The 1990s were a time of great change for the country, and the 1990s were a time of great change for the country. Operation Fenkil is one of the most impressive and huge military operations and victories that testified to the military intelligence and distance of the Eritrean youth.
When the LGBTIQ decided to launch Operation Fenkil, it had to be very well prepared, given its magnitude and importance and the potential impact of its success and failure on the future prospects of Eritrean independence. In 1977, the JLF’s operation to burn the port city of Mitsva did not go as planned and cost huge sacrifices, leaving bitter memories in the minds of every fighter and people. Therefore, there is no doubt that the battle to burn Mitsva for the second time in 13 years and to clarify the direction of the military and political journey of the Eritrean people and their revolution must be flawless.
To conduct an effective military operation, accurate enemy intelligence is the first military rule. In his book The Art Of War, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said, “If you know your enemy and yourself, you will not be afraid of the outcome of hundreds of battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, you will also accept defeat in every victory you achieve. If you don’t know yourself and your enemy, you’ll be silent in every battle,” he says.
The JLF, therefore, worked seriously in gathering information so that it could know its own capabilities and carefully study the capabilities of its enemy to achieve unwavering victory. He understood the capabilities of his enemy; He devised a step-by-step military strategy on where, when, and how to attack and win.
However, the Derg was not lazy in its counter-intelligence and military strategies. However, after examining, studying and analyzing all the circumstances and intelligence activities of the HLF, he confirmed that the HG would attack the port city of Mitsva. Understanding the capabilities of the HLF, he made preparations to thwart the attack. The HLF, in turn, confirmed with intense and accurate intelligence that the Derg knew it was going to attack Mitsva and had made preparations to thwart the attack.
This situation threatened the HLF and the long-planned military operation. Because the information gathered by the HLF through long and detailed intelligence activities and the military strategy it devised were known to the enemy. Thus, the “suddenness” that is so important in war and gives the advantage of victory has been taken away. Launching an attack on your enemy in such a situation is like, “Destroyed flour plays with the wind”.
The HLF has concluded that its planned Operation Fenkil must not fail under any circumstances and must be implemented. However, the “suddenness” he held is not war. The battle now is against your most powerful enemy who already knows you are going to attack. This kind of war doesn’t work, not even with your enemy who is on the defensive with a superior capability, nor with an enemy who is on the defensive with a low capability. “So what’s to be done?” he asked. It became a confusing question for the military engineers of the HLF.
The only solution is to take away the “suddenness” that the Derg has taken away from the Derg again. “Good. But how do we snatch it?” It was a question that the military strategists of the HLF had to answer. Even when you are facing your enemy, you can gain the advantage of “suddenness” by attacking your enemy from an unexpected direction/angle. To do this, you must create expectations in your enemy’s mind by making deceptive compliments.
This strategy is based on China’s military strategy: “Attack in the west and attack in the east.” is described as. The military architects of the HLF, who were responsible for the lives of thousands of heroes of the Eritrean people, devised an unpredictable strategy to save the lives of the fighters and carry out Operation Fenkil at little cost. “To make Operation Fenkil a success, go to the heart of Ethiopia and launch a military offensive.” It was a nice sight.
So, a young Eritrean (C/S 70) who was swarming the Samhar valleys to carry out part of Operation Fenkil suddenly loaded up in a Mercedes and disappeared from Eritrean soil. However, the movement and radio communications of a small number of units of the 70th Brigade continued in the Samar valleys and adjacent Sahel territory so that the Derg army would not benefit from this new military change. The 85th Brigade, which was primarily determined to carry out Operation Fenkil, disappeared completely from communications. The Derg military engineers believed that the 70th Brigade, which had been hidden from them for a long time, had now suddenly found its whereabouts through intercepted radios and that the 70th Brigade would carry out the planned attack on Mitsva.
It was in this state of mind that the 70th Brigade, which had traveled 1,800 km from Eritrea and unknowingly entered central Ethiopia, in early January 1990, attacked the peacefully resting Derg army at Asosa. Ethiopia and the world were shaken by this sudden operation. The Derg said, “The Shaabia has been conducting maneuvers in the Samar to attack inside Ethiopia. He’s amazed us!” He rushed to extinguish the HLF volcano in central Ethiopia by drawing reinforcements from Tigray and elsewhere in Ethiopia.
The Second Revolutionary Army, which was on full alert in Eritrea, especially to defend Mitsva, began to relax in the same belief. The HLF snatched the ‘suddenness’ from the Derg again with the military strategy of “increase in the west and attack in the east”.
The 70th Brigade, which traveled 1,800 km and attacked inside Ethiopia with mechanized units, followed the military strategy of “attack like lightning and disappear like the wind” and soon became a stench of water. Without his movements being known, he passed through Sudanese territory as before and appeared in Samhar. Thus, three brigades of the 85th Brigade, three brigades of the 70th Brigade, two brigades of the 61st Brigade, one brigade of the 96th Brigade and two mechanized brigades of the 74th Brigade were prepared to carry out the attack. In total, the HLF had 13,500 dead fighters, 45 100mm tanks, 31 heavy artillery (130, 122, 85mm), 4 BM 21 rocket launchers, more than 20 anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank missiles and more He mobilized a small naval force armed with 10 fast boats and prepared for a unique sea and land attack.
The Derg army, meanwhile, had about 25,000 troops plus 3,000 naval personnel, about 150 different tanks, about 70 heavy artillery, over 100 rifles, a large number of anti-tank missiles, bombing aircraft from Asmara, and a 35-year-old experienced navy consisting of eight squadrons He was armed with 30 ships, large and small, ready to defend.
The HLF, which was insignificant in all measures of military capability compared to the Derg army – prepared for attack, with a highly skilled ‘suddenness’ of war and real aim, defeated the colonial force that was beaten by the HLF’s highly skilled and distanced military strategy Three days of lightning strikes (February 8-10, 1990) wrote the remarkable Eritrean military victory that we now remember with pride 33 years later in the archives of Eritrean history with the blood and bones of heroes.
Source: Eritrea – Ministry of Information