Category: Politics

By Peter Mwai BBC Reality Check March 29, 2022 The United Nations says there is a severe shortage of food and humanitarian supplies in northern Ethiopia’s region of Tigray as a consequence of the ongoing conflict there. The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels have agreed a humanitarian truce to allow aid into the region, but both have accused the other side of continuing to obstruct deliveries. More than 90% of the population in the region is in urgent need of assistance, according to the UN. • Aid delivery only possible by air No aid trucks have successfully delivered aid to Tigray since mid-December. So aid agencies have been forced to transport supplies by air. This is far more costly and delivers only minimal supplies. “Planes carry less cargo at 25 times the cost of truck convoys” says Samantha Power, of the US international development agency (USAID). “Trucking means more food for war-torn Tigray, but the Ethiopian government continues to block access for trucks.” During the first week of March, only 100 metric tonnes of humanitarian supplied were transported via air to Mekelle, the regional capital of Tigray, according to the UN, far less than is needed. About half a million children are estimated to be lacking food in Tigray, including more than 115,000 severely malnourished. Families are exhausting all remaining means to access food, with three quarters of the population reported to be using extreme coping strategies to survive, the UN says. “The level of food insecurity is expected to worsen in the coming months as remaining food stocks from the last harvest, which was half of normal year production, get depleted.” • What’s blocking overland routes into Tigray? UN aid agencies estimate that 100 trucks carrying food, non-food items and fuel, are required to the deliver the required aid into Tigray every day. But the main routes have been blocked for many months due to the ongoing conflict. Continued fighting in the border region between Tigray and neighbouring Afar province to the east has made that route too dangerous. Roads from the Amhara region to the south and Sudan to the west have also been closed as opposing militia contest for control of these areas. There is no access either via Tigray’s northern border with Eritrea. • What does the government say? The Ethiopian government rejects claims that Ethiopia is blocking aid, blaming the rebels of the TPLF instead. It says that an aid convoy set off from Semera, the capital of Afar province on 17 March, bound for Mekelle, raising hopes that the main overland route would be operational once again. But no aid convoy has yet reached there. The TPLF have denied government accusations that they are to blame for disrupting the aid. “At no time before, during or after the fighting have aid trucks been prevented from passing through into Tigray by Tigray forces,” it has said. • Fuel scarcity a challenge In addition to other supplies, availability of fuel has been a key issue. The government has been restricting movement of fuel into Tigray for many months, which has severely affected the distribution of aid within Tigray. “With no fuel, even if we can get supplies in, getting them to where they need to go is very difficult, or impossible,” says WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. • Humanitarian convoys are facing severe problems accessing the Tigray region For many months, the Ethiopian government was also restricting movement of medical supplies. The WHO was however allowed to airlift some supplies in February. It estimates that 2,200 tonnes of emergency health supplies are needed to respond to urgent health needs in Tigray. Only 221 tonnes have so far been delivered – just about 4% of what is needed. •••••••••• * Map showing Tigray and other regions with key places * Women seen in a camp for internally displaced persons in Afar regionImage source, Getty Images Image caption, * An Internally Displaced Person (IDP), fleeing from violence in the Metekel zone in Western Ethiopia, holds a bowl with food at a camp in Chagni, Ethiopia, on January 27, 2021.Image source, AFP * WFP trucks parked at a checkpoint along the Amhara and Tigray regions borderImage source, Reuters Image caption,

