ransom. “We see that an exploitation system has been devised, a criminal revenue model in which people are seen as commodities,” said press officer Gerben Wilbrink of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office to NOS.

The prosecution has been aware of the human smuggling network for some time and have had them on their radar since 2018 and were able to detain two ringleaders of the network. They were charged with participation in a criminal organization, human trafficking, and aggravated assault.

One of the two ringleaders is Eritrean Tewelde G., known as Walid, and is detained in the Netherlands. The second main suspect is Eritrean Kidane Zekarias H., who has been on the Dutch wanted list since 2021 and had previously fled Ethiopia. He is still detained in Dubai. Five other people who were responsible for collecting the ransom from the victims’ relatives have also been arrested, the TV programme reported.

But the smugglers alone have not been involved in the human rights violations. According to Eritrea expert Mirjam van Reisen of Tilburg University, the Eritrean regime is also involved in the human smuggling network and extortion in the Netherlands. It is a “closed system” in which the smugglers work with middlemen in the Netherlands who are linked to the Eritrean regime.

However, the Embassy of Eritrea in The Hague denies these allegations, announcing “The Embassy of Eritrea strongly rejects the fabricated allegations against the Eritrean government by these so-called Tilburg University researchers.” The embassy also wrote that it “fully supports the legal action taken by the Dutch prosecution against human smugglers,” NOS reported.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Berlin: Eritrea Filmmaker Nahom Abraham Wins Berlinale NEFTI Award for Short ‘Home’

Nahom Abraham from Eritrea has won the top prize for best film, and $5,000, in the Berlinale’s 2023 NEFTI award for his film Home, a drama about a couple longing to be reunited.

Mihk Vergara and Miko Livelo from the Philippines took the NEFTI Audience Viewers Choice award, along with the $2,000 prize for You Are Gathered Here Today, a story about a man who returns home to the Philippines to bury his father and reunite with his best friends.

The third finalist was Zoulikha Tahar from Algeria for her film Leila’s Night Of Joy, about a girl who, on her 25th birthday, finally stands up for herself and takes her life into her own hands.

A panel of judges, including actress Vivica A. Fox, Oscar-winning producer Bruce Cohen (American Beauty) and Fox/Disney President, of feature post-production Ted Gagliano, picked the NEFTI winners together with last year’s competition winner Minenhle Luthuli, selected the three finalists.

The NEFTI awards, sponsored by Austria’s NEFT Vodka and backed by the Berlinale’s European Film Market, the Durban Film Mart, and the International Emerging Film Talent Association (IEFTA), are designed to celebrate, and challenge, filmmakers from emerging economic regions to showcase their creative skills and to expand their reach into regions that may otherwise not have been available to them. While the short films did not have to be about NEFT, they all had to include the vodka brand in a way other than product placement. The only other criteria for were that all films must be non-violent and non-political.

The next NEFTI competition, NEFTI Africa, isopen only to applicants living on the continent or African territories. Applications open on May 1. There are also plans for aNEFTI All-Stars competition, where the winners from all NEFTI events create new films to compete for a NEFTI All-Stars prize.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Tour du Rwanda 2023 Stage 7 : Eritrea’s Henok Mulubrhan is the new leader of the general classification.

Manuele Tarozzi has won the seventh stage of the Tour du Rwanda. The Italian, who quickly went on the attack, was the best on the tough finish on Mont Kigali. Henok Mulubrhan is the new leader of the general classification.

The penultimate stage in Rwanda started in Nyamata. From that place, south of the capital of Rwanda, the riders went to the now well-known finish in Kigali. There was the Mont Kigali, which must be climbed after a ride of 115.8 kilometers.

On the way, seven riders broke away. They were Aklilu Arefayne, Daniel Teklehaimanot (both selection Eritrea), Jean Bosco Nsengimana (selection Rwanda), Marc Oliver Pritzen (EF Education-Nippo Development), Asier Etxeberria (Euskaltel-Euskadi), Filippo Fiorelli (Green Project- Bardiani CSF – Faizanè ) and James Oram ( Bolton Equities Black Spoke ). For a moment, the seven-member breakaway was ahead of the peloton for a minute, but not much later they were caught again.

Tarozzi survives Mont Kigali the best for the first time

Then a large group of about twenty riders rode away. At one point they cycled a few minutes ahead of the peloton. At the foot of the first climb of Mont Kigali (5.3 km at 6.5%), the leading group still had a nice lead, but the peloton had opened the hunt.

The first ascent ensured that the large leading group completely exploded. The peloton, on the other hand, led by the Soudal Quick-Step training team , rode together towards the absolute final. It was Manuele Tarozzi of Green Project-Bardiani CSF-Faizanè who started the final kilometers with a lead. The Italian did that with a lead of 35 seconds.

Mulubrhan new leader

Tarozzi had to survive on the second and final ascent of Mont Kigali. The last two kilometers in particular were very tough with an average percentage of nine percent. However, 24-year-old Tarozzi managed his effort well and survived. Tarozzi thus won his second professional race on Mont Kigali.

The good news didn’t stop for Green Project-Bardiani CSF-Faizanè as Henok Mulubrhan is the new overall leader. The rider from Eritrea was thirteen seconds behind leader William Junior Lecerf and has now overtaken him. The last stage is on the menu in Rwanda on Sunday. It promises to be exciting, because the first five riders are in the standings within five seconds.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

VifIndia.org: The Future of Ethiopia’s Peace Deal

There are nations with states and nations without a state. And in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a third category: states without nations. One such case in point is Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a Federal Democratic Republic with two chartered cities and nine ethnically based autonomous regional entities.[1] With more than 90 distinct ethnic groups and 80 languages, Ethiopia is one of the world’s most ethnically and culturally diverse countries.[2] 43.5 percent of the country follows Orthodox Christianism, while another 33.9 per cent follows Islam. The rest of the population follows Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and traditional religions.[3] It is Africa’s second most populous country and is expected to become the largest economy of East Africa soon.[4]

The year 2022 was a busy year for Ethiopian democracy, where the country witnessed a seesaw battle between the national army and a coalition of rebel groups led by Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) throughout the year. Nonetheless, the year ended on a good note when in November 2022, the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray rebels signed a peace deal to end the two-year-long metastasising war.[5] However, even three months after the signing of the peace deal, there is hardly any dialogue between the two parties, thus, making the future of the peace deal doubtful. Since the peace deal, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed only once has held a meeting with the rebels, on 3rd January, for a brief period.[6]

So far, an estimated 600,000 people have lost their lives in this war, making it one of the world’s deadliest conflicts of recent times. [7] Another 900,000 Ethiopians left Ethiopia and escaped to neighbouring Sudan. Additionally, there were 2.75 million internally displaced persons in 2022, meaning 52 percent of Tigray’s population fled their homes.[8] Now, as two parties signed the peace deal in Pretoria, the world has decided to move on from the Ethiopian conflict with the empty vessel of “African solutions for African problems.” However, several thorny questions remain unanswered. What will be the future of the TPLF rebels and TPLF as a political entity? Will there be any punishments for the war crimes committed by both sides? What will be the future of the Prime Minister’s ambitious reform agenda? But most important of all, will the peace deal hold? Because if the violence breaks out again, this would not be the first time a treaty will be relapsed into a conflict.

A Brief Recap of the Events

In 2018, Abiy Ahmed became the PM, riding through an anti-government wave. As part of his reform programme, in 2019, Abiy founded the Prosperity Party to curtail the ethnicisation of politics.[9] The new political entity had all eight regional states. However, TPLF declined to join the alliance and remained outside, claiming that Abiy was acting to consolidate his power. He also tried to scrap article 39 from the constitution, which gave each province constitutionally granted autonomy in a decentralised political system and a right to secede. [10] Abiy’s supporters contend that his policies are pan-Ethiopian and geared toward creating a more unitarian state. However, his detractors accused him of attempting to centralise power. For them, it is against the constitution and will reduce the autonomy of ethno-nationalist forces.

In May 2020, Abiy Government postponed the general election scheduled for August 2020 due to the pandemic and proposed rescheduling it to June 2021.[11] However, the TPLF proceeded with the election in the Tigray region in September 2020.[12] Later, in November 2020, the TPLF attacked one federal military base resulting in many fatalities, injuries, and property damage. The rebel organisation from Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region justified their attack as a preemptive strike because they feared an attack from the federal army. In response, Ethiopian forces, with the help of neighbouring Eritrean troops and local militias, retaliated and quickly took control of the whole Tigray province, including the capital Mekelle.[13]

In this seesaw battle, TPLF made several dramatic comebacks and once was on the verge of attacking Addis Ababa. However, with the assistance of drones that were purportedly provided by Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, the Ethiopian army again took control of the situation around December 2022.[14] The government declared its readiness for a humanitarian truce and unwavering intention to participate in productive negotiations with the African Union as the mediator. However, the violence continued on a smaller scale. In March 2022, everyone was surprised when both sides agreed to a ceasefire out of the blue. Peace prevailed for the next few months, and Ethiopia’s situation was slowly returning to normal.

Unfortunately, it was only a brief pause in a long-protracted war as violence erupted again in August.[15] And when it was thought to be over, the five-month-long humanitarian truce collapsed again on 24th August when TPLF launched a fresh attack on Raya Kobo.[16] And it became another full-blown war when Eritrea joined the fight in September.[17] As last time the civil war raged again within five months of the humanitarian ceasefire, the fear of a similar renewal of violence can’t be ignored. It is to be seen whether the current peace deal holds or the vicious cycle repeats itself.

Currently, both sides have stopped their violent and destructive conflict and taken basic steps toward political and security stabilisation, including the restoration of essential services such as electricity, communications and banking in Tigray. However, the two-year-long conflict dealt a significant blow to the Ethiopian economy that will hurt growth and increase basic commodity prices in the coming months. As per some estimates, rebuilding only northern Ethiopia will require approximately $20 billion over the next three years.[18]

Political Instabilities in Ethiopia

Although the current situation in Ethiopia is taking an enormous human toll, causing political instability throughout the Horn of Africa, these events are not entirely unfamiliar in Ethiopia. In its 60-year political discourse, Ethiopia has experienced alternating periods of peace and conflict. The first Italo-Ethiopian war, culminating with the Battle of Adwa (1895-1896), remains a watershed moment in the history of Ethiopia. The battle ended with the Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896), recognising Ethiopia’s independence.[19] In 1974, amilitary group known as the Derg overthrew the monarch, Haile Selassie. The head of the Derg, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, launched a deadly purge to transform the country into a communist stronghold, infamously known as the Red Terror.[20] Mengistu began a collectivisation programme while the nation was experiencing one of its regular droughts, and hundreds of thousands perished in the famine.

In 1991, a coalition of rebel militias overthrew Mengistu’s Marxist military regime, thus putting an end to a violent seventeen-year civil war.[21] The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the most ferocious and well-organised of the rebel organisations, rose to command the ruling alliance. The TPLF-led government first named the country the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Later in 1995, they introduced a new constitution explicitly endorsing the different ethnic groups’ rights to self-determination(article 8) and secession without restriction (article 39)[22].

Adopting this outdated Soviet Communist theories of governance gave ethnic identity and space priority over national identity. In a way, it denied Ethiopian citizens their status as citizens who transcended nationality and acknowledged them as primarily ethnic creatures. Immanuel Kant, a prominent philosopher of enlightenment, appropriately identified this phenomenon as “public reason” with “private reason.”[23] The 1995 constitution simply replaced the supremacy of private reason with ethnic reason.

Although this radical ethno-nationalistic tilt of the 1995 Constitution was anticipated to lessen violent conflict in Ethiopia, issues related to ethnic conflict persisted, and the country remained divided on important national narratives. Nevertheless, during the three decades of TPLF reign, Ethiopia experienced respectable economic growth, averaging approximately ten per cent.[24] The TPLF initiated a programme of economic modernisation, which over time, yielded tremendous benefits.[25] In fact, some people have begun referring to Ethiopia as the China of Africa, and the nation has emerged as a stable nation in the disturbing, violent Horn of Africa.[26]

The Future of Ethiopia’s Peace Deal

Through the peace deal, TPLF survived its doomsday and got another opportunity to achieve politically what it failed to achieve militarily. Going forward, they may try to form some ethno-nationalist bloc under the pretext of fighting the central regime against federalism. However, their dream of an independent state doesn’t look viable from a realpolitik perspective. Tigray is a landlocked region situated between the rest of Ethiopia, with which it is still at loggerheads, in addition to the central government, and an antagonistic Eritrea on the other side, which just assisted Abiy’s government in putting down its insurrection. Moreover, if their independence were acknowledged, it would spark a chain reaction of nationalist movements, causing the continent to become unstable. What would prevent other regions of Ethiopia from trying the same thing? Definitely, African Union will staunchly oppose this move as the domino effect may impact many other countries of the continent.

Indeed, in many parts of Africa, there is a strong emergence of the pre-1991 politics of nationalism. This particular genre of politics undermines the right to national self-government by ideologising a centralised unitarist state in the guise of unity. This type of nation-building effort was made in Somalia under President Siad Barre, which eventually led to the breakdown of the state and the unilateral declaration of independence by Somaliland in 1991. Sudan’s attempt at the Arabisation of South Sudan in 2011 also resulted in the state partition and the longest civil conflict in Africa. Ironically, a once hegemonic TPLF itself re-joined national movements for self-determination, often known as federalist forces, which it side-lined and oppressed for over a quarter-century.

Way Forward

Ethiopia’s assimilationist nationalism has yet to yield any notable outcomes, and its aspiration for a nation-state remains elusive. A state can be defined based on its political sovereignty, geographic scope, and institutional framework. However, the idea of a nation is broader since it takes into account a variety of additional features, such as a shared cultural, historical, and linguistic background. And from that perspective, it is a long-drawn process to be achieved over a long period, and not by imposing it from the top. Going forward, Ethiopia may need to change its steadfast top-down strategy for creating an indivisible nation-state, which prevents the society’s federal structure from flourishing. Ethiopia may instead initiate a bottom-up international federalisation process that matches society with the state. Until then, Ethiopia’s quest for a nation-state will continue to be elusive.

On a positive note, Ethiopia has had multiple civil wars, a socialist revolution, two coups, and countless droughts, famines, and pandemics. And yet, it attained Africa’s highest GDP growth rate, averaging 8 and 11 per cent yearly in the last decade until 2016. Probably Ethiopian nationalism was strengthened by these successive civil wars. History has demonstrated that nothing can bring a nation closer than difficult times. The question is whether Ethiopia can break these vicious cycles of violence and whether there is a silver lining for Ethiopia as a nation.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online