Month: January 2023

Asmara, 31 January 2023- Mr. Yosuf Saiq, head of Organizational Affairs of PFDJ, holds virtual and in person meeting with nationals from various cities of Australia focusing on strengthening organizational capacity.

At the meeting conducted from 22 to 29 January with nationals in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth, Mr. Yosuf gave briefing on the history of the struggle of the people of Eritrea for independence as well as in safeguarding the national sovereignty.

Mr. Yosuf also gave briefing on the covert and open hostilities that have been perpetrated against Eritrea and the strong resilience of the Eritrean people to combat and foil the hostilities.

Indicating that the encouraging stage Eritrea has currently reached is the result of strong resilience and perseverance of the Government and people of Eritrea, Mr. Yosuf called on the nationals to strengthen organizational capacity and participation in the national affairs.

The participants of the meeting on their part expressed readiness to strengthen organizational capacity and participation in the implementation of the national development drives.

Source: Eritrea – Ministry of Information

Africa was a major focus for both the US and Russia last week, with US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveling to the continent in a bid to influence key states. The two are fighting over influence in Africa as European states leave the Sahel and China digs deeper into the continent. Africa can be seen within the context of the great power competition framework. For Washington, Africa remains vitally important. Yellen visited Senegal, South Africa and Zambia, while Lavrov visited South Africa, Eswatini, Angola and Eritrea. Lavrov’s visit to the continent was his second in six months.

The US strategy toward Africa is centered on the simple recognition that the continent will shape the future of the global economy. Yellen’s visit was the start of the Biden administration’s efforts to rebuild ties with Africa in the light of China’s rapidly increasing economic presence on the world’s second-largest continent and Russia’s military and diplomatic foothold in parts of it.

Yellen’s time in Zambia focused on Chinese debt traps and mining interests. The US was working on a formula for rejecting such activity, especially as China digs deeper into key African mining states. The US is reaching out to other European and Arab partners to help “offset” Chinese, and Russian, mining practices by reaching new, transparent agreements. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed such an agreement with the UAE as part of Washington’s Africa policy program.

Yellen visited the South African coal-mining province of Mpumalanga and announced more stringent measures to cap the price of premium Russian oil products on the international market. She also asked South Africa to respond to serious violations of sanctions by local business or by governments. Yellen’s warning was meant to be heard in all African capitals. Her comments were accompanied by Washington declaring Russia’s Wagner Group a foreign terrorist organization that is present in various hot spots throughout the continent. This was a firm warning of US and Western resolve. That Yellen made these comments from South Africa was also highly significant.

South Africa, Africa’s most developed economy and which is pivotal to the US plan, also has deep ties with both Russia and China. It raised concerns at the White House in February 2022, when Pretoria announced it would host Russian and Chinese warships and take part in joint naval drills with them off its east coast, near the sensitive area of the Mozambique Channel.

While Yellen focused on warning South Africa, Lavrov visited Eswatini. Eswatini is one of the few countries in the world that recognizes Taiwan, so Lavrov’s presence in the former Swaziland was significant. Eswatini has signed a deal with Taiwan to put one of Africa’s largest data centers in the country. Lavrov’s visit may interrupt or influence those plans, to the benefit of Chinese tech firms. Eswatini is also near the southern areas of Mozambique, a major focus for many international players.

Lavrov’s visits to Angola and Eritrea ran counter to US interests as presented by Yellen during her Africa trip. Lavrov is searching for continued support for Russia from African states. In the UN General Assembly’s first resolution in March last year condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, African countries formed a significant proportion of those abstaining. Eritrea was one of only five countries to vote against the motion, along with Syria, North Korea, China and Belarus.

In both countries, Lavrov visited key Russian cultural monuments as part of Moscow’s soft power outreach. He also held discussions with top Angolan and Eritrean leaders about continuing African support for Moscow in international forums such as the UN. In Angola, Lavrov discussed building nuclear power plants in the country but, given Western restrictions and possible penalties, the likelihood of actual construction is far off, maybe never.

Nevertheless, in both the Angolan and Eritrean capitals, Lavrov talked about Russian port access. The ports discussion is also highly significant for continuing access to Russian maritime assets that have military value. Moreover, Lavrov’s discussion with Eritrea about Russian access to the port of Massawa is certainly going to raise security concerns, given the proximity of the port to Yemen, but also its centrality to Sudanese logistic lines that are undergoing development. This discussion on port access between Russia and key African states is part of an ongoing strategy by Moscow as Western sanctions start to seriously hit.

Meanwhile, Yellen’s visit was a key piece of US foreign policy that needs to be taken seriously by African states. With France leaving the Sahel and the African continent facing a number of very serious threats, from social inequality to terrorism, there is a strong Western requirement to keep what it sees as negative influences away.

Overall, Yellen and Lavrov were focusing more on the southern part of the continent, excluding the key visit of the Russian foreign minister to Eritrea, which is also significant because of the strategic nature of how Africa is geographically divided. The root causes of Africa’s problems need to be addressed in a factual way, as opposed to through narratives that mask reality. Closer attention to atmospherics, instead of relying on probable information warfare outlets, is important. Violations of sanctions policy by African governments and stakeholders will be punished. Whether those Western sanctions will alter the so-called Eastern assertiveness on the African continent as part of the great power competition is another question.

* Dr. Theodore Karasik is a senior advisor to Gulf State Analytics and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Lexington Institute in Washington, D.C. He is a former Advisor and Director of Research for a number of UAE institutions. Dr. Karasik was a Lecturer at the Dubai School of Government, Middlesex University Dubai, and the University of Wollongong Dubai where he taught “Labor and Migration” and “Global Political Economy” at the graduate level. Dr. Karasik was a Senior Political Scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation. From 2002-2003, he served as Director of Research for the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy. Throughout Dr. Karasik’s career, he has worked for numerous U.S. agencies involved in researching and analyzing defense acquisition, the use of military power, and religio-political issues across the Middle East, North Africa, and Eurasia, including the evolution of violent extremism. Dr. Karasik lived in the UAE for 10 years and is currently based in Washington, D.C. Dr. Karasik received his PhD in History from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Almost three months after it was signed, the ceasefire agreement between Ethiopia’s federal government and forces from the northern Tigray region is mostly holding, while humanitarian aid is flowing more freely to the millions of people in need.

The 2 November deal was struck as fighting raged in Tigray, drawing in forces from the Amhara region and neighbouring Eritrea on the side of the government. Hundreds of thousands are thought to have died in one of the world’s deadliest recent wars.

Over the past few weeks, Tigrayan forces have handed over heavy weapons as stipulated by the deal, which was signed in South Africa. Eritrean troops also appear to be withdrawing as part of the pact, residents in Tigray told The New Humanitarian.

However, Eritrean forces remain on the border and are yet to fully leave Ethiopian soil, according to the United States. And other other contentious aspects of the accord, including plans to install a transitional Tigray administration, have not yet advanced.

Though levels of humanitarian aid are increasing in Tigray, some areas remain off limits, according to aid officials, and high levels of need persist in much of the region, which has a population of around six million people.

“The issue we are facing now is scale,” said a senior aid worker, who asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the subject. “We are going into communities that haven’t received support for five months, and we’re seeing very high demand for services.”

Post-peace violence

The war erupted in late 2020 following tensions between the federal government and Tigray’s ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) which dominated Ethiopian national politics until Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018.

Access for aid groups delivering food and medical supplies in Tigray was restricted for large parts of the war, while essential services such as telecommunications, banking, and electricity were also cut off, prompting accusations of a government-imposed “blockade”.

The balance of power on the battlefield has swung back and forth, but the peace deal was signed as the TPLF suffered a series of significant defeats to Ethiopia’s federal military and its allies.

The agreements core provisions – that the TPLF disarms, replenishes control of key infrastructure in Tigray, and dissolves its regional administration in exchange for unfettered aid access and an end to the fighting – favour the federal government and skirt over the thorny political issues that led to the conflict.

Though the ceasefire has ended major hostilities, atrocities have continued, according to a report from the Tigray Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), a humanitarian body that brings together local government offices, UN agencies, and international NGOs.

Seen by The New Humanitarian, the report states that Eritrean troops and Amhara militias killed 3,708 civilians in Tigray in the eight weeks between the signing of the deal and 30 December. It also documents the abduction of 645 people over the same period.

Two previous reports from the ECC detail dozens of rapes in Tigray after the ceasefire – which was mediated by the African Union and backed by the United States and the UN – as well as instances of looting.

Eritrean troops withdraw

Still, there have been signs of progress, including some noticeable movement over the past week. Eight Tigray residents from the towns of Shire, Axum, and Adwa told The New Humanitarian they had seen Eritrean troops leaving their towns in recent days.

In late January, images were posted on social media appearing to show buses and trucks of Eritrean troops leaving Adwa and Shire. Some of the soldiers were carrying banners with victorious slogans, such as “Game Over”.

Diplomats and the TPLF have long demanded Eritrean troops – accused of rampant human rights abuses in Tigray – leave Ethiopian soil, and their withdrawal from major towns will give the ceasefire a much-needed boost.

“We see the beginning of a withdrawal, but it is not complete. They are still in some parts of Tigray.”

However, the troops have not fully departed and are still present along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the UN, told reporters on Saturday.

“We see the beginning of a withdrawal, but it is not complete. They are still in some parts of Tigray,” said a diplomat in Addis Ababa, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid damaging relations with the federal government.

That line contradicts a senior Ethiopian commander, who told foreign officials over the weekend that “there is no other security force in the Tigray region except the FDRE Defense Forces”, using an acronym for the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Weapons handed over

The Eritrean military’s partial withdrawal comes after TPLF forces handed over several tanks and artillery pieces to the federal government. That fulfils a key part of a follow-up agreement that both sides committed to on 12 November in Kenya.

It states that TPLF forces will disband their heavy weaponry “concurrently with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF [federal] forces from the region”.

The disarmament process was overseen by the African Union’s monitoring and verification team, which is composed of military officers from across the continent. After several weeks of delays, they deployed to Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, on 29 December.

However, it is unclear if the TPLF has handed over its entire arsenal. The diplomat in Addis Ababa said the group may have relinquished “the least relevant or most outdated” heavy weapons and kept others, “while waiting for a complete retreat of the Eritreans”.

Increased humanitarian aid

Humanitarian supplies, meanwhile, are flowing freely into most of Tigray after being subject to repeated restrictions throughout the two-year conflict that the UN said brought 400,000 people close to famine.

In total, 3.9 million of the 5.4 million people in Tigray who need humanitarian support have received aid since the ceasefire, according to unpublished UN figures shared with The New Humanitarian.

In the first weeks after the ceasefire was signed, aid agencies reported limitations being placed on their movements within Tigray and the amount of cash they could bring into the region, but these have mostly been lifted, said the senior aid official in Addis Ababa.

“Up until a month ago, we could only work in areas controlled by the government.”

“Up until a month ago, we could only work in areas controlled by the government,” they said. “But since the last week of December, they started letting us into areas outside their control.”

Yet despite these improvements, some areas are still cut off from aid. These include Mai Tsebri, an area claimed by the Amhara region where its forces are allegedly blocking distributions, and Hitsats, which previously housed Eritrean refugees.

Though banks are re-opening Tigray branches – their closure during the war meant people couldn’t access savings to buy food – a lack of cash means withdrawals and transfers are still unavailable.

And while flights have been restored to the region – alongside phone lines and mobile internet after a two-year blackout – journalists have not yet been granted permission to travel to Tigray.

Western Tigray

The ceasefire deal makes no mention of the disputed territory of western Tigray, which was annexed during the war by Amhara forces. They forcibly deported much of the area’s Tigrayan population, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing by the US.

In a speech to parliament in November, Abiy said a referendum could be held to determine the territory’s fate. However, such a poll appears a long way off, and it’s not clear whether displaced people would be able to return home before it is held.

Nor is it clear when Tigray’s government will be dissolved and replaced with a transitional administration ahead of fresh regional elections.

The TPLF’s decision to hold a local election in September 2020 when national ones were suspended on account of the COVID-19 pandemic was a key spark for the conflict.

Though some aspects of the ceasefire are dragging, Ethiopia’s government is keen to rehabilitate its international image and bring back foreign investment after the war cost almost $20 billion in damaged infrastructure and depleted foreign currency reserves.

Western donors are keen to welcome Ethiopia back into the fold – especially as competition for influence in Africa ramps up – though the EU has said this depends upon progress regarding transitional justice and accountability.

Such developments have been limited so far. Only a handful of Ethiopian troops have been convicted for war crimes, and there’s little prospect of justice for victims of Eritrea’s military, which has not indicated it would allow prosecutors to investigate its troops.

Amnesty International, meanwhile, has criticised the ceasefire deal, saying it “fails to offer a clear roadmap on how to ensure accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and overlooks rampant impunity in the country, which could lead to violations being repeated.”

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Eritrea’s consistent defense of its sovereignty and the newfound geostrategic context in which Russia is operating have resulted in Moscow regarding Asmara as politically reliable with respect to being a multipolar partner in its own right, Russia’s gateway to Ethiopia, and a regional logistics center for expanding trade with the Global South.

A Truly Historic Visit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid his first trip to Eritrea last week on the final leg of his latest Africa tour, which was also the first time that any of Russia’s top diplomats visited that country. While there, he met with President Isaias Afwerki and his counterpart Foreign Minister Osman Saleh. The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently published a press release of his visit as well as transcripts of his comments after meeting with President Afwerki and his press conference with Foreign Minister Saleh.

The comprehensive expansion of economic ties, with a focus on developing Massawa’s related connectivity potential, and military ones formed the basis of their discussions according to these official reports. The two sides also talked about further developing their socio-political cooperation as well, including at the regional and UN level. Furthermore, President Afwerki was invited to participate in this summer’s second Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg, which will greatly enhance their ties if he does.

Altogether, it can be concluded that Lavrov’s trip to Eritrea sought to advance Russia’s multipolar strategy for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia functions as the core in this respect due to its much deeper and longer relations with Russia, not to mention its status as a regional leader due to its much larger economy, military, and population. Nevertheless, Eritrea still fulfills a crucial role for Russia in these strategic calculations for several reasons that will now be explained and which put his visit into context.

Eritrea Was A Multipolar Pioneer Even Before Russia

For starters, President Afwerki is a bonafide multipolar revolutionary who’s consistently defended Eritrea’s sovereignty in the face of immense pressure upon it from the US-led West’s Golden Billion in the three decades since independence. He presciently foresaw long ago that the global systemic transition would inevitably move towards multipolarity from its prior state of unipolarity, ergo why he refused to capitulate to that aforementioned de facto New Cold War bloc’s coercion against his country.

Under former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, incumbent President Vladimir Putin’s first two terms, and former President Dmitry Medvedev, Russia admittedly attempted to strike a balance between the Golden Billion and the jointly BRICS- & SCO-led Global South of which it’s a part instead of accelerate the global systemic transition to multipolarity like President Afwerki has always tried to do. It was only after the failure of this grand strategy last February that this Eurasian Great Power emulated Eritrea’s policies.

The decision to commence Russia’s ongoing special operation in Ukraine heralded a defining moment in world history whereby Moscow decisively broke with the Golden Billion and thus began to lead the global systemic transition to multipolarity. To this end, President Putin articulated on several occasions last year what can in hindsight be referred to as his Global Revolutionary Manifesto, which included Foreign Minister Lavrov’s pledge to help African countries fully complete their decolonization processes.

Russia’s Multipolar Strategy In The Horn Of Africa

In practical terms, this takes the form of scaling its “Democratic Security” assistance to various partners like the Central African Republic, Mali, and likely soon (or already according to some reports) Burkina Faso in order to help them counteract Western-exacerbated Hybrid War threats to their societies. Parallelly, Russia passionately defends African countries like Ethiopia at the UN from Western political pressure and is also actively exploring ways to expand real-sector economic cooperation with them too.

Regarding that Horn of Africa giant, Moscow already promised in December 2021 to play an important role in its post-war rehabilitation, which is presently being pursued as a result of last November’s ceasefire. This mutually beneficial goal requires reliable connectivity between them, however, which is impeded by Ethiopia’s landlocked nature. Neither neighboring Djibouti nor Sudan can be depended on since they could both potentially be pressured by their Golden Billion partners into impeding this.

Eritrea, by contrast, has proven that it’ll never allow itself to be influenced by anyone. Accordingly, Russia therefore regards it as the most politically reliable coastal state in the Horn of Africa, which thus enables that country to play the indispensable transit role that Moscow and Addis require for optimizing their noble post-war rehabilitation goal. Eritrea’s newfound geo-economic importance to Russia’s regional strategy therefore explains the timing of Foreign Minister Lavrov’s visit.

With these imperatives in mind, it appears likely that Massawa will function as Russia’s future gateway to Ethiopia, thus enabling Eritrea to benefit from their bilateral trade. Not only does it stand to play an irreplaceable role in facilitating the further comprehensive expansion of the Russian-Ethiopian Strategic Partnership, which is expected to supercharge multipolar processes across the Horn of Africa, but Eritrea is also therefore by default becoming indispensable to each of their respective grand strategies.

Eritrea’s Indispensable Grand Strategic Role

Ethiopia regards now-friendly Eritrea as its most politically reliable means for maximizing economic ties with its Russian partner since Djibouti’s susceptibility to the Golden Billion’s secondary sanctions pressure and outstanding territorial tensions with Sudan make both undependable in this respect. Russia has always remained a pillar of Ethiopian grand strategy, with Moscow’s role being more important than ever nowadays, which thus imbues Eritrea with even greater significance to Addis.

Likewise, Ethiopia has always remained a pillar of Russian grand strategy, but its role is more important than ever nowadays too and thus also imbues Eritrea with an even greater significance to Moscow. The Ethiopian-Eritrean rapprochement overseen by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Afwerki over the past few years also made these neighboring countries each other’s top strategic partner in and of themselves, with this bilateral basis now being built upon to facilitate their respective ties with Russia.

As for Russian-Eritrean relations, ties have been solid since the latter’s independence but are now poised to become unprecedentedly strategic both because of Asmara’s irreplaceable role in facilitating Moscow’s economic engagement with Addis as well as its geostrategic coastal status. Regarding the second-mentioned point, Russia is nowadays focusing on trade ties with the Global South in response to the Golden Billion’s sanctions, which makes regional logistics facilities like Eritrea’s a priority for it.

Concluding Thoughts

Considering the insight that’s been shared in this analysis, several conclusions can therefore be made about Foreign Minister Lavrov’s trip to Eritrea. First, the combination of the global New Cold War context, Russia’s leading role within it, and the regional context of Ethiopia’s peace process explain why Moscow dispatched its top diplomat to that country for the first time in history since these factors collectively imbued Eritrea with a much greater significance for Russia than ever before.

Second, Eritrea’s consistent defense of its sovereignty and the newfound geostrategic context in which Russia is operating have resulted in Moscow regarding Asmara as politically reliable with respect to being a multipolar partner in its own right, Russia’s gateway to Ethiopia, and a regional logistics center for expanding trade with the Global South. And third, Eritrea is thus expected to play an outsized role in shaping the dynamics of the New Cold War in Africa due to these aforementioned factors.

What all of this shows is that Eritrea’s geostrategic star is rising exactly as President Afwerki presciently foresaw would inevitably happen decades ago. Having successfully weathered the twists and turns of his country’s post-independence history, which was by no means easy considering previously fierce tensions with Ethiopia and immense pressure from the Golden Billion, he’s now successfully placed Eritrea in the position to finally reap the benefits of multipolarity that its people truly deserve.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

WASHINGTON — The Somali government has sent thousands of military recruits to nearby countries for training to strengthen the army for its war against al-Shabab militants, according to the national security adviser for the Somali president.

In an exclusive interview on January 26 with VOA Somali, Hussein Sheikh-Ali said Somalia has sent 3,000 soldiers each to Eritrea and Uganda in the past few weeks. He said an additional 6,000 recruits will be sent to Ethiopia and Egypt.

“We want to complete making 15,000 soldiers ready within 2023,” Ali told VOA in the one-on-one interview in Washington where he met with U.S. officials to seek more support for Somalia.

The news comes as a report by the Mogadishu-based think tank Heritage Institute for Political Studies (HIPS) cast doubt that the government will meet its December 2024 deadline to have 24,000 soldiers ready to assume security responsibilities when troops from the African Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) are scheduled to leave.

“This timetable is ambitious because the Somali security services are unlikely to be fully autonomous by then, nor is it likely that al-Shabab will have been militarily defeated,” the report said.

“The deadline and the fact the army is in a war while at the same time they are being rebuilt … we argue it’s a tight deadline,” said Afyare Elmi, executive director of HIPS and the report’s coauthor. “It will be difficult to meet.”

The report noted that in November, the Somali government asked ATMIS to delay the first drawdown of 2,000 soldiers by six months, from December 2022 to June 30, 2023.

Ali said the delay was requested because the troops Somalia is expecting to take over from ATMIS are in training abroad. He also said the government doesn’t want to disrupt military operations against al-Shabab in central Somalia, as the areas ATMIS troops would vacate will have to be taken over by Somali forces.

The Somali government recently brought home most of the 5,000 soldiers who were trained in Eritrea. Ali defended the decision to send more recruits there, calling the plan “transparent.” He said the government is ahead of its training schedule.

He said the government will have 24,000 troops trained and fully equipped by next year.

“There is no reason for ATMIS to stay or to continue to stay in Somalia,” he added.

Ali also made a bold prediction that the government will defeat the militant group by next summer.

“Our … primary goal is that in the summer of 2024, before June or July, that there will be no al-Shabab person occupying a territory in Somalia. You can note that down,” he said.

Financial challenges

The Somali army, working with local clan militia, succeeded in taking several towns and villages in central Somalia from al-Shabab in 2022.

Despite these successes, Somali security forces have other challenges, including financial constraints, and capability and training gaps, the HIPS report said.

The Somali parliament recently approved its biggest-ever budget for 2023 at $967 million, but domestic revenue is very low, and two-thirds of the budget comes from external support. That budget allocates $113 million for the national army.

“To date, the Somali authorities alone cannot afford the army they want,” the report said.

Elmi said building an army without a budgetary plan could result in an unsustainable situation.

“An army is more than paying a salary. So many expenses come with it,” he said.

“We have only emphasized sustainability. We are not specifying a number. We are saying they must be affordable. That affordability is coming from the capacity of the state.”

Capability gaps

The report said ongoing military operations highlighted two major capability gaps for the Somali National Army (SNA). It says the troops suffered from many casualties over the years from improvised explosive devices, lack of equipment and armored personnel carriers, and a shortage of explosive ordnance disposal teams.

The report said Somali army units trained by the United States, known as Danab (Lightning), and Turkey, known as Gorgor (Eagle), are now “reasonably well equipped,” but the regular army units are only marginally better equipped than the Ma’awisley, the local clan militias supporting government forces.

“This inequality is so pronounced that officials now talk about the SNA being effectively two armies — one that is mobile, and one that is largely stationary,” the report says.

The report also highlights struggles in generating and deploying “hold” forces that can stabilize newly recaptured areas.

“There is an important difference between pushing al-Shabab forces out of areas and holding them long enough to deliver a real peace dividend to the local inhabitants,” it said.

The report further said al-Shabab made stabilization efforts much harder by destroying schools, medical facilities, wells and other important infrastructure.

Security and intelligence experts say it’s the responsibility of other government agencies such as police, intelligence and regional paramilitary forces to relieve the army in stabilizing recovered territories.

“To hold the areas seized, to defend themselves and to go forward and seize more territory is difficult for them, both quantity and quality,” said Brigadier General Abdi Hassan Hussein, a former intelligence officer and former police commander of Puntland region.

Hussein said the capacity of Somali soldiers has been affected by a decades-long international weapons embargo on Somalia. He said the United Nations and other stakeholders must look into the issue.

“If the stakeholders do not play a role in this fight and it fails, [peace] will be far away,” Hussein said.

Al-Shabab strategy

Al-Shabab is unwilling to fight the government’s war. It wants to fight its own war and is trying to draw the government into its war, experts on the militant group said.

The militant group has been using an older strategy to withdraw from territories as government forces and local militias approach. But the group’s fighters are not going far, according to former al-Shabab official and defector Omar Mohamed Abu Ayan.

“They are not defending the towns, which they used to do,” said Abu Ayan. “Instead of moving further away, they are hovering around in the forests nearby the towns, and then they send suicide bombers back into the town.”

Abu Ayan also said al-Shabab started withdrawing its money from banks after the government froze funds and shut down hundreds of accounts suspected of having links to the group.

“They developed hostility towards the banks,” he said. “They also called the companies and businesses and asked them to give the money they were supposed to pay them several years in advance, so that they can accumulate more money. They have also reduced their expenses.”

The Somali government announced that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is hosting the heads of states from the “front-line” countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti this week to discuss the war against al-Shabab. Defense ministers and army chiefs from the four countries met in Mogadishu on Tuesday ahead of Wednesday’s summit.

Source: Voice of America