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

The agenda of the first African tour made by the newly appointed Chinese envoy to the Horn of Africa did not tackle the controversial GERD dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Mohamed Saied @MohamedSaiedF March 29, 2022 As China presents itself as a supporter of stability in the Horn of Africa, the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan failed to make it to the agenda of the newly appointed Chinese envoy during his first tour of the region. Xue Bing, China’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa, landed in Ethiopia as part of an African tour that he started March 12. On March 14, Xue held talks with Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Demeke Mekonnen, during which they discussed relations between the two countries and joint projects. In February, China appointed Xue to support efforts aimed at overcoming security challenges in the conflict-ridden region, including in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, as Beijing is seeking to preserve its interests and enhance its geopolitical influence at the expense of the United States, its competitor in the region. Besides Ethiopia, Xue’s tour included Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. During his meeting with Xue, Mekonnen praised his country’s long-term relations with China. In a statement by the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, Mekonnen lauded “China’s support in international fora, which has helped Ethiopia thwart threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” China, along with Russia, has repeatedly used its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to prevent any condemnation of the violations committed by the Ethiopian government against the rebels in the northern region of Tigray, as Beijing considers the issue to be a domestic affair and not a UN matter. China also opposed US sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea, which are accused of committing rape and brutal massacres in Tigray. Its support has not been political only, as it has provided military support as well. According to the website oryxspioenkop for security and defense affairs, China supported the government of Abiy Ahmed with drones in the war. As for the GERD dispute, Mekonnen said during his meeting with Xue that China’s constructive stance on the issue of the dam in support of the principle of “African solution to African problems” is commendable. The giant $5 billion hydroelectric dam project that Addis Ababa is building on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the Nile River, has raised tensions with Egypt and Sudan, which fear it will limit their supplies of vital Nile waters. For more than a decade, Egypt and Sudan have failed to persuade Ethiopia to agree to a legal agreement regulating the filling and operation of the dam. In the summer of last year, tensions increased when Ethiopia announced the completion of the second filling of the dam reservoir despite Egypt and Sudan’s rejection of the unilateral decision. This Ethiopian move came months after a diplomatic upheaval that culminated in repeated Egyptian statements that implied the possibility of military action against the dam in the event Addis Ababa embarks on such a step. In the summer of 2021, Cairo and Khartoum managed to push toward adding the GERD issue to the agenda of the UN Security Council despite Ethiopia’s rejection of this step. Subsequently, the Security Council issued a presidential statement calling on the three countries to continue their talks under the auspices of the African Union, which has since sought to resume negotiations, to no avail. Meanwhile, China’s position on the dam issue at the Security Council meeting did not live up to the expectations of Egypt’s decision-makers. China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun said in a speech at the Security Council meeting that his country believes that through joint efforts the GERD can become a tripartite development project to promote win-win cooperation. This position was considered supportive of the Ethiopian point of view on the issue. In his statements after the session, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said that the position of states in the council is subject to political considerations, alignments and intertwining interests. Egyptian writer and Sen. Emad al-Din Hussein described China’s position as very negative. In an article titled “Those who let us down at the Security Council,” Hussein called on the Egyptian administration to reevaluate its relations with all countries, including China, on the basis of these countries’ supportive or opposing position on the dam issue. Kjetil Tronvoll, professor of peace and conflict studies at Oslo New University College, told Al-Monitor that China’s noninterference policy is a key guiding principle, so they try to shy away from the domestic disputes and issues of tension, such as the GERD or the Tigray war. However, Tronvoll sees that this should not necessarily be looked upon with concern by Egypt or Sudan; China needs also to maintain relations with them. China has close political and economic relations with the three countries, but it has yet to engage or present itself as a mediator to try to settle the conflict, which may erupt at any moment, and its repercussions may affect the already volatile region. Joshua Meservey, senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, told Al-Monitor that China understands what a contentious issue the dam is, but wishes to avoid being drawn into the dispute between the parties with which it has close relations. “China likely wishes for the dispute to end but prefers that other countries take the risks involved in mediation, while it reaps the benefits cost-free,” Meservey said. He noted that Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of Chinese loans and FDI in Africa, one of China’s largest African trade partners. “Beijing does not want to endanger any of that,” he added. Chinese companies are heavily investing in Ethiopia’s textile, pharmaceutical, construction and manufacturing industries. China also views Ethiopia as a hub for the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to expand its commercial influence into the Horn of Africa. According to the Ethiopian Investment Authority, Ethiopia had approved by the end of June 2020 more than 1,500 investment projects from China amounting to $2.7 billion, thus accounting for 25% of the total direct investment projects in Ethiopia. China’s loans to Ethiopia totaled more than $13 billion between 2000 and 2019. Beijing also holds more than 50% of Addis Ababa’s foreign debt. Of note, China contributed to the financing of the GERD project, as it provided a loan of about $1 billion to help build transmission lines to and from Addis Ababa to provide the services necessary for the construction of the dam. Beijing is also investing $1.8 billion to finance the expansion of Ethiopia’s electricity grid. Two Chinese companies are involved in building the dam. But China has huge investments in Egypt and Sudan as well. In Egypt, Chinese banks are involved in financing the new administrative capital, which is being built outside Cairo, with the Chinese government’s Construction Engineering Corporation being one of the main contractors. The volume of Chinese direct investments in Egypt amounted to $190 million, while the volume of trade exchange amounted to $14.5 billion in 2020. Egypt is also an important country for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and serves as a gateway for Chinese goods to markets in the African continent. Meanwhile, China has for years been Khartoum’s largest trading partner, and Sudan was one of the first countries to sign the Belt and Road Agreement, which Beijing considers important given its strategic ports on the Red Sea. The volume of trade between the two countries amounted to $2.8 billion in 2017, accounting for 21% of Sudan’s total imports and exports. Chinese investments in Sudan are spread across the oil, infrastructure, agriculture and mining sectors. John Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, told Al-Monitor that the GERD crisis vividly illustrates the dilemmas that China faces in expanding relations with regional countries that are in conflict with each other. He said, “To date, China’s standard diplomatic response to such conflicts has been to hew closely to its foundational principles of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ strive to maintain strict neutrality, call for restraint, encourage a negotiated settlement, keep open channels of communication with all sides and occasionally offer bland peace proposals.” An Egyptian official told Al-Monitor that his country is still counting on its international partners, including China, to play a greater role in settling the dam dispute. Egypt and Sudan hope to resume negotiations that have been frozen for nearly a year with Ethiopia, before Addis Ababa begins filling the dam’s reservoir for the third time in the upcoming rainy season in June-September. As for whether Beijing can play a role in resolving the Nile issue, Calabrese pointed out this would depend on whether it wants to and whether all the disputants would welcome Chinese mediation. However, he said, “At the present time, I do not see either of those conditions operative.” ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * Media staff members watch a live image of China’s President Xi Jinping speaking at the media center of the United Nations Biodiversity Conference, Kunming, Yunnan province, China, Oct. 12, 2021. STR/AFP via Getty Images

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Many remember Moscow’s support for liberation from colonial rule, and a strong anti-imperialist feeling remains

Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni in 2019.

Jason Burke in Johannesburg

Mon 28 Mar 2022 08.12 BST

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Twelve hours after its forces attacked Ukraine last month, Russian government officials and senior soldiers in South Africa gathered at a comfortable residence in the city of Pretoria for a cocktail reception to celebrate Russian Motherland Defenders’ Day.

The host was the Russian ambassador, Ilya Rogachev, and his guests included the South African minister of defence as well as the head of the country’s armed forces. Neither saw any reason to shun the gathering as many other nations’ officials did, nor to apologise afterwards.

Attendance was “integral to the fulfilment of defence international affairs”, a government spokesperson said.

Vladimir Putin speaks to South African president Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa summit in 2019.

Support from many African leaders and governments for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – or at least reluctance to condemn it – has dismayed western officials.

At the UN general assembly resolution 17 African nations abstained – almost half all abstentions – and one voted against condemning Russia for its ‘aggression’ and demanding a withdrawal from Ukraine, though a majority of African countries gave it their backing. The resolution passed by 141 to 5.

Some observers have raised the possibility of a new strategic split across Africa, similar to that during the cold war.

“It harks back to cold war days and the divisions we saw then. But … the objective reality of the international system is so different now this raises a lot of questions about some African countries’ commitment to the post-cold war order and its values,” said Priyal Singh, researcher at Institute for Strategic Studies in Pretoria.

Since the ambassador’s party, the ruling African National Congress party in South Africa has doubled down on its refusal to criticise Russia, saying it hopes to remain neutral and encourage dialogue.

Others on the continent have followed a similar line, calling for peace but blaming Nato’s eastward expansion for the war, complaining of western “double standards” and resisting all calls to criticise Russia.

That the new divide looks like the one which split Africa decades ago is no coincidence. Many countries across the continent are still ruled by parties that were supported by Moscow during their struggles for liberation from colonial or white supremacist rule, analysts say. Though few among their youthful populations experienced the bitter battles of the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s, leaders of ruling parties in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique remember how Soviet weapons, cash and advisers helped win freedom.

Emmerson Mnangagwa, the president of Zimbabwe, has described both Russia and China as “dependable pillars for many years” which “assisted us in our fight for independence, but equally … to defend our sovereignty against the sustained onslaught by our detractors,” a reference to western sanctions on Zimbabwe, imposed after human rights abuses under the regime of Robert Mugabe.

Mozambique also abstained at the UN, arguing like others that it hoped to encourage dialogue to resolve the violence. So too did Algeria, once seen as a “revolutionary” state close to Moscow.

In recent years Russia has moved to exploit such historic links, underlining ties in public statements, at big conferences and on repeated trips across Africa by foreign minster Sergei Lavrov. Moscow has also pushed its agenda through covert social media networks which portray Moscow as on the side of Africans against western “imperialists”.

Such efforts have focused on unstable parts of Africa, which Moscow sees as a fertile ground for intervention, and have reaped significant rewards in places like Central African Republic and Mali, where resentment of former colonial power France already ran deep.

“In the Sahel there is a strong anti-western feeling, an anti-imperialist tendency in public opinion and anti-imperialist means anti-US and the west,” said Pauline Bax, deputy director of the Africa Programme at the International Crisis Group.

Mali has recently renewed ties with Moscow after a military takeover there, and the country’s new rulers have called in paramilitary mercenaries linked to the Kremlin to fight Islamic insurgents as French and other western troops withdraw. The Wagner group is run by a businessman who is a close associate of President Putin and is now thought to be present in at least six African countries, including the CAR and Sudan which both abstained at the UN. Boris Johnson announced sanctions against Wagner on Thursday.

Sudan has also tilted closer to Moscow in recent months. The country, where a military coup last year derailed a fragile transition to democratic rule, has concluded a big deal offering Russia a port on Africa’s eastern coast for 25 years. Eritrea – the only nation on the continent to vote against the UN motion– is a brutally repressive authoritarian state which Moscow has also wooed.

Other Russian ties across the continent are strengthened through investment in mining, financial loans and the sale of agricultural equipment or nuclear technology. Rosatom, the Russian state corporation involved with military and civil use of nuclear energy, has sought to expand in Africa in recent years. Russia was the largest arms exporter to sub-Saharan Africa in 2016–20, supplying almost a third of total sub-Saharan arms imports, up from a quarter in 2011–15, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Western officials have been particularly disappointed by Uganda, which has received huge sums of western aid. A once close relationship with the US and the UK has soured over the crushing of political dissent and western pressure to recognise LGBT rights. Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, has accused the west of interfering in domestic affairs.

Protesters outside the Uganda High Commission in London urging the president not to sign an anti-LGBT bill in 2015.

Museveni’s influential son and aspirant successor, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, said on Twitter that “the majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine”.

Uganda’s UN representative said Uganda abstained from the vote on the UN resolution to protect its neutrality as the next chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, a cold war-era group of 120 member states that includes almost every African nation. However Museveni has made little effort to hide his sympathies, criticising the west’s “aggression against Africa” and describing Russia as the “centre of gravity” for the Balkans, like China in south-east Asia.

Nicholas Sengoba, a columnist with Uganda’s Daily Monitor newspaper, said that many authoritarian African leaders like Museveni were pleased to see Putin “stand up to the big boys in the west.”

Analysts say that more recent examples of what is seen as western ‘neo-imperialism” also influences the reaction of many in Africa to the conflict.

“The 2011 Libyan crisis and the Nato intervention there, instability in the Sahel and other experiences mean that many countries buy into the wariness of western dominance and believe that we need a global counterpoint … Russia is seen as representative of the former Soviet Union in this regard,” said Singh.

Reports that some African students have faced discrimination from security officials and others in Ukraine as they attempt to flee the conflict, magnified by social media, have also prompted anger in Nigeria and elsewhere.

But it is unclear how far the positions taken by often elderly leaders reflects broader sentiments, especially among younger populations. The war in Ukraine has laid bare political, social and other divides within countries, as well as among them.

In South Africa, the populist leftwing Economic Freedom Fighters praised Moscow’s action to “avert … a patent and clear security threat to Russian territory and people by Nato forces, and particularly the US”, while the centre right Democratic Alliance projected the colours of the Ukrainian flag on to the provincial parliament in Cape Town, a city it runs, and said it joined “the global condemnation of Russia’s attack on Ukrainian civilians, mostly women and children.”

The anti-western and anti-Nato stance of some on the continent risks overshadowing the early stance against the invasion of Ukraine taken by the African Union, and the speech made by Kenya’s ambassador to the UN, Martin Kimani, who argued that as Africans had suffered imperialist violence themselves for centuries they should not condone efforts to alter or impose frontiers by force.l

“It’s important to note that a majority of African nations voted in favour [of the UN resolution] and that regional and continental bodies such as the African Union or the ECOWAS [a West Africa grouping] were quite quick to condemn Moscow,” said Bax.

One recent study found that the 27 African countries that voted for the UN resolution were mostly democracies and all western allies, often actively involved in joint military operations. Most of those that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, were authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

The Charge d’Affairs at the Eritrean Embassy in Kuwait Mr. Humed Yahiya met and held talks with Assistant Foreign Minister of Kuwait for African Affairs, Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed, focusing on strengthening bilateral relations.

At the meeting, Mr. Humed and Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed highlighting on the overall progress of the bilateral relations between Eritrea and Kuwait held talks on investment opportunities and economic cooperation.

Both sides also agreed the implementation of the cooperation protocol the two countries previously signed on various sectors including education and health.

Ambassador Ali Sulaiman Al-Saeed, Assistant Foreign Minister of Kuwait for African Affairs expressed his country’s readiness to expand and develop relations with Eritrea and other Eastern African countries.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

Let me first take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude for the continued support and friendship that Japan has been extending to nation-building efforts of Eritrea since its independence. This was especially so after the launching of TICAD in 1993.

Excellences,

It may be history now. But the first half of the 1990s saw remarkable changes in the paradigm of relations between countries of the Horn of Africa, the Nile Basin, Red Sea Region and the Gulf States. This was indeed a watershed moment. It marked the beginning of a new era of peace and promising economic development in our region. Unfortunately, the hope and optimism engendered at the time was soon dashed. The region was again plunged into another spiral of unnecessary and unavoidable war, instability and protracted crisis. This could not but obstruct progress in the region despite its strategic location, abundant natural resources, and potential investment and market opportunities.

As it will be recalled, the Ethiopian government, led by the TPLF, declared an unprovoked war against Eritrea in 1998 under flimsy pretext of a border dispute. The vicious war raged for two years inculcating huge loss of life and destruction of property. Finally, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers Peace agreement in December 2000. This was brokered by and signed under the auspices of international community.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission announced its final and binding ruling in April 2002. But the TPLF reneged on international communities and rejected the decision. The international community failed to condemn this act. The “no war, no peace” situation that ensued, and the TPLF’s intermittent military assaults, remained the cause of tensions and instability in our region for the subsequent 18 years. Fortunately, and after the removal of the TPLF from power in 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Joint Agreement of Peace and Friendship. This was done out of their volition and without third party intermediaries.

The new reality has rekindled hope and optimism. It has reinvigorated the desire, political goodwill and determination for robust cooperation in our region. The prospects thus remain positive in spite of last-ditch and meaningless efforts by the TPLF to scuttle the peace process.

In this context, the Government of Eritrea is ready to engage in meaningful and impacting cooperation with Japan. In the event, GOE humbly requests the Government of Japan, the co-organizers of TICAD and other development partners to take the prevailing momentum for peace as a good opportunity to push ahead with social and economic development to benefit the peoples of the region.

Let me conclude by expressing my best wishes for success to the Ministerial Meeting session.

I thank you

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

To support stabilization, peace, and democracy efforts in Ethiopia.

________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 4, 2022

Mr. Malinowski (for himself, Mrs. Kim of California, Mr. Meeks, and Mr. McCaul) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

________________________________________

A BILL

To support stabilization, peace, and democracy efforts in Ethiopia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Ethiopia Stabilization, Peace, and Democracy Act”.

SEC. 2. Statement of policy.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support efforts to end the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia and gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities in Ethiopia;

(2) to use all diplomatic, development, and legal tools to stabilize and end violence in Ethiopia;

(3) to support efforts to hold accountable those who committed gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities in Ethiopia; and

(4) to promote an inclusive national dialogue in order to bring about a peaceful, democratic, and unified Ethiopia.

SEC. 3. Strategy to support stabilization efforts, human rights, and democracy.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to support efforts to end the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia, pursue accountability for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities in Ethiopia, and promote democracy, human rights, and reconciliation in Ethiopia.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include a plan to implement the strategy, including to—

(1) advance diplomatic engagement with the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and other regional bodies, countries, and international partners;

(2) address acute humanitarian needs, ensure unfettered humanitarian access to and support for vulnerable populations, including refugees, internally displaced persons, vulnerable populations, and individuals forcibly displaced by the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(3) identify and deter external material support provided to any parties to the conflict for the purposes of perpetuating or affecting the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(4) support justice and accountability for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and atrocities committed in Ethiopia and to enhance rule of law;

(5) ensure the safety and security of United States Embassy staff and United States citizens and legal permanent residents in Ethiopia, including contingency plans to evacuate, as needed, these individuals from Ethiopia;

(6) combat hate speech and disinformation in Ethiopia, including efforts to coordinate with social media companies to mitigate the effects of social media content generated outside of the United States focused on perpetuating the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia, including through hate speech and language inciting violence;

(7) meaningfully engage civil society of all ethnicities, including women and youth, in conflict resolution, inclusive dialogue, reconciliation, and community-based efforts to support peacebuilding and an end to violence in Ethiopia;

(8) support conflict resolution and psychosocial rehabilitation for populations in Ethiopia affected by the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia, including an analysis of the drivers of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(9) as appropriate, support efforts to restore medical and other health-related infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed during the course of the civil war in Ethiopia;

(10) develop, communicate, and assess clearly defined benchmarks and metrics required to resume certain assistance in Ethiopia, including related to democracy and governance, economic growth, and development and an analysis of the drivers of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia; and

(11) address threats, due to ethnicity, religion, political or geographic affiliations, or affiliation with the United States, against Ethiopian citizens working for United States Government agencies in Ethiopia.

(c) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the strategy required by subsection (a).

(d) Report on progress towards accountability.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress towards holding individuals accountable for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities.

SEC. 4. Actions in support of peace, stability, and accountability.

(a) Bilateral sanctions.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (2) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines—

(A) has undermined, attempted to undermine, or seeks to undermine efforts with respect to a cease-fire and negotiated settlement to end the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(B) is responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that expanded or extended the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(C) has committed gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or other atrocities in Ethiopia;

(D) has obstructed, delayed, or diverted, or seeks to obstruct, delay, or divert, the provision of humanitarian assistance for those affected by the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(E) has planned, directed, or committed attacks in Ethiopia against United Nations and African Union, humanitarian, or nongovernmental organization personnel; and

(F) has—

(i) knowingly engaged in or materially contributed to the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(ii) provided to any party involved in the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia conventional weapons that fall within the scope of conventional weapons under the United National Register of Conventional Arms; or

(iii) provided to any party involved in the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms, spare parts, and related materiel described in paragraph (1), utilized for the purposes of perpetuating and expanding the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(2) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed under paragraph (1) with respect to a foreign person are the following:

(A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(B) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in paragraph (1) is—

(I) inadmissible to the United States;

(II) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(III) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in paragraph (1) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under subclause (I) shall—

(aa) take effect immediately; and

(bb) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(3) EXCEPTIONS.—

(A) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The authority or a requirement to impose sanctions under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(ii) GOOD DEFINED.—In this subparagraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES.—Sanctions under paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States—

(i) is necessary to permit the United States to comply with agreements between the United Nations and the United States, between the United States and certain other international organizations or entities, or other applicable international obligations of the United States, as identified by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies; or

(ii) would further important law enforcement objectives.

(4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this subsection.

(B) PENALTIES RELATING TO BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(C) TERMINATION.—Sanctions imposed on a person under paragraph (2) shall not apply on or after the date that is 30 days after the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate committees that the person no longer engages in activities described in paragraph (1).

(D) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under this subsection for periods not to exceed 90 days if the President determines that the parties to the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia have agreed to and are upholding a cease-fire and undergoing an inclusive political dialogue in Ethiopia.

(ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President makes a determination to suspend the imposition of sanctions as described in clause (i), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the determination.

(iii) REIMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Any sanctions suspended under clause (i) shall be reimposed if the President determines that the criteria described in that clause are no longer being met.

(E) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions described in paragraph (2) with respect to a person described in paragraph (1) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(F) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under this subsection:

(i) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

(ii) Any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities of the United States.

(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

(A) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(B) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.

(C) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(D) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(i) a United States citizen, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States, or any other individual subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; or

(ii) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such entity.

(b) Multilateral sanctions.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate, should seek to engage with other member countries of the United Nations Security Council, other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the African Union, and any other relevant actors to achieve a coordinated imposition of multilateral sanctions and export controls on persons described in subsection (a)(1).

(c) Limitations on export of defense and dual-Use items.—

(1) DUAL-USE ITEMS.—The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall determine whether licenses should be required under section 1754(c)(1)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)) for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Ethiopia or Eritrea of items described in clause (ii) of that section.

(2) DEFENSE ITEMS.—No license may be issued for the export to Ethiopia or Eritrea of any item on the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

SEC. 5. Limitation on security assistance.

(a) In general.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, all amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code, and made available to provide assistance to Ethiopia’s security forces shall be suspended from obligation and expenditure until the date that is 30 days after the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the conditions described in subsection (b) are met.

(b) Conditions described.—The conditions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) The Government of Ethiopia has ceased all offensive military operations associated with the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(2) The Government of Ethiopia has taken steps toward negotiations and a legitimate, inclusive national dialogue.

(3) The Government of Ethiopia has implemented measures to better protect human rights and ensure adherence to international humanitarian law.

(4) The Government of Ethiopia has continuously allowed unfettered humanitarian access.

(5) The Government of Ethiopia has cooperated with independent investigations of credible allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuse carried out in the course of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(c) Exception.—The suspension of amounts under subsection (a) shall not include amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for law enforcement, border security, including land, sea, and air ports of entry, or other activities conducted in coordination with the Government of Ethiopia that are in support of United States national security objectives.

(d) Report.—Not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive list of all assistance suspended in compliance with the limitation on assistance required by subsection (a) as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

(e) Waiver.—The President may, subject to congressional notification requirements under other applicable provisions of law, waive the limitation on assistance required by subsection (a), if the President—

(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of and justification for the waiver not later than 15 days after the exercise of the waiver, including an explanation as to why the waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

SEC. 6. Limitation on assistance provided through international financial institutions.

(a) Restrictions.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution—

(1) to use the voice and vote of the United States in the respective institution to oppose any loan or extension of financial or technical assistance to the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea; and

(2) to work with other key donor countries to develop a coordinated policy with respect to lending to the Government of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea aimed at advancing human rights and promoting peace.

(b) Exception for humanitarian purposes.—Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any loan or financial or technical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, including efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to the COVID–19 pandemic, or any other infectious disease threat that is declared by the World Health Organization to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

(c) Waiver for projects that directly support basic human needs.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive the application of subsection (a)(1) if the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination, arrived at with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that the waiver is being exercised to support projects that directly support basic human needs.

(d) Termination.—Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply on or after the date that is 30 days after the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea have—

(1) ceased all offensive military operations associated with the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(2) taken steps towards negotiations and an inclusive, legitimate national dialogue;

(3) continuously allowed unfettered humanitarian access; and

(4) cooperated with independent investigations of credible allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuses carried out in the course of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(e) Definition of international financial institution.—In this section, the term “international financial institution” means the International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.

SEC. 7. Limitation on support provided by United States International Development Finance Corporation.

(a) In general.—The United States International Development Finance Corporation may not provide support under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621 et seq.) for projects in Ethiopia.

(b) Termination.—The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply on or after the date that is 30 days after the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Ethiopia has—

(1) ceased all offensive military operations related to the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(2) taken steps toward negotiations and a legitimate, inclusive political dialogue;

(3) continuously allowed unfettered humanitarian access; and

(4) cooperated with independent investigations of credible allegations of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, carried out in the course of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(c) Waiver.—The President may waive the prohibition under subsection (a) if the President—

(1) determines that it is in the United States national security interest; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the use of the waiver not later than 15 days after the exercise of the waiver, including an explanation as to why the waiver is in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 8. Support for accountability.

(a) In general.—The President is authorized to provide financial, technical, and diplomatic support for efforts and activities necessary to preserve evidence of atrocities in Ethiopia and to pursue accountability for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law, that have taken place in the course of the civil war and other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(b) Provision of information.—The President is authorized to share information possessed by the United States Government with organizations engaged in credible investigations meant to lead to the prosecution of any individual credibly accused of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities in Ethiopia in accordance with this section.

SEC. 9. Report.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) describes the actions and involvement of senior officials of the Government of Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, and armed opposition groups or associated forces engaged in—

(A) directing, carrying out, or ordering gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and other atrocities in Ethiopia; and

(B) directing, carrying out, or ordering targeting of civilians, civilian infrastructure, medical facilities or the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in Ethiopia;

(2) describes the actions and involvement of any external actors, including in the People’s Republic of China, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Egypt, Sudan, and Turkey, engaged in, facilitating, or financing the sale or transfers of arms or weapons to any party to the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia;

(3) identifies foreign financial institutions in which senior officials described in paragraph (1) or external actors described in paragraph (2) hold significant assets, and provides an assessment of the value of such assets; and

(4) identifies foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate or finance the sale or transfer of weapons, arms, or non-lethal equipment intended or altered by a third party for military use to any party to the civil war or other conflicts in Ethiopia.

(b) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 10. Determination of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies represented on the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force and representatives of human rights organizations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination whether actions in Ethiopia by the armed forces of Ethiopia, the armed forces of Eritrea, the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, or associated forces or armed actors constitute genocide (as defined in section 1091 of title 18, United States Code), war crimes, or crimes against humanity.

(b) Form.—The determination required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and published on a publicly available website of the Department of State, but may include a classified annex if such annex is provided separately from the unclassified determination.

SEC. 11. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(2) GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” includes torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.

SEC. 12. Sunset.

This Act, and any sanctions imposed pursuant to this Act, shall cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Mr. President,

• Eritrea is taking the floor in explanation of position after the adoption of draft resolution A/ES-11/L2 (Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine)

• The draft resolution just adopted regrettably makes reference to the resolution adopted on 2nd March which my delegation voted against. Eritrea is disappointed that the humanitarian issue is politicized.

• Eritrea rejects any politicization of humanitarian issue as it undermines actions geared towards addressing core humanitarian situation of affected peoples and countries. Had the text presented for the consideration of the general assembly focused on humanitarian priorities only, it could have been possible to adopt the text by consensus, garnering a much stronger and united voice on humanitarian principles that matter most within the context of the agenda item that we have been discussing for the last two days.

• Eritrea appreciates the initiative of South Africa in tabling L3. The draft focused on humanitarian priorities and avoided polarizing political contents which were already addressed in the previous occasion. Eritrea was prepared to support the L3 draft text.

• In the consideration of humanitarian assistance, it is important that the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence is upheld, and all humanitarian actions are guided by the full respect of these principles.

• Despite the geopolitical differences between US led NATO and Russia, which is having grave humanitarian consequences for Ukraine, Eritrea wishes to stress that all parties to the conflict take concrete steps to respect their obligations under international humanitarian principles, to ensure that, all civilians and nationalities, including African nationals are fully protected. It is important to make every effort possible to minimize humanitarian consequences for the civilian population.

• The unfolding humanitarian situation demands agreeing on a ceasefire and achieving humanitarian pauses to ensure safe, rapid, voluntary and unhindered evacuation of civilians.

• While the task of humanitarian assistance is ongoing, there should be an earnest effort on the political track to end the conflict and in this regard, Eritrea wishes to reiterate its call for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy.

• Finally, on a more serious political note, the current campaign or drive to go back to a unipolar world order by I quote, “tightening the noose on Russia”, is becoming more dangerous and risky military confrontation which runs contrary to the fundamental pillars of robust multilateralism as well as the lofty aspirations of the majority of the world’s peoples and nations. We must remain guided by the UN Charter in the full respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of states for a peaceful world order.

• In this tumultuous period of great uncertainty, Eritrea wishes peace to Ukraine and Russia as well as to the rest of the region.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea