Category: Politics

The 1st millennium B.C. is an important period to understand changes in settlement, technology and economies that gave rise to the development of complex societies in various regions of the African continent. The Horn of Africa saw the development of extensive highland agro-pastoralist village communities as well as elite ritual centers in highland Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. The expansion of cultural exchanges and interaction patterns during the epoch had significant impacts on the development of agro-pastoralism, permanent village settlement and continuation of ritual manifestations.

The 1st millennium B.C. witnessed the culmination of socio-economic and socio-political patterns and processes that began earlier around the 5th millennium. Already established food production strategies blossomed into full-fledged intensive agro-pastoral traditions by the 1st millennium B.C. Pastoralism was coupled with intensive cultivation of domesticated cereals and pulses of both African and Near Eastern origin. Stone tool technology was linked with metal technology as already established ceramic tradition became elaborated.

The 1st millennium communities also developed long established patterns of interaction, further expanding trade engagement with people from surrounding regions. The appearance of new forms of iconography and material culture is a testimony, in one way, of an expansion or intensification of established contacts with other peoples of the southern Red Sea. The elaborate manifestations of interregional cultural contacts appear in places like Matara and Keskese during the 1st millennium B.C., a time of expanded political and commercial activity in much of Africa and the Indian Ocean world.

While continuities are apparent, there are also important discontinuities in settlement between the pre-1st millennium B.C. populations and the 1st millennium B.C. populations in northern Horn of Africa. Such discontinuity is particularly apparent in the settlements that flourished in the Asmara Plateau, where sedentary agro-pastoral communities appear around or just after 900 B.C. The absence of pre-1st millennium cultural layers in the Asmara Plateau is quite unique in the region.

The fact that the communities settled in areas and in concentrations not apparent in the preceding periods had provoked archaeologists to look into the evolution of complex communities in the Horn differently from long-held assumptions and postulations. Many interpretations by scholars interested in the development of complex societies in the northern Horn are based on a view that attributes the development of African social complexity to foreign influences and innovations, stressing one way donor-recipient relations. Near Eastern societies were portrayed as bestowing civilizations on African communities.

Interpretations focusing on external influences as the primary catalyst for complex societies and state development in the Horn of Africa were not critically assessed prior to the findings from the Greater Asmara and this edition of the column will highlight how ancient 1st millennium B.C. settled communities in the Asmara plateau have helped shape/ change previously held perspectives of social complexity in this part of the Horn. The local elements of the settled communities in the Asmara plateau are emphasized to show how they differ from contemporaneous highland civilization in the northern Horn.

The highlands around Asmara supported the earliest settled agro-pastoral communities known in the Horn between 800 B.C. and 400 B.C. These communities predate and are in one way contemporaneous with 1st millennium B.C. settlements in central highlands of Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. The agro-pastoral settlements that flourished around Asmara are seen as vital precursors to the later mid-1st millennium B.C. urban settlements in the central highlands of Eritrea at sites such as Matara, Keskese and perhaps Qohaito. The demographic complexity seen at the sites around Asmara between 800 B.C. – 400 B.C. is an extraordinary period in the ancient history of the Horn.

A constellation of settlements was distributed over much of the plateau and various excavations at the sites of Sembel, Ona Gudo, Mai Husta, Weki Duba, Adi Segdo, Adi Abieto and Mai Chihot provided key insights into the variation of the settlements in the region. The excavations uncovered architectural remains and several household units further providing important evidence of daily life including diet, economy, ritual and ideological life, trade and domestic activities. Two phases of settlement history have been understood in the Greater Asmara Area, with both the earlier and later phases particularly demonstrating the nature of social organization in the region.

Dates from the archaeological sites of Sembel, Mai-Hutsa, Ona Gudo range from the 9th century B.C. to the 4th century B.C. implying the earlier phases of the settlements can be understood from these sites. Similarly, radio carbon dates from Mai Chihot site provide perspectives on the later phases of the 1st millennium B.C. settlements in the Asmara plateau. Dates from Mai Chihot fall within the spectrum of 300 B.C. to 220 B.C. and the interpretation is further corroborated by the very different material culture and architecture at the site.

The settlements in general represent an agro-pastoral society living in communities of varying size from scattered homesteads to villages and small towns with a high regional population density. The settlements in the Asmara Plateau are characterized by few or little evidence of architectural features making them distinct from ceremonial or ritual centers like Matara and Keskese which flourished in the mid-1st millennium B.C. The settlement history, especially in the main settlement phases is marked by a high degree of egalitarianism and thus far with few signs of social or political differentiation, perhaps a characteristic that arises partly out of pastoral roots.

As far as diet is concerned, the communities relied heavily on domesticated animals where sheep, goats and cattle provided the bulk of the diet. The diet was supplemented by mammals, domestic chicken and game birds from the natural surroundings in sites like Mai Chihot. Moreover, macro-botanical remains that were recovered from domestic food preparation areas point that the communities were fully agro-pastoral during the earliest occupation of the region, planting crops such as emmer, bread wheat, lentils and linseed early on, and adding taf towards the mid- 1st millennium B.C.

The communities that flourished in the Asmara plateau by the 1st millennium B.C. also distinctively developed an extensive network of gold mining as communities were located nearby gold mines. Evidence from Ona Gudo and Weki Duba reveal the demographic complexity resultant of the exploitation of the gold mines. The manufacture of bull´s head fashioned out of chipped and ground stones also united the communities around ritual and ideological manifestations. The objects are commonly scattered over the central part of the Asmara plateau between 700-500 B.C.

In conclusion, the claims that peoples of the highlands of Eritrea owed their cultural genesis to interactions with the peoples of the South Arabian Peninsula of the Nile basin are not reflected in the Asmara plateau. The majority of the communities in the Asmara Plateau grew in an organic manner and evidence for monumental architecture, epigraphic evidence and specialized funerary ceramics is virtually lacking. Only towards the terminal stage of the settlements do we see instances of differences in material culture and architecture that possibly mark social differentiation.

The coming of bronze objects and beads reveal a change linked to the rise of elites in settlements like Matara in the later stages. Such objects were uncovered from Mai Chihot and Mai-Temenai and elaborate funerary treatments reflected in items like bronze tweezers, bracelets, earrings as well as beads which may point to a presence of small elite. Ceramics from Mai-Temenai show affinities to Yeha further demonstrating the rise of elites in the early 4th century B.C.

Yet, these objects are not manifest in the majority of settlements in the Asmara Plateau further compelling archaeologists to conclude that the 1st millennium B.C. communities were urban precursors to the civilizations which started to flourish in the central highlands of Eritrea by mid-1st millennium B.C. The local agency demonstrated in the settlements around Asmara also helped critically envisage the development of social complexity in the Horn of Africa during the period, a phenomenon that for long was ascribed to external influences.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

The Philosopher, George Santayana, is known for declaring that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This saying speaks to the importance of remembering history. Highlighting the importance of history, Howard Zinn also wrote: “If you don’t know history it is as if you were born yesterday. And if you were born yesterday, anybody up there in a position of power can tell you anything, and you have no way of checking upon it.” In Eritrea there are numerous historically important dates worth remembering. Here are some of the important dates that happened in the month of March.

March 9, 1975, Black Sunday in Akordet: Successive Ethiopian governments intensified genocidal acts to crush the armed resistance of the Eritrean people and pursued a scorched earth policy of destruction and terror to impair the fighting spirit of Eritreans. Black Sunday of Akordet was part of the many barbaric and brutal killings of innocent Eritreans. On that cursed day people were dragged from their houses and a mosque to be slain like animals. Soldiers tore pregnant mothers’ wombs and severed the heads of children and the elderly. The aim of the mass killings in Akordet, like other places of Eritrea, was to terrorize and demoralize the people.

A former senior Ethiopian government official, who was by no means sympathetic to the Eritrean legitimate cause for national liberation, said “The army made a crucial error in this operation; it did not concentrate on attacking the guerrillas directly; instead it devastated the villages suspected of harboring them.” Recounting his personal memory, he further writes: “I remember soldiers slaughtering cattle, eating what they wanted, and then leaving the rest to rot. Sometimes soldiers would kill cattle just to get the livers.”

The immediate cause of the March 9, 1975 massacre was the assassination of a security officer in Akordet by freedom fighters. When Major General Werku Chernet came to see the Ethiopian army based in Barka, he held a meeting in Akordet. In the midst of the meeting he heard the news about the assassination of the well known Ethiopian agent in the town. Before leaving the town, the general gave an order to his subordinates to kill the inhabitants of the town. The atrocious massacre started at around 4:15 pm and continued well up to 7:00 o’clock. Within three hours, more than 375 innocent people were killed and more than 350 houses burned. Eritreans refer to the day as ‘Black Sunday.’

March 23, 1977, the liberation of Nakfa: During its first congress, the EPLF had resolved to continue the strategy of ‘liberating the land and the people step by step.’ Karora was the first town to be liberated; it was liberated in January 1977. Nakfa was second and was liberated in March 1977 following a siege that lasted six months. Nakfa was a symbol of resilience and perseverance. The Ethiopian army fought many deadly battles to regain Nakfa shouting “Nakfa or death” but to no avail. Nakfa saved the symbolic and material aspects of the Eritrean struggle for independence. In recognition of Nakfa’s incredible role during the struggle for independence, Eritrea’s currency is named Nakfa.

March 26, 1983, the seventh or stealth offensive of the Derg: This offensive was different from the military campaigns before it because it was conducted without fanfare. It lasted five months until the EPLF forces carried out a counter offensive. The Derg initiated the military campaign because it thought that the EPLF had been weakened during the sixth offensive in 1982. It’s true that the sixth offensive drained more than half of the EPLF’s combatants. But the numerical disadvantage of the EPLF was compensated by its fighters’ perseverance, dedication and creativity. During the seventh offensive, the Derg army sustained a heavy loss: around 25,000 dead and wounded.

March 19-21, 1984, the demise of Wuqaw Command in North Eastern Sahel: Following the strategic withdrawal of the EPLF in 1978 up to 1983, the Ethiopian army had a relatively superior position over the freedom fighter. But after the sixth (1982) and seventh (1983) offensive attacks, the war entered a stage of stalemate. The EPLF withstood the strongest offensive attacks the enemy had ever launched. This success boosted the EPLF’s morale to launch counter-offensive attacks to end the stalemate and change the balance of power in its favor. The EPLF’s offensive on March 19, 1984 against Wuqaw Command garrisoned in North Eastern Sahel, marked the beginning of the burial of the Ethiopian army in Sahel. The surprise attack by Eritrean freedom fighters drowned the Ethiopian army into the Red Sea. The Derg lost around 7000 soldiers in the plains of Sahel.

March 17-19, 1988, the demise of Nadew Command and the liberation of Afabet: After the second and unity congress, the EPLF had decided to intensify its military operations. On March 17 Eritrean People’s Liberation Army (EPLA) began its most comprehensive military offensive to annihilate Nadew Command and liberate the town of Afabet. The Nadew command was a 22,000-strong army, stationed permanently at Nakfa and Afabet fronts for nine years. As planned, the EPLA destroyed the Nadew Command and liberated Afabet within 48 hours. The strongest of the Ethiopian army couldn’t withstand the offensive of the EPLA. Afabet, which since 1979 had been the main garrison town of Ethiopia’s strongest army, fell in the hands of the EPLA on March 19. The center of gravity of the Ethiopian army was smashed and the Derg lost one of its most experienced and war-hardened army of 18,000. Lt. Col. Afewerki Wassae, political commissar of the Ethiopian army in Eritrea, and three Soviet officers were captured. In the operation 50 tanks, 100 trucks and a large number of light and heavy weapons were seized.

The battle of Afabet was described by historian Basil Davidson as “the biggest victory ever scored by a liberation movement anywhere since Dien Bien Phu.”

March 12 – 19, 1987, the Second and Unity Congress of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front (Central Leadership) conducted: the Congress was attended by 1,287 representatives of freedom fighters and civilians, nationalist organizations, representatives of 25 governments, political parties and organizations. As national heroes, two elderly Eritrean political leaders, Woldeab Woldemariam, in person, and Sheik Ibrahim Sultan, via video, delivered messages of unity and heroism to the participants. A Central Committee was elected and in turn the Central Committee elected Issaias Afwerki as the Secretary General of the EPLF.

March 29, 1991, EPLF released three Soviet prisoners of war: The Derg received unrestricted material and military support from the Soviet Union, which sent senior army officers to plan and lead the war in Eritrea. After years of fighting, for the first time, three Soviet military advisors (two colonels and a lieutenant), had fallen in EPLF’s hands during the Operation that crushed Nadew Command.

March 14-16, 1999, crushing intensive offensive by TPLF units against Eritrean position in Egrimekel: On 14th March 1999, the TPLF-led government of Ethiopia started an attack to break the defense lines of Eritrean Defense Forces in Egrimekel with huge human wave and strong armory. This battle demonstrated the fighting capabilities of Eritrean forces. TPLF units were destroyed egregiously. In the battle 50 tanks were burned, one MI-35 helicopter was shot down while 30 tanks were captured by Eritrean forces. The humiliating defeat of the TPLF army was witnessed and reported by Eritrean and foreign journalists.

When we speak about remembering the past our focus should not be on single and scattered events. Historical events should be studied not in isolation, but by making connections to the bigger picture.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

H.R.6600 is a foreign policy mistake which would appoint Washington imperialist judge of Ethiopian domestic affairs. Jon Abbink March 30, 2022| 12:01 am The Russian assault on Ukraine is pushing other global conflicts into the shadows, but the latter keep festering nonetheless. Some of these will also have important geostrategic consequences. One of them is the still ongoing armed conflict in Ethiopia, initiated by the TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front) with a massive and unprovoked attack the night of November 3, 2020. The United States has not played an enlightening role in the conflict, as it primarily blamed the federal government for the violence. Politically, U.S. efforts over the past year and a half have been even marked by undue interference and sanctimoniousness. U.S. policy circles have not demonstrated honest understanding of the war, of its context, and of the means to help end it. The State Department as well as USAID (which is self-admittedly an arm of U.S. foreign policy) have rarely sided with Ethiopian government efforts to bring this conflict to an end and seem to have condoned the TPLF—incorrectly equating it with the Tigrayan people. The U.S. Congress has not stayed far behind the executive branch foreign policy establishment. The latest Ethiopia gaffes to be produced by the United States will be in the discussion and voting on H.R.6600, proposed in Congress on February 4 by Rep. Tom Malinowski (D, New Jersey), and Rep. Young Kim (R, California). The initiative is surrealistically called the “Ethiopia Stabilization, Peace, and Democracy Act.” In practice, it will do more of the opposite: produce destabilization, hinder peace, and undermine the democracy in Ethiopia. Here is why. In brief the bill says that the State Department is required to develop a plan for supporting democracy and human rights in Ethiopia, including plans to combat hate speech online and support accountability measures for atrocities and efforts to buttress a national dialogue. Moreover, it proposes that the U.S. president impose sanctions on individuals who undermine negotiations to end the conflict, commit human rights abuses, exacerbate corruption, or provide weapons to any hostile party. The bill suggests that security assistance to the government of Ethiopia should be suspended until it ceases offensive operations, takes steps towards a national dialogue, improves protection of human rights, allows unfettered humanitarian access to conflict areas, and investigates allegations of war crimes. The bill also determines that the U.S. must oppose loans or other financial assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF to the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea unless for humanitarian purposes, until they take steps to end the war and restore respect for human rights. It concludes that a determination from the State Department is required concerning allegations of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Ethiopia. This series of proposals is a program of unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia, based on a lot of ignorance and bias. Many of the conflict issues and food aid efforts are under the brief of the Ethiopian government and are being addressed already as much as their financial means allow. Nowhere does the bill mention the TPLF and its war actions. This is surprising if not laughable; it almost looks like TPLF people were co-drafters of the legislation. The target of the sanctions and strictures in the bill are Ethiopian and Eritrean government people. Again, no one denies that the humanitarian problems in Tigray are serious and painful: There is a huge lack of food supplies, fuel, medical facilities, etc. In the early phase of the conflict there were unlawful killings and expulsions by federal army soldiers, Eritrean soldiers, and militias—in a spiral of TPLF-induced violence. But Ethiopian federal force excesses were and are being tackled via the courts. TPLF violence and abuse is not: Impunity reigns, as the TPLF does not call any of its forces to account. In the course of 2021, notably after their rejection of a government ceasefire offer in June, the TPLF’s violence was dramatically expanded in the Amhara and Afar Regions in a spirit of revenge and destruction. The onus of initiating, perpetrating, and sustaining the violence thus lies with the TPLF. And there has been no more ground fighting in the Tigray Region since June 2021: All of it occurs in the Afar and Amhara regions, still partly occupied as of March 2022. Any serious analysis would reveal that responsibility for the huge damage, the large number of victims, and the abhorrent nature of the violence as a war policy was on the TPLF side. The problems were compounded by hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Amhara and Afar Regions made international displaced persons by the TPLF; they are still waiting in camps, with nothing but their bare clothes as possessions. In addition, many in western Ethiopia are still terrorized by the “Oromo Liberation Army,” allied to the insurgent TPLF and engaged in what some are describing as an “ethnic cleansing” operation—they are not mentioned in the H.R. bill either. The same goes for Gumuz violent rebels in the west, who appear to get support in Sudan, probably with Egyptian backing. On March 24, the Ethiopian government proclaimed a “humanitarian truce.” The TPLF, fearing to lose the propaganda battle, later that same day issued a bizarre statement indicating that they accepted the idea. Unfortunately, it was not a clear commitment. TPLF has not shown an interest in stability or cessation of conflict, neither in Ethiopia as a whole nor in “its own” region, Tigray. New fighting continued to erupt even after their statement on cessation of hostilities. In response to the bill, Ethiopian government spokesperson Dina Mufti said: “The [H.R.6600] bill doesn’t measure up to the level of historic relationship between Ethiopia and the United States.” That is putting it in an admirably mild way. The bill would be an unprecedented and an unjustifiable blow to an elected government and will jeopardize a long and dynamic relationship between two countries. It would alienate not only the Ethiopian government but also the Ethiopian people from the U.S., and regrettably so, because most Ethiopians value a good relationship with America. Millions of Ethiopians have family and friends living there, thousands have studied there, and economic and strategic relations are important. To jeopardize this growing and often mutually beneficial relationship is irresponsible. The H.R.6600 bill and its aggressive and arrogant tone would add extra damage to the situation, after the already absurd delisting of Ethiopia from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which is only hurting ordinary workers and not members of the government. As law, H.R.6600 would even be imperialist: The Biden Administration could wield control over Ethiopia in social media, traveling, domestic politics, economic affairs, international loans, etc. under a 10-year sanctions regime. Ethiopia’s right to economic development would in fact be denied; as it says in Section 6(c) of the bill, Ethiopians would only benefit from support for projects on “basic services.” These economic impacts would also lead Ethiopia to intensify relations with China. Apart from its intrinsic failings, H.R.6600—if made law—would impose a harsh regime on Ethiopia that will not be productive or bring the desired results; only more socio-economic hardship and misery will follow. If the U.S. Congress wants to see stabilization, peace, and democracy efforts in Ethiopia, it will do well to start developing a more balanced approach to the Ethiopian conundrum. A better approach should be based on an analysis of what in fact happened: an armed insurgency by a rogue party that aimed to overthrow the federal government and went on to destabilize the country by war, mass killings, destruction, and economic sabotage. While the Ethiopian government can be urged to do more, it is time for the U.S. to put heavy pressure on the TPLF and call them to abandon armed insurgency and be accountable under the law. The severe sanctions approach in H.R.6600 smacks of the sanctions against Russia in the Ukraine war. But Ethiopia is not Russia. H.R.6600 is entirely unhelpful and should go where it belongs, in the dustbin. * Jon Abbink is a senior researcher at the African Studies Centre and professor of Politics and Governance in Africa at Leiden University. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Ethiopia’s ethnically divided Map ruled by 20th/21st Warlords… * Tunaydbah, Sudan – 10 February 2021; Ethiopian refugee steps out of bus. Ethiopian refugees live in Um Rakuba refugee camp in Sudan. (Amors photos/Shutterstock)…

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

By Peter Mwai BBC Reality Check March 29, 2022 The United Nations says there is a severe shortage of food and humanitarian supplies in northern Ethiopia’s region of Tigray as a consequence of the ongoing conflict there. The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels have agreed a humanitarian truce to allow aid into the region, but both have accused the other side of continuing to obstruct deliveries. More than 90% of the population in the region is in urgent need of assistance, according to the UN. • Aid delivery only possible by air No aid trucks have successfully delivered aid to Tigray since mid-December. So aid agencies have been forced to transport supplies by air. This is far more costly and delivers only minimal supplies. “Planes carry less cargo at 25 times the cost of truck convoys” says Samantha Power, of the US international development agency (USAID). “Trucking means more food for war-torn Tigray, but the Ethiopian government continues to block access for trucks.” During the first week of March, only 100 metric tonnes of humanitarian supplied were transported via air to Mekelle, the regional capital of Tigray, according to the UN, far less than is needed. About half a million children are estimated to be lacking food in Tigray, including more than 115,000 severely malnourished. Families are exhausting all remaining means to access food, with three quarters of the population reported to be using extreme coping strategies to survive, the UN says. “The level of food insecurity is expected to worsen in the coming months as remaining food stocks from the last harvest, which was half of normal year production, get depleted.” • What’s blocking overland routes into Tigray? UN aid agencies estimate that 100 trucks carrying food, non-food items and fuel, are required to the deliver the required aid into Tigray every day. But the main routes have been blocked for many months due to the ongoing conflict. Continued fighting in the border region between Tigray and neighbouring Afar province to the east has made that route too dangerous. Roads from the Amhara region to the south and Sudan to the west have also been closed as opposing militia contest for control of these areas. There is no access either via Tigray’s northern border with Eritrea. • What does the government say? The Ethiopian government rejects claims that Ethiopia is blocking aid, blaming the rebels of the TPLF instead. It says that an aid convoy set off from Semera, the capital of Afar province on 17 March, bound for Mekelle, raising hopes that the main overland route would be operational once again. But no aid convoy has yet reached there. The TPLF have denied government accusations that they are to blame for disrupting the aid. “At no time before, during or after the fighting have aid trucks been prevented from passing through into Tigray by Tigray forces,” it has said. • Fuel scarcity a challenge In addition to other supplies, availability of fuel has been a key issue. The government has been restricting movement of fuel into Tigray for many months, which has severely affected the distribution of aid within Tigray. “With no fuel, even if we can get supplies in, getting them to where they need to go is very difficult, or impossible,” says WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. • Humanitarian convoys are facing severe problems accessing the Tigray region For many months, the Ethiopian government was also restricting movement of medical supplies. The WHO was however allowed to airlift some supplies in February. It estimates that 2,200 tonnes of emergency health supplies are needed to respond to urgent health needs in Tigray. Only 221 tonnes have so far been delivered – just about 4% of what is needed. •••••••••• * Map showing Tigray and other regions with key places * Women seen in a camp for internally displaced persons in Afar regionImage source, Getty Images Image caption, * An Internally Displaced Person (IDP), fleeing from violence in the Metekel zone in Western Ethiopia, holds a bowl with food at a camp in Chagni, Ethiopia, on January 27, 2021.Image source, AFP * WFP trucks parked at a checkpoint along the Amhara and Tigray regions borderImage source, Reuters Image caption,

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

The agenda of the first African tour made by the newly appointed Chinese envoy to the Horn of Africa did not tackle the controversial GERD dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Mohamed Saied @MohamedSaiedF March 29, 2022 As China presents itself as a supporter of stability in the Horn of Africa, the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan failed to make it to the agenda of the newly appointed Chinese envoy during his first tour of the region. Xue Bing, China’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa, landed in Ethiopia as part of an African tour that he started March 12. On March 14, Xue held talks with Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Demeke Mekonnen, during which they discussed relations between the two countries and joint projects. In February, China appointed Xue to support efforts aimed at overcoming security challenges in the conflict-ridden region, including in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, as Beijing is seeking to preserve its interests and enhance its geopolitical influence at the expense of the United States, its competitor in the region. Besides Ethiopia, Xue’s tour included Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. During his meeting with Xue, Mekonnen praised his country’s long-term relations with China. In a statement by the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, Mekonnen lauded “China’s support in international fora, which has helped Ethiopia thwart threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” China, along with Russia, has repeatedly used its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to prevent any condemnation of the violations committed by the Ethiopian government against the rebels in the northern region of Tigray, as Beijing considers the issue to be a domestic affair and not a UN matter. China also opposed US sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea, which are accused of committing rape and brutal massacres in Tigray. Its support has not been political only, as it has provided military support as well. According to the website oryxspioenkop for security and defense affairs, China supported the government of Abiy Ahmed with drones in the war. As for the GERD dispute, Mekonnen said during his meeting with Xue that China’s constructive stance on the issue of the dam in support of the principle of “African solution to African problems” is commendable. The giant $5 billion hydroelectric dam project that Addis Ababa is building on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the Nile River, has raised tensions with Egypt and Sudan, which fear it will limit their supplies of vital Nile waters. For more than a decade, Egypt and Sudan have failed to persuade Ethiopia to agree to a legal agreement regulating the filling and operation of the dam. In the summer of last year, tensions increased when Ethiopia announced the completion of the second filling of the dam reservoir despite Egypt and Sudan’s rejection of the unilateral decision. This Ethiopian move came months after a diplomatic upheaval that culminated in repeated Egyptian statements that implied the possibility of military action against the dam in the event Addis Ababa embarks on such a step. In the summer of 2021, Cairo and Khartoum managed to push toward adding the GERD issue to the agenda of the UN Security Council despite Ethiopia’s rejection of this step. Subsequently, the Security Council issued a presidential statement calling on the three countries to continue their talks under the auspices of the African Union, which has since sought to resume negotiations, to no avail. Meanwhile, China’s position on the dam issue at the Security Council meeting did not live up to the expectations of Egypt’s decision-makers. China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun said in a speech at the Security Council meeting that his country believes that through joint efforts the GERD can become a tripartite development project to promote win-win cooperation. This position was considered supportive of the Ethiopian point of view on the issue. In his statements after the session, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said that the position of states in the council is subject to political considerations, alignments and intertwining interests. Egyptian writer and Sen. Emad al-Din Hussein described China’s position as very negative. In an article titled “Those who let us down at the Security Council,” Hussein called on the Egyptian administration to reevaluate its relations with all countries, including China, on the basis of these countries’ supportive or opposing position on the dam issue. Kjetil Tronvoll, professor of peace and conflict studies at Oslo New University College, told Al-Monitor that China’s noninterference policy is a key guiding principle, so they try to shy away from the domestic disputes and issues of tension, such as the GERD or the Tigray war. However, Tronvoll sees that this should not necessarily be looked upon with concern by Egypt or Sudan; China needs also to maintain relations with them. China has close political and economic relations with the three countries, but it has yet to engage or present itself as a mediator to try to settle the conflict, which may erupt at any moment, and its repercussions may affect the already volatile region. Joshua Meservey, senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, told Al-Monitor that China understands what a contentious issue the dam is, but wishes to avoid being drawn into the dispute between the parties with which it has close relations. “China likely wishes for the dispute to end but prefers that other countries take the risks involved in mediation, while it reaps the benefits cost-free,” Meservey said. He noted that Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of Chinese loans and FDI in Africa, one of China’s largest African trade partners. “Beijing does not want to endanger any of that,” he added. Chinese companies are heavily investing in Ethiopia’s textile, pharmaceutical, construction and manufacturing industries. China also views Ethiopia as a hub for the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to expand its commercial influence into the Horn of Africa. According to the Ethiopian Investment Authority, Ethiopia had approved by the end of June 2020 more than 1,500 investment projects from China amounting to $2.7 billion, thus accounting for 25% of the total direct investment projects in Ethiopia. China’s loans to Ethiopia totaled more than $13 billion between 2000 and 2019. Beijing also holds more than 50% of Addis Ababa’s foreign debt. Of note, China contributed to the financing of the GERD project, as it provided a loan of about $1 billion to help build transmission lines to and from Addis Ababa to provide the services necessary for the construction of the dam. Beijing is also investing $1.8 billion to finance the expansion of Ethiopia’s electricity grid. Two Chinese companies are involved in building the dam. But China has huge investments in Egypt and Sudan as well. In Egypt, Chinese banks are involved in financing the new administrative capital, which is being built outside Cairo, with the Chinese government’s Construction Engineering Corporation being one of the main contractors. The volume of Chinese direct investments in Egypt amounted to $190 million, while the volume of trade exchange amounted to $14.5 billion in 2020. Egypt is also an important country for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and serves as a gateway for Chinese goods to markets in the African continent. Meanwhile, China has for years been Khartoum’s largest trading partner, and Sudan was one of the first countries to sign the Belt and Road Agreement, which Beijing considers important given its strategic ports on the Red Sea. The volume of trade between the two countries amounted to $2.8 billion in 2017, accounting for 21% of Sudan’s total imports and exports. Chinese investments in Sudan are spread across the oil, infrastructure, agriculture and mining sectors. John Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, told Al-Monitor that the GERD crisis vividly illustrates the dilemmas that China faces in expanding relations with regional countries that are in conflict with each other. He said, “To date, China’s standard diplomatic response to such conflicts has been to hew closely to its foundational principles of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ strive to maintain strict neutrality, call for restraint, encourage a negotiated settlement, keep open channels of communication with all sides and occasionally offer bland peace proposals.” An Egyptian official told Al-Monitor that his country is still counting on its international partners, including China, to play a greater role in settling the dam dispute. Egypt and Sudan hope to resume negotiations that have been frozen for nearly a year with Ethiopia, before Addis Ababa begins filling the dam’s reservoir for the third time in the upcoming rainy season in June-September. As for whether Beijing can play a role in resolving the Nile issue, Calabrese pointed out this would depend on whether it wants to and whether all the disputants would welcome Chinese mediation. However, he said, “At the present time, I do not see either of those conditions operative.” ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Media staff members watch a live image of China’s President Xi Jinping speaking at the media center of the United Nations Biodiversity Conference, Kunming, Yunnan province, China, Oct. 12, 2021. STR/AFP via Getty Images

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Many remember Moscow’s support for liberation from colonial rule, and a strong anti-imperialist feeling remains

Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni in 2019.

Jason Burke in Johannesburg

Mon 28 Mar 2022 08.12 BST

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Twelve hours after its forces attacked Ukraine last month, Russian government officials and senior soldiers in South Africa gathered at a comfortable residence in the city of Pretoria for a cocktail reception to celebrate Russian Motherland Defenders’ Day.

The host was the Russian ambassador, Ilya Rogachev, and his guests included the South African minister of defence as well as the head of the country’s armed forces. Neither saw any reason to shun the gathering as many other nations’ officials did, nor to apologise afterwards.

Attendance was “integral to the fulfilment of defence international affairs”, a government spokesperson said.

Vladimir Putin speaks to South African president Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa summit in 2019.

Support from many African leaders and governments for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – or at least reluctance to condemn it – has dismayed western officials.

At the UN general assembly resolution 17 African nations abstained – almost half all abstentions – and one voted against condemning Russia for its ‘aggression’ and demanding a withdrawal from Ukraine, though a majority of African countries gave it their backing. The resolution passed by 141 to 5.

Some observers have raised the possibility of a new strategic split across Africa, similar to that during the cold war.

“It harks back to cold war days and the divisions we saw then. But … the objective reality of the international system is so different now this raises a lot of questions about some African countries’ commitment to the post-cold war order and its values,” said Priyal Singh, researcher at Institute for Strategic Studies in Pretoria.

Since the ambassador’s party, the ruling African National Congress party in South Africa has doubled down on its refusal to criticise Russia, saying it hopes to remain neutral and encourage dialogue.

Others on the continent have followed a similar line, calling for peace but blaming Nato’s eastward expansion for the war, complaining of western “double standards” and resisting all calls to criticise Russia.

That the new divide looks like the one which split Africa decades ago is no coincidence. Many countries across the continent are still ruled by parties that were supported by Moscow during their struggles for liberation from colonial or white supremacist rule, analysts say. Though few among their youthful populations experienced the bitter battles of the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s, leaders of ruling parties in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique remember how Soviet weapons, cash and advisers helped win freedom.

Emmerson Mnangagwa, the president of Zimbabwe, has described both Russia and China as “dependable pillars for many years” which “assisted us in our fight for independence, but equally … to defend our sovereignty against the sustained onslaught by our detractors,” a reference to western sanctions on Zimbabwe, imposed after human rights abuses under the regime of Robert Mugabe.

Mozambique also abstained at the UN, arguing like others that it hoped to encourage dialogue to resolve the violence. So too did Algeria, once seen as a “revolutionary” state close to Moscow.

In recent years Russia has moved to exploit such historic links, underlining ties in public statements, at big conferences and on repeated trips across Africa by foreign minster Sergei Lavrov. Moscow has also pushed its agenda through covert social media networks which portray Moscow as on the side of Africans against western “imperialists”.

Such efforts have focused on unstable parts of Africa, which Moscow sees as a fertile ground for intervention, and have reaped significant rewards in places like Central African Republic and Mali, where resentment of former colonial power France already ran deep.

“In the Sahel there is a strong anti-western feeling, an anti-imperialist tendency in public opinion and anti-imperialist means anti-US and the west,” said Pauline Bax, deputy director of the Africa Programme at the International Crisis Group.

Mali has recently renewed ties with Moscow after a military takeover there, and the country’s new rulers have called in paramilitary mercenaries linked to the Kremlin to fight Islamic insurgents as French and other western troops withdraw. The Wagner group is run by a businessman who is a close associate of President Putin and is now thought to be present in at least six African countries, including the CAR and Sudan which both abstained at the UN. Boris Johnson announced sanctions against Wagner on Thursday.

Sudan has also tilted closer to Moscow in recent months. The country, where a military coup last year derailed a fragile transition to democratic rule, has concluded a big deal offering Russia a port on Africa’s eastern coast for 25 years. Eritrea – the only nation on the continent to vote against the UN motion– is a brutally repressive authoritarian state which Moscow has also wooed.

Other Russian ties across the continent are strengthened through investment in mining, financial loans and the sale of agricultural equipment or nuclear technology. Rosatom, the Russian state corporation involved with military and civil use of nuclear energy, has sought to expand in Africa in recent years. Russia was the largest arms exporter to sub-Saharan Africa in 2016–20, supplying almost a third of total sub-Saharan arms imports, up from a quarter in 2011–15, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Western officials have been particularly disappointed by Uganda, which has received huge sums of western aid. A once close relationship with the US and the UK has soured over the crushing of political dissent and western pressure to recognise LGBT rights. Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, has accused the west of interfering in domestic affairs.

Protesters outside the Uganda High Commission in London urging the president not to sign an anti-LGBT bill in 2015.

Museveni’s influential son and aspirant successor, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, said on Twitter that “the majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine”.

Uganda’s UN representative said Uganda abstained from the vote on the UN resolution to protect its neutrality as the next chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, a cold war-era group of 120 member states that includes almost every African nation. However Museveni has made little effort to hide his sympathies, criticising the west’s “aggression against Africa” and describing Russia as the “centre of gravity” for the Balkans, like China in south-east Asia.

Nicholas Sengoba, a columnist with Uganda’s Daily Monitor newspaper, said that many authoritarian African leaders like Museveni were pleased to see Putin “stand up to the big boys in the west.”

Analysts say that more recent examples of what is seen as western ‘neo-imperialism” also influences the reaction of many in Africa to the conflict.

“The 2011 Libyan crisis and the Nato intervention there, instability in the Sahel and other experiences mean that many countries buy into the wariness of western dominance and believe that we need a global counterpoint … Russia is seen as representative of the former Soviet Union in this regard,” said Singh.

Reports that some African students have faced discrimination from security officials and others in Ukraine as they attempt to flee the conflict, magnified by social media, have also prompted anger in Nigeria and elsewhere.

But it is unclear how far the positions taken by often elderly leaders reflects broader sentiments, especially among younger populations. The war in Ukraine has laid bare political, social and other divides within countries, as well as among them.

In South Africa, the populist leftwing Economic Freedom Fighters praised Moscow’s action to “avert … a patent and clear security threat to Russian territory and people by Nato forces, and particularly the US”, while the centre right Democratic Alliance projected the colours of the Ukrainian flag on to the provincial parliament in Cape Town, a city it runs, and said it joined “the global condemnation of Russia’s attack on Ukrainian civilians, mostly women and children.”

The anti-western and anti-Nato stance of some on the continent risks overshadowing the early stance against the invasion of Ukraine taken by the African Union, and the speech made by Kenya’s ambassador to the UN, Martin Kimani, who argued that as Africans had suffered imperialist violence themselves for centuries they should not condone efforts to alter or impose frontiers by force.l

“It’s important to note that a majority of African nations voted in favour [of the UN resolution] and that regional and continental bodies such as the African Union or the ECOWAS [a West Africa grouping] were quite quick to condemn Moscow,” said Bax.

One recent study found that the 27 African countries that voted for the UN resolution were mostly democracies and all western allies, often actively involved in joint military operations. Most of those that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, were authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

The Charge d’Affairs at the Eritrean Embassy in Kuwait Mr. Humed Yahiya met and held talks with Assistant Foreign Minister of Kuwait for African Affairs, Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed, focusing on strengthening bilateral relations.

At the meeting, Mr. Humed and Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed highlighting on the overall progress of the bilateral relations between Eritrea and Kuwait held talks on investment opportunities and economic cooperation.

Both sides also agreed the implementation of the cooperation protocol the two countries previously signed on various sectors including education and health.

Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed, Assistant Foreign Minister of Kuwait for African Affairs expressed his country’s readiness to expand and develop relations with Eritrea and other Eastern African countries.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea