Category: Politics

A day after the Ethiopian federal government abruptly suspended nearly eight months of military operations against rebels in its Tigray region, communications with the country’s northern region remained sketchy at best, and humanitarians were hopeful the truce would hold so aid could reach the hundreds of thousands of people struggling in famine-like conditions.

“The consequences and impact of the immediate cease-fire remain unclear,” U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters Tuesday.

He said the organization’s aid operations have been constrained in recent days because of the fighting but would resume pending a security and access assessment.

“We are looking at supply routes into Tigray in consultation with our security colleagues and logistic experts,” Dujarric said, adding that land routes and the airport in Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, are closed.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has also temporarily limited its movements outside Mekelle and is monitoring developments closely.

“The situation in the region is very volatile, but Mekelle looks quiet now,” ICRC regional spokesperson Alyona Synenko said from Nairobi, where she has been in contact with ICRC staff on the ground. “Shops are open, we see people in the street. Communication networks are down, internet is not working.”

The United Nations says some 350,000 Tigrayans are coping with famine-like conditions because of the fighting. On Tuesday, USAID official Sarah Charles put the number closer to 1 million in testimony to the U.S. Congress.

“Of the 6 million people that live in Tigray, we estimate that 3.5 million to 4.5 million are in need of urgent humanitarian food assistance,” she said. “Of these, 700,000 to 900,000 people are already experiencing catastrophic conditions.” Without scaled up aid deliveries, she said, “we will likely see widespread famine in Ethiopia this year.”

Humanitarian pause

On Monday, the federal government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed unexpectedly announced it was pausing military activities against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to “help ensure better humanitarian access and strengthen the effort to rehabilitate and rebuild the Tigray region,” which it was bombing as recently as one week ago.

Aly Verjee, a London-based researcher for the U.S. Institute of Peace who specializes in East Africa, said that there are two theories as to why Abiy chose this moment to declare a cease-fire, and that the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

“One is that the ferocity of the [Tigrayan] forces’ actions has prompted the federal government to resort to a cease-fire,” said Verjee. “The second is that the federal government had been planning this, recognizing the humanitarian situation is deteriorating and something needed to be done.”

Abiy has been under intense Western pressure to end the fighting. The U.S. restricted economic and security assistance to Ethiopia because of the fighting and imposed visa restrictions on some Ethiopian officials. The European Union has also warned that it is “ready to activate all its foreign policy tools.”

What lies ahead?

A senior State Department official warned Tuesday that the country is at an inflection point, and what the parties do now will determine its future.

“If the government’s announcement of a cessation of hostilities does not result in improvements, and the situation continues to worsen, Ethiopia and Eritrea should anticipate further actions,” Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Robert Godec told a congressional hearing on the situation. “We will not stand by in the face of horrors in Tigray.”

Eritrean troops have been fighting the Tigrayan rebels on the side of the Ethiopian military. It is not yet clear whether they have also pulled back or departed.

But the halt in the federal government’s offensive does not mean the danger has passed for Ethiopia or the Horn of Africa region.

Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, said there are concerns that the country could still break apart along ethnic lines, much as Yugoslavia did in the early 1990s.

“The idea that the Tigrayans are now fully in control of their territory suggests that they are very unlikely to seek a new kind of political union with Ethiopia and will in fact do their best to exert greater autonomy over the region,” Hudson said.

He noted simmering ethnic tensions in several other parts of the country, which has a population of 113 million.

“What lesson will they draw from the Tigrayans possibly beating back the government’s military, and then exerting greater autonomy for themselves in their region?” Hudson asked.

Source: Voice of America

The National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea (NICE), which was established in 1992, has come a long way to become an organization of great reputation. It has three operation centers, Asmara (Head Office), Massawa, and Assab, and markets its services through a network of agents across the entire country and globe.

NICE, the only insurance corporation in Eritrea, gives life and non-life insurance services and believes strongly in the virtues of reinsuring insurances. Reinsurance is a case where multiple insurance companies share risk by purchasing insurance policies from other insurers to limit their own total loss in case of disaster. The goal is to ensure that no insurance company has too much exposure to a particularly large event or disaster.

In explaining the rationale behind the corporation’s decision to practice reinsurance, Mr. Zeru Woldemichael, General Manager of NICE, said, “Our insurance company cannot possibly insure a 750 million USD worth aircraft. We have business deals with different international companies and we reinsure the damaged good to the concerned companies.”

NICE began its operations with small capital and limited income. As Mr. Zeru put it, “to initiate insurance in the new country was very tiresome and demanded making efforts constantly. That is why we contacted insurance companies in Germany and England to create linkages.”

NICE then signed agreements with the international reinsurance corporations and continued operating with a capital of five million Birr. The Insurance sector is big and complex and there were not many experts in the field in Eritrea back then. This meant that the corporation had to deal with the challenges of building its human resources almost from scratch.

From1995 on, NICE has been organizing courses and professional exams with Charter Insurance Institute (CII) for its employees. The march toward building the professional capacity that started in 1995 still persists with even more insurance educational institutions involved. Mr. Zeru was an executive member of the CII which agreed to make Eritrea an international exam center for the CII. Unlike many other businesses, the insurance sector cannot run without employees that have certified knowledge and skills, and NICE’s partners sought such certificates. This acted as a major driving force for NICE’s commitment to building its employees’ capacity. Today the corporation boasts a mature organization and management.

Insurance companies are classified by the type of insurance service they provide as life and non-life insurance, and many operate on both. NICE works with big insurance companies of different kinds. For instance, it has reinsurance deals with airplane insurance companies in England and contacts with South African Insurance Corporation, one of the biggest in the world for mine insurance and many others.

In 2004 and 2013 NICE sold shares to Eritrean citizens and the decisions have paid off in the form of building a strong insurance corporation. At present it has a net worth of 105 million capital and 750 million shareholders’ capital. It has over two thousand shareholders, and 56% of the shares are owned by Eritrea’s Ministry of Finance while 44% belong to Eritrean individuals and institutions within Eritrea. The corporation invests in various international and domestic businesses. For example, it is a shareholder in African Reinsurance Corporation, with headquarters in Nigeria, known as Africa-Re or ZEP-Re PTA Reinsurance Company, NESICO Insurance Company, with headquarters in Juba, South Sudan, where NICE has been working from the beginning. NICE has shares in COMESA Zebra Company, where members of its staff are elected as board members from time to time. It also works in close partnership with the largest Chinese insurance company known as People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC).

NICE also invests in many domestic ventures such as Shishay Animal Feed Factory, Roof Garden Restaurant, located on the fifth floor of the NICE building, Shemshemya Commercial Farm in Tokombia sub-zone, Gash-Barka region, which engages in modern agriculture and livestock. In addition, NICE manages the Eritrean Government Pension Scheme and Martyrs’ Fund, for which it charges service and management fees.

Worldwide, NICE is one of the most internationally recognized and respected corporations. It promotes its image and the image of Eritrea. Mr. Zeru said, “We do know we have our drawbacks, but we are constantly striving to bring them down.”

NICE covers many types of insurance; in fact, there is none that it cannot cover because NICE’s dependence on reinsurers gives it absolute security. When there comes a devastating calamity, it is not NICE that carries the burden but the companies it is reinsured in. Whatever type of insurance is sought, there are four international brokers associated with the corporation that link it to the desired insurance market. For example, motor insurance is mostly handled in Eritrea but if it exceeds five million, we bring it down to the international insurance market with the help of our brokers.

Life insurance is quite new in Eritrea. Not many people are aware of its benefits and the collective progress it begets but NICE is working on it. The law of large numbers works well when there is a massive number of insurance clients of different ages and health conditions. The larger the number of the insured is the further the extremes are evened out.

NICE has managed to ensure clients up to the age of 80-85. Most insurance corporations in the world limit the age to 75 or below, but NICE can take up to that age because it ensures the clients in big numbers. If, say, it ensures members of the teachers association, it figures out how many of them are above the age of sixty or have threatening diseases or are likely to get into accidents per year. The number of those who are not likely to claim benefits tends to exceed the number of those that would seek reimbursement. This balance drags back the average age of the insured to about 45, which is very attractive in the reinsurance market. At this rate NICE is working to ensure the Eritrean population as a whole. Worldwide, this is the trend in insurance technique and it is indeed effective. What percentage of the whole population is likely going to need medical care in a year? It is very small, indeed, considering the ratio of healthy members of the population to the unhealthy ones.

In the past 29 years, NICE has been built to be a strong insurance corporation, with its efficient management and well-educated personnel. It has raised its capital from 5 million to 105 million Nakfa and managed to provide sufficient insurance services to its clients. It has an excellent corporate image both in Eritrea and abroad.

NICE regularly analyzes the capacity of its employees and works to develop them, which is mandatory for the outstanding job it performs.

The corporation is working extensively on life insurance and raising people’s awareness about it. It funds a sitcom that is aired on Eri- TV and dramas on varied themes, including those that emphasize the functions and importance of insurance.

“People say an insurance agreement with NICE is the same as a decent marriage; no promises are broken. The corporation is widely recognized as trustworthy and is loyal to the needs of the insured,” Mr.Zeru said in his closing statement during the interview.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

NAIROBI – Kenyan authorities say at least 350 young people who joined the Somali Islamist militant group al-Shabab have surrendered this year and will be reintegrated into society.

Security agencies in Kenya’s coast region say fewer youth are crossing to Somalia to fight for the group in a sign that counterterrorism measures are working.

Kenyan counterterrorism officials are in the county of Mombasa this week to help sensitize the community against violent extremism and to assist former al-Shabab fighters.

Their efforts are targeting six counties directly affected by the terror group’s activities along the Kenya-Somalia border.

Canon Harun Rashid, chief officer in charge of preventing violent extremism at Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Center, said the center is processing more than 300 former al-Shabab fighters who are seeking to re-enter society.

Understanding the crimes

“It’s not just a blanket returning program,” Rashid said. “All these individuals who are coming in, there is a process of filtering them and understanding the kind of crime they have committed, and the legal system is also waiting to see prosecutable areas once these returnees are put into such a program. Then there is the sensitization part of it, the deradicalization part of it.”

For more than a decade, the militant group has used local and historical grievances to get Kenyan young people to join its violent activities.

A few thousand Kenyan youths are still fighting alongside al-Shabab in Somalia, but increased security operations and awareness campaigns inside Somalia and Kenya’s northeast and coastal areas have reduced youth recruitment.

Rashid said the counterterrorism programs now target security officers who are involved in fighting terrorism, so they can understand the process of radicalization.

The security officers need “to understand the radical drivers, to understand the legitimacy behind the radicals calling for their agenda,” Rashid said.

Nairobi-based security analyst Richard Tuta said Kenyans who joined al-Shabab could return to Kenya if the government accepted them.

Some sought income

“Remember, some of these young people did not go there because they were radicalized,” he said. “They went there because of other factors — like, for instance, to get a source of income, because one of the ways used to induce them to cross over is because they are promised even to be paid in dollars. So when the government gives them an amnesty, it makes it easier for them to make a comeback.”

Munira Hamisi, head of youth affairs and community empowerment in the county of Mombasa, said her county was ready to provide economic opportunities to more than 100 youths who return from Somalia.

“As a department, we have a Mombasa County revolving fund that has an economic stimulus package for our young people, where youth-led business licenses have been waived,” she said. “We also have a revolving fund where we are giving out soft loans to businesses that are owned by young people and women.”

The counterterrorism center campaign plans to expand and target 12 counties in all in the hope of encouraging more Kenyan youths to forsake terrorism.

Source: Voice of America

The U.S. has recently imposed sanctions against some Ethiopian officials who Washington blames for alleged human rights abuses in the country’s restive Tigray Province. The background context is that members of the previously most important party of the former Ethiopian ruling coalition, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), recently split with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s new Prosperity Party ruling coalition over serious domestic political differences related to his vision for the country. To admittedly oversimplify a very complex situation, Mr. Ahmed was earlier appointed by the EPRDF as a reformer in favor of substantive decentralization of Ethiopia’s federal system but then reversed course as a result of fears that his unprecedented “glasnost– and perestroika-like” rhetoric was inadvertently provoking “Balkanization” in this extremely cosmopolitan country that is also Africa’s second most populous.

In short, the TPLF fled to its native Tigray Province and launched an insurgency against the same government that it ironically used to lead. This prompted the central authorities to commence an overwhelming military operation to suppress this separatist threat, which led to accusations of human rights abuses and war crimes that have been difficult to verify due to the lack of access to the region by independent observers. Addis Ababa claims that it won’t sacrifice its sovereignty by allowing just anyone enter Tigray, which—while causing suspicion among some observers that it has something to hide—is nonetheless based in historical precedent considering prior Western meddling plots.

The irony is that a role reversal of sorts is presently taking place in Ethiopia which interestingly mirrors one that occurred during the Old Cold War but to a more localized extent. During the 1970s, Ethiopia was regarded as an American ally even after its Communist revolution, while the neighboring Somalia was a Soviet ally. The Ogaden War resulted in the superpowers trading patrons and thus ended with Ethiopia becoming a Soviet ally, while Somalia became an American one. Now, however, the TPLF is being at the very least indirectly supported by the U.S. through political means via the recent sanctions and despite the fact that the party has at times in its past been skeptical of America and closer to China. However, it also pragmatically engaged with Washington whenever it believed doing so would be mutually beneficial, like in the case of Somalia in the Ogaden War. Abiy Ahmed, who was initially considered American-friendly, is now cast as a villain by the U.S. due to the consequences of his military campaign in Tigray.

Some observers now expect Ethiopia to reverse its geopolitical course of recent years and more enthusiastically embrace China, just like the TPLF used to do when it was in power before Mr. Ahmed decided to recalibrate foreign policy during his now seemingly failed experiment with his country’s version of glasnost and perestroika. Since being appointed to power by the same ruling coalition that he was later responsible for replacing with his newfound Prosperity Party, he also moved a lot closer to the GCC. The latter has recently been more in support of Egypt and Sudan with which Ethiopia is embroiled in a bitter dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that some fear might one day lead to war. That being the case, Abiy’s reactionary embrace of China in response to U.S. sanctions and geopolitical disappointment with the GCC could lead to disproportionate geostrategic dependence on the People’s Republic.

Regarding geopolitical balancing as one of the top trends of the 21st century amid the world irreversibly transitioning to multipolarity, it would arguably be best for Ethiopia to preemptively balance its prospectively disproportionate geostrategic dependence on China with another party. Western countries side with the U.S. for obvious reasons, so are clearly excluded from this calculation, while it’s unrealistic to expect the GCC to abandon its support for its fellow Arab partners. This results in Russia being the only practical balancing partner for Ethiopia to engage with if it desires to balance China, especially in a friendly way that will not risk provoking any suspicions about its geostrategic intentions from the People’s Republic since Moscow and Beijing enjoy unprecedentedly close relations. Russia has also sought to return to Africa in recent years, as evidenced by its first-ever Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in October 2019.

Reaching out to Russia right now wouldn’t just be for symbolism’s sake but could result in a slew of mutually beneficial outcomes for both countries. Ethiopia requires reliable military support more than ever, and Russia is known for its no-strings-attached military deals and used to be Addis Ababa’s top military partner during the Old Cold War. Furthermore, many Russian companies are world-renowned for the quality of their work, especially in the extractive and logistical spheres. Ethiopia could certainly use their expertise in the years to come if Western companies decide to leave the country due to pressure from their governments. Another point is that stronger Russian-Ethiopian ties would complement Moscow’s geostrategic reorientation towards the Global South since the onset of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 which some regard as the start of the New Cold War, particularly since the Horn of Africa country is among the continent’s most promising markets.

With Ethiopia as its regional entry point, Russia could further expand its influence throughout the Horn of Africa and subsequently the rest of East Africa. In fact, visibly successful Russian-Ethiopian cooperation in the coming years, accelerated as it may be, could serve as a proof for why other African countries should follow in Addis Ababa’s footsteps by reaching out to Moscow as a pragmatic balancing partner even if they presently enjoy equally excellent relations with Washington and Beijing. After all, balancing between two great powers can be difficult to maintain indefinitely, but everything could be optimized if a third partner, such as Russia, were introduced into this geostrategic calculation. This would provide the host state with more opportunities to leverage its relationships to the most profitable end.

It is for these reasons why Ethiopia should reach out to Russia sooner than later. Not only would this serve its interests in the immediate moment, but it would also preemptively balance its prospectively disproportionate dependence on China as well as set a regional example for other countries to follow. Whether one agrees with Abiy’s vision for the country or not, to say nothing of the military intervention that he commenced in Tigray and its reported consequences, nobody can reasonably deny that the U.S. is putting pressure on Ethiopia through sanctions in the hopes of influencing its domestic policies and perhaps even encouraging regime change with time. The intriguing role reversal that just took place—whereby the previously Chinese-friendly and somewhat American-skeptical TPLF is now at the very least politically supported by the U.S., while the formerly American-friendly and Chinese-skeptical Abiy is cast as a villain—shows how flexible the U.S. can be in pursuit of its interests.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

I. Background

The Politicized Approach Against Eritrea

The Present Report and Its Flawed Methodology

II. A Futile Exercise: Searching for a Human Rights “Crisis” in Eritrea

The Rule of Law

Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

Non-Fulfillment of Reforms

Eritrea’s development orientation and post-COVID-19 prospects

National Service and Forced Labor

Fundamental Freedoms

Religious Freedom

Freedom of Association and Assembly

Freedom of Expression

III. Regional peace, security, and development dynamics

Emerging prospects of regional dynamics

The Tigray Crisis

The hard fact – TPLF Incited the Crisis

The disinformation campaign and wild allegations

The TPLF’s Culpability

Allegations relating to Eritrean refugees in Tigray

Eritrea – Djibouti Relations and the facts

IV. Engagement and International Cooperation

The Principles of Engagement

Progress and Recent Accomplishments

The Centrality of the UPR and Progress

Treaty bodies reporting

Thematic and treaty body invitations made by Eritrea

Cooperation with the OHCHR and the HRC

Eritrea’s engagement and Cooperation with the ACHPR

Other areas of cooperation

V. Conclusion and Way Forward

I. Background

The Politicized Approach Against Eritrea

1. The Human Rights Council (HRC) is once again presented with a flawed report from a Special Rapporteur (SR) on Eritrea. Unfortunately, the report repeats many of the same unsubstantiated allegations that have characterized previously published reports following the establishment of the SR’s mandate in 2012. The first HRC resolution was pushed at the peak of existential external threats against Eritrea and as a fallback option to the unwarranted sanctions imposed by certain western powers under the umbrella of the United Nations Security Council. Eritrea was also subjected to a parallel mandate through the COI. The first SR on Eritrea, Sheila Keetharut, formerly of Amnesty International, which has long pushed for “regime change” and stood against the country’s independence, again participated as a member of the COI to maximize the damage on the people and the Government of the State of Eritrea.

2. The original Resolution against Eritrea was sponsored by three African countries presumably to imbue it an African “face”. With time, however, many Member States had come to realize the hollowness of the charges leveled against Eritrea. As it happened, recent Resolutions in the last two years that called for renewal of the mandate and appointment of a new SR were not sponsored by a single African country. In the event, Western countries who were the original architects of the scheme had no choice but to come out of the closet.

3. Eritrea has thus been targeted through politically-motivated, country specific, resolutions and mechanisms of the HRC for almost a decade. The flawed reports ignored key contextual factors and downplayed Eritrea’s earnest progress and achievements in many areas. Most of the information was collated in TPLF-dominated Ethiopia, often in cahoots with the intelligence chief – later a fugitive from the law – and a narrow network of Eritrea’s archenemies, including some hostile countries. As we pleaded on multiple occasions, this conduct is in breach of accepted principles and norms of objectivity, neutrality and professionalism which must characterize the ethical standards of those entrusted with the task.

4. In a nutshell, there has never been a “human right crisis” in Eritrea that warrants the targeting of the country through any Human Rights Council agenda. As such, the present SR report is another attempt to portray a bleak picture of the nation on the basis of the same flawed pattern and methodology.

The Present Report and Its Flawed Methodology

5. Special Procedures were established by the broad mandate given to the Human Rights Council in General Assembly Resolution 60/251. The Code of Conduct outlined thereof stipulates the indispensable qualities of personal integrity, independence, impartiality, and objectivity of Rapporteurs in the dispensation of their tasks. Unfortunately, the report on Eritrea relies on sensational and unverified claims from dubious sources and others who have a long history of advocating for “regime change’’. The following examples amplify the visceral flaws of the current report:

• recycled allegations raised as “concerns” (Summary section)

• based upon “observations” (summary section, L4)

• information gathered from a variety of “unidentified sources” (summary section, L5)

• remote monitoring (introduction section, P3)

• Information through “alternative means” including Eritrean refugees

• “Selected other sources” – “diplomats in Khartoum”, “core group” of members of HRC, engagement in the UK (Activities section – P 8)

6. Furthermore, a critical observation on the Code of Conduct of the special procedures stipulated in Article 6, exposes the absence of responsibility and failure of the methodology. The Code of Conduct demands obligations including “facts, based on objective, reliable information emanating from relevant credible sources, .. duly cross-checked to the best extent possible”. Article 8 on the sources of information also demands that the SR “be guided by the principles of discretion, transparency, impartiality, and even-handedness” and further “Rely on objective and dependable facts”.

7. As with previous SR reports on Eritrea, the lack of reliable data, heavy dependence on biased sources, non-verifiable approach, and ignorance of Eritrea’s ground realities renders the methodology and the essence of the allegations tenuous and unacceptable.

II. A Futile Exercise: Searching for a Human Rights “Crisis” in Eritrea

8. Like every other country in the world, Eritrea faces challenges. However, the GoSE continuously works to address these challenges and improve human rights standards in the country. Accordingly, there is no “crisis” that warrants the targeting of the nation through HRC agendas and mandates.

9. Eritrea’s progress in all sectors, including the mainstreaming of human rights, embodies peace, stability, equal rights and opportunities, emerging legal trends, and a governance system that capitalizes on popular participation. Having said that, however, the GoSE recognizes the need for continuous consolidation and improvement remains central to the process of nation-building.

10. The progress outlined above should not be understated. It is the result of the resilience, sacrifices, and efforts of the population. What is more, the progress and achievements were registered in spite of numerous challenges and existential threats. Most importantly, the GoSE is committed to addressing all remaining challenges and achieving its human rights targets so as to reach its key objective which is creating a socially just society. It is incumbent upon the HRC and the mandate on Eritrea to acknowledge the significant points discussed above and correct its misguided, wrong position suggesting a systemic failure in Eritrea.

11. The baseless charges in the current Report are numerous and are carefully crafted so as to maintain the image of a “fragile and failed state”. These allegations have been addressed repeatedly in all past GoSE reports including in the UPR, statements and responses. The present response focuses specifically on the allegations relating to the absence of the rule of law; Gender-based violence (GBV); non-fulfillment of reforms; national service and forced labor; and international cooperation.

The Rule of Law

12. Contrary to the allegations in the current Report, Eritrea is governed by the rule of law. The following national instruments are worthy highlighting here:

• The Transitional Code (new codes have been published in 2015 and are under continuous public campaigns and discussion) is complemented by 178 proclamations and 125 legal notices. These are enforced as the source of law reflecting relevant internationally accepted norms. The judiciary, composed of hierarchical courts and public prosecution, upholds the administration of justice and maintains the rule of law in the society.

• An active and vibrant public participation at all levels of local governance is symbolic of the overall people-driven political process of nation-building inherent to Eritrea. Local governance in 2862 villages and 751 localities serves as the base for governance and responsible participation.

• Elected regional and local assemblies serve as the basis for exercising rights and carry the responsibility of administering public affairs. This has ensured State viability and a people-power nexus.

• Regional Administrations (six regions) shoulder governance responsibilities reflecting a decentralized system and are responsible for organization and implementation of local developmental projects.

• The commitment to strengthen the State through viable governance is thus apparent in the rule of law while functional responsibilities on policy, monitoring, training, and human resources, is promoted and regulated by sector ministries.

Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

13. Eritrean women’s revered role in society has been the subject of many objective studies and books examining both their inimitable contribution to the struggle for liberation as well as their equal participation in national service and national development projects. This has established a fundamental basis for women’s equality and empowerment and a strong rejection of any type of GBV.

14. The political, social, and cultural basis for fighting GBV in Eritrea is enshrined in law. Eritrea’s customary laws and traditions do not tolerate any form of sexual harassment, violence, or rape, and these laws have been reinforced in the Penal and Civil Codes enacted after independence. Anyone committing a crime related to violence against girls and women, such as rape (Art 589), sexual outrages accompanied by violence at various levels (Art 590-599), physical assault (Art 537), grave injury (Art 538/539), FGM-C (Art 4) is brought to the court by public prosecution and all criminal cases are duly adjudicated by the criminal courts only.

15. In general, an overwhelming focus and effort by the Government is to consolidate the substantial progress and achievements in gender equality, mainstreaming, and empowerment. The essence has focused on promoting human dignity, improving standards of living, and supporting inclusive development as sanctioned by national laws. It is therefore safe to say that the allegations related to GBV are unwarranted and Eritrea has regularly reported on this issue. The prevalence of small and stubborn pockets in society is minimal and dealt with through appropriate legal measures.

Non-Fulfillment of Reforms

16. The SR incorrectly asserts (paragraph 9 line 4-6) that “most of the recommendations made on Eritrea during its review for the third cycle in January 2019, including on the long-awaited reforms, are still largely unimplemented”.

Eritrea’s development orientation and post-COVID-19 prospects

17. After 20 years of a state of war, the Peace and Cooperation Declaration between Eritrea and Ethiopia, signed on July 2018, ushered in a new era of stability in the Horn of Africa. In light of this new atmosphere and the attendant regional dynamics, Eritrea has been working to recalibrate its development-orientation and remains committed to maximizing on agreements that are beneficial to all sides. Obviously, this is a work in progress and can only be assessed through objective measures taking into account the national context of each country in the region and without undue external dictations and pressure.

18. The new state of relative stability was seized to strengthen two dimensions: internal dynamics of development and international cooperation and engagement. Eritrea’s ambitious national development programmes are being reorganized and pursued with this new positive outlook in sight. Accordingly, Eritrea redoubled its efforts to achieve a qualitative leap in the near future. Unfortunately, Eritrea, along with the rest of the world, was impacted by the global COVID-19 pandemic. This has led to the scaling down of a number of the country’s development projects, initiatives, and programmes.

19. The new national development roadmap articulates the pertinent priorities that befit the new context, needs, and human betterment ideals of the society. The 9 strategic programs in the road-map aim at creating macro-economic growth and stability, effective reorganization through institutional, organizational and administrative consolidation, and the strengthening of the political process of nation-building. The development paradigm is driven by Eritrea’s long held commitment to asserting local ownership, priorities, and implementation. Furthermore, the overall strategy is to rely on the extended mobilization, higher organization, and effective harnessing of the national capacity of the people.

20. Despite the prevailing situation and dynamics outlined above, Eritrea is better placed to funnel all its material and human capital towards meaningful and sustainable development. Its track record of the past 30 years illustrates that the country has and can achieve inclusive and rapid economic growth predicated on social justice, promotion of equal rights and opportunities sanctioned by national law while focusing on human dignity, betterment of life, and development under favorable conditions of internal and regional peace. A central dimension in this respect is the ongoing effort to strengthen the mainstreaming of human rights in Eritrea’s nation-building.

21. The detrimental effect of the pandemic on the pace of progress in achieving developmental goals, and the economic impact of the protective measures notwithstanding, the people and Government of Eritrea have rededicated their energy and resources to laying the foundation for economic development and improving the standard of living by focusing on key productive sectors in accordance with the new national development roadmap. The fruits of this purposeful and resolute endeavour will surely be reaped in the years ahead and extensive work is going in sectors of comparative advantage as a ground for a post-COVID-19 recovery plan.

National Service and Forced Labor

22. Eritrea’s National Service was established through Proclamation No. 82 of 1995 with a commitment to human dignity, empowering of new generations critical to nation-building and all-round development, national unity and citizenship, and national interests predicated on social justice and the promotion of a viable future.

23. By law, every Eritrean, 18yrs of age and above, is required to complete National Service, which includes 6 months of training and education and 12 months of participation in development activities. National Service was introduced immediately after Independence as the government embarked on a massive demobilization programme at the time. In times of peace, National Service members do not have any other obligations once they fulfill their duty of service for 18 months. They remain in theory part of the reserve army eligible for recall if and when necessary. In the above context, National Service does not require reform as stipulated in paragraphs 39 to 43 of the present report, in relation to lack of improvement in conditions, systemic and widespread violations including forced labour, lack of free choice, etc. Furthermore, it is not the mandate of this body to demand National Service reform without due consideration given to the national context.

24. It is important to note here that when the “border” war ended and Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Algiers Peace Agreement, the Government of Eritrea launched the second demobilization programme where 105,000 soldiers were demobilized. But when the then TPLF-led Government of Ethiopia rejected the final and binding arbitral ruling and continued its policies of occupation and hostility, the government had no option but to prolong the National Service.

25. The causality inference (paragraph 40) suggested in the present report between national service and migration from Eritrea is unjustified and unacceptable. In line with the new development drive, as well as the emerging prospects of viable peace and cooperation in the Horn of Africa, efforts will gradually be made to return National Service to its original duration. Moreover, a significant number of national service members have been integrated into the new remuneration system which improved the salary scale of the civil service.

26. Eritrea again rejects the allegations on forced labor in the context of National Service (paragraph 42) cited from the COI Report on Eritrea. Forced labor is not practiced and National Service members are not employed in private enterprises unless they are formally discharged. Their participation in development programs only reflects the provisions stipulated in the Proclamation.

27. The allegation that returnees face imprisonment (paragraph 52) is contrary to the measures of amnesty introduced and the facts on the ground. A simple fact-check can tell how much citizens who were victims of the politicization of migration through human trafficking networks, perpetuated as part of the existential external threats on Eritrea to drain the youth from national defense, national service and development have become participants in national development and visit their country and family regularly without any problems.

Fundamental Freedoms

28. The present report has focused on recycling the usual allegations on religion and the rights to association, assembly, and expression (paragraphs 44 to 51) and are addressed here briefly as a reminder of Eritrea’s national context.

Religious Freedom

29. Eritrea is a secular state and freedom of religion is protected by law. The country’s rich history of religious tolerance, peaceful co-existence, and general harmony in a turbulent region that is often wracked by acute religious polarization and strife remains a positive, unique example. Contrary to the allegations in the report (paragraph 45 and 47), continuous efforts are being made to strengthen religious coexistence, mutual respect, and tolerance.

30. Even within the confines of secularism, the Government has shouldered the obligations to ensure that this centuries-old religious tolerance and harmony is not perturbed by externally-induced new trends of Islamic or Christian fundamentalism that corrode the social fabric. The operation of new faiths, with funding from external sources is, however, a matter seen in the context of Proclamation 73/1995. Religious affairs, including registration, declaration of funding, etc. are regulated by Proclamation 73/1995 and failure to comply with the requirements is faced with legal measures. The SR needed to check the objective facts on the ground so as not to follow the same deliberate attempts to tarnish Eritrea’s image in the name of religious freedom.

Freedom of Association and Assembly

31. Freedom of association and assembly is respected by law and the allegation that “public gatherings of more than seven people without permit are still prohibited” (paragraph 51) is completely false. Legal Notice No 5 of 1992 on “Registration of non-government national organizations and associations” sets the conditions for their establishment and operation. Presently, all national organizations are operational. Eritrea’s labor proclamation also upholds workers’ rights and trade unions are fully functional. The organizations, associations, trade unions, and interest groups have their own constitutions, elected leaders, and members, and they conduct regular meetings, conferences, and activities. Furthermore, veterans of the liberation struggle, local communities, social and cultural groups have also formed associations and are active in local communities. They play a significant role in creating platforms to discuss and address social, economic, cultural, and administrative issues. All associations are autonomous bodies and once registered function and work independently.

Freedom of Expression

32. Eritrean citizens have the right for lawful expression and opinion without interference and are both participants and beneficiaries of information and ideas. At the same time, however, this demands responsibility from every citizen to promote collective interest of the nation and the society. In this regard, public media has been strengthened and reflects the reality of national development. It has cultivated progressive thinking, transformational culture, and reliable information instrumental to a knowledge-based society. Furthermore, it has helped to consolidate the responsible participation of citizens. Importantly, regional and international issues and developments are covered on a daily basis. Hence, the contribution of Eritrea’s media establishment to the freedom of expression is ascertained by its democratic nature. To promote free expression through cultural works, the government encourages the production and distribution of various cultural and artistic contributions.

III. Regional peace, security, and development dynamics

Emerging prospects of regional dynamics

33. The present Report fails to objectively assess and portray the significant threat to regional peace and security posed by the TPLF after the implementation of the 2018 Peace, Friendship and Cooperation declaration between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Moreover, the continued occupation of sovereign Eritrean territories in defiance of international law, its right to live in peace without any threats, and the right to development have always been ignored by the SR’s reports.

34. In this regard, the recent futile campaign to scapegoat Eritrea in matters concerning Ethiopia, notably the enforcement of rule of law operation successfully undertaken by the Government of Prime Minister Abiy, deserves special mention. Much of the attempt to tarnish Eritrea’s image (paragraphs 15 to 19) is reminiscent of old patterns levied at the country for almost two decades. This time the intention is clearly to give life to the decadent group rejected by the vast majority of its own population. There is no mention in the current report of TPLF’s damaging role in the region over 27 years and its declared animosity towards the recent efforts of peace, security and development. This is unfortunate and exhibits clear bias.

The Tigray Crisis

The hard fact – TPLF Incited the Crisis

35. Until its removal from power, the TPLF governed Ethiopia with an iron fist, corruption, and the politics of ethnicity. With the seemingly unconditional support of some western powers, it served as the main agent for the destabilization of the Horn of Africa. The same western countries continued to support the TPLF even as it was weakened and forced to retreat from central government.

36. Emboldened by some governments, the Western media, and NGOs, the TPLF, by its own admission, unleashed an insurrectionist war in November 2020 after it was ousted from power in 2018 after 27 years of despotic rule in Ethiopia. The objective of this massive, premeditated and unprovoked attack that the TPLF launched on all the contingents of the Ethiopian army in the north was to totally neutralize the Northern Command which possessed around 80% of the EDF’s total arsenal. The TPLF killed several hundred non-Tigrayan soldiers within the Northern Command and its overall plan was to topple the central government once it had pacified the Northern Command. Subsequent plans included military action against Eritrea to advance its avowed “regime change” agenda as well as incorporation of Eritrean sovereign territories for its long-term, multi-layered, aims and aspirations.

37. The TPLF took these decisions at the highest levels of its leadership; in the meetings of its Central Committee days prior to the attack. Confident as it was on the “inevitable success of its preparations and plans’’ – the TPLF had trained around 250,000 militias and Special Forces in previous years while also infiltrating the ENDF to secretly enroll senior officers and soldiers of Tigrayan ethnic origin – the TPLF went as far as publicly and audaciously announcing the rationale and objectives of its military adventure in the early days of the war.

38. In the early days after it attacked Ethiopia’s Northern Command, the TPLF also launched missile attacks on adjacent regions in Ethiopia, as well as multiple civilian targets in several cities of Eritrea.

39. All these incontrovertible information is in the public domain. Indeed, only two weeks ago, General Tsadkan, who is leading the remnants of the TPLF army – acknowledged with some remorse that had it not been for the Drone strikes, the TPLF’s early successes and meticulous plans would have been implemented fully.

The disinformation campaign and wild allegations

40. As TPLF’s original plan failed, it resorted to a propaganda campaign of defaming Eritrea (paragraphs 17–20 of the report) and cyber disinformation became its most potent tool. Desperate fabrications, recycling of fake news, photoshopped images were all employed in this massive and coordinated crusade to scapegoat Eritrea. Shamelessly, some mainstream media organizations, hired by the TPLF during its reign over in Ethiopia, amplified this without scrutiny and due journalistic diligence.

41. Allegations singling out and defaming the Eritrean army, an institution anchored on ethics, values of humanity and respect for human dignity in any situation, are an insult to the history and culture of Eritreans. The country’s strong advocacy and practice of adherence to human rights during its 30-year national liberation struggle is well-documented. The same is true of the experience during the so-called border war. This commitment to human dignity, even of POWs, emanates from the strong ethical values of the society. The allegations are meant to deflect attention from the war launched and atrocities committed by the defunct TPLF and merit independent investigation and accountability.

42. Needless to say, all other allegations of sexual violence, looting, and crimes are baseless and devoid of credibility. Similarly, claims of mass killings and executions in Axum (paragraph 18) and Mekele (paragraph 1), as well as indiscriminate shelling in Humera and Adigrat are all false.

The TPLF’s Culpability

43. Crimes of aggression, ethnic cleansing, and other acts of injustice committed by the TPLF span three decades and go much farther than Ethiopia’s borders to neighboring countries, including Eritrea. The fact is that no amount of historical revision can absolve the clique of the crimes it committed throughout the Horn of Africa region. It is therefore unfortunate that the same external entities that aided and abetted TPLF’s murderous reign for almost three decades are now desperately working to cover up its crimes, offer it a lifeline, and scapegoat Eritrea.

44. Any attempt to deflect attention from the high crimes perpetrated by the TPLF clique and downplaying its culpability will not, indeed, serve the cause of peace and security in the region. Instead, such an attempt will entail a historic betrayal to the ongoing efforts of pursuing genuine peace, security, and development in the Horn of Africa. Any party motivated by peace, security and development in the region, shoulders the responsibility to condemn the TPLF’s crimes and should call for it to be held accountable without delay.

Allegations relating to Eritrean refugees in Tigray

45. Paragraphs 64 to 68 (as well as 75) stipulate the unwarranted and outrageous allegations mentioning violations of human and international humanitarian law and refugee law by the Eritrean army. The SR could have provided a more accurate reflection of the dreadful situation that the Eritrean refugees were faced with inside refugee camps hosting Tigray Special Forces and militia. The persistent question that has yet to be answered is in regard to the management of the camps and the eventual spontaneous scattering of the refugees to different parts of Ethiopia risking their life after being threatened, leaving those remaining to be rescued by Ethiopian federal forces.

Eritrea – Djibouti Relations and the facts

46. In paragraph 14 of the Advance Report, the SR indicated that “Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute persists”, and mention has been made of the alleged “…missing Djiboutian prisoners of war”. As mentioned above, the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia ushered in a new era of peace and cooperation leading to the revitalization of regional dynamics. Djibouti is an integral and important element in this revitalized vision and praxis. In this regard,

• the joint visit and meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia with the President of the Republic of Djibouti was an important development.

• This was followed by the subsequent meeting between the Presidents of Eritrea and Djibouti in Jeddah under the auspices of the King of Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, both Presidents agreed to continue the process of bilateral dialogue on any outstanding issues.

• The promising way forward is to consider the further development of the agreement made by the two presidents to gradually push the bilateral engagement and dialogue on any real, outstanding issue.

47. Eritrea presently does not have Djiboutian prisoners of war (POWs) in its custody. In accordance with the 2010 Mediation Agreement signed with the Republic of Djibouti under the auspices of the Emir of Qatar, Eritrea released 4 Djiboutian POWs. At the time, the international community, including the Republic of Djibouti through an official statement of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed their satisfaction with the action taken. Note is to be made that previously 2 Djiboutian POWs escaped and one died as a result of illness while in custody. Eritrea again declares that it does not have any Djiboutian POWs in its custody at present.

IV. Engagement and International Cooperation

The Principles of Engagement

48. Eritrea has earnestly worked to promote dignified engagement and cooperation predicated on mutual respect, understanding, and benefit and in line with its effort of consolidating of human rights mainstreaming that also gradually fulfills its international and regional commitments. The reality is that the confrontational HRC mandate and mechanisms have not created any dividend in the promotion of human rights. In fact, they have attempted to undermine its engagement and international cooperation. The situation bestows responsibility and demands on the HRC to consider the objective situation articulated to further consolidate the effort and output.

Progress and Recent Accomplishments

The Centrality of the UPR and Progress

49. Eritrea believes that the UPR is an effective mechanism for dignified engagement and cooperation based on the accepted recommendations by the State party. Eritrea has taken the UPR process and the attendant measures as epicenter for the follow-up and coordination infrastructure regarding Eritrea’s international and regional commitments and reporting. It is committed to further strengthening the institutional and organizational basis, capabilities, and experiences so far developed to continuously implement the UPR’s accepted recommendations.

50. Accordingly, measures are being taken to further consolidate the integrated and coordinated implementation and mainstreaming of the 3rd Cycle UPR accepted recommendations in development programmes. The Government has again developed the Framework for Action and an overall plan has been developed on the basis of sector goals and targets to mainstream human rights and implement the accepted recommendations of the Working Group in the 3rd UPR Cycle.

Treaty bodies reporting

51. Eritrea has been engaged in fulfilling certain obligations related to treaties of which it is a party to. The following are mentioned in this regard:

• Eritrea’s 6th CEDAW Report was considered during the 75th Session of the Committee on February 14, 2020. The observations and conclusions of the Committee are being evaluated to develop a Framework for Action.

• Similarly, the combined 5th and 6th CRC report has been submitted and is awaiting review. Eritrea will engage constructively in the upcoming review.

• In the absence of the initial report, the Committee considered the situation of civil and political rights under the Covenant in Eritrea at its 3582nd and 3583rd meetings (CCPR/C/SR.3582 and 3583), held in public sessions on March 12-13, 2019. At its 3599th meeting, held on March 25, 2019, the Committee adopted concluding observations. The committee had frank discussions with the Eritrean delegation. Regrettably, none of Eritrea’s important inputs or clarifications were included in the observations and conclusions of the Committee (of May 3, 2019), except for a brief solitary sentence recognizing the presence of the delegation.

Thematic and treaty body invitations made by Eritrea

52. As was mentioned in previous reports and statements during HRC sessions, as an initial step the Government of Eritrea took the initiative to further strengthen engagement, broaden cooperation, and deepen understanding of Eritrea’s context and objective realities by inviting certain thematic mandates and Treaty bodies (Ref OM/2/028 of 14 April 2016 sent to Chief a.i. Special Procedures Branch – OHCHR). While it was hoped that the initiative would lay the groundwork for further invitations, broader engagement, and deeper cooperation, the OHCHR failed to respond to the request. The invitations included:

• Initial invitations for 2016

• Thematic mandates – SR on the right to health, SR on the right to education

• Treaty Bodies – Committee on the Rights of the Child

• Initial Follow-up Invitations after 2016

• Thematic mandates – Independent expert on access to safe drinking water and sanitation, SR on the rights to food

• Treaty Bodies – Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

Cooperation with the OHCHR and the HRC

53. Eritrea has earnestly engaged and worked to partner with the OHCHR and its various divisions at different levels, including through the High Commissioners at the time. In this vein, Eritrea presented its own initial priorities for technical capacity-building in the administration of justice, right of the disabled, and rights related to water security. To this effect, four OHCHR technical missions were conducted. The OHCHR technical missions and the attendant reports neither reflected the efforts and the outcomes adequately nor did they appear with a balanced view of Eritrea’s reality in all reports of the High Commissioner. In substance and intent, they seemed to blindly endorse or recycle the biased, sensationalized approach of the SR’s reports on Eritrea. This serves as further confirmation that the OHCHR is not genuinely willing or prepared to work as a sincere partner to promote technical capacities vital to the promotion and protection of human rights in Eritrea.

54. Eritrea remains committed to the technical assistance in capacity-building, institutional links, and mobilizing resources to mainstream the pertinent rights under the identified areas and benefit from the experiences and comparative advantage of the Office. Nonetheless, the outcome of the visits and exchange of letters should have been transformed to concrete actions in those areas already identified before the cooperation is expanded in depth and scope as submitted in the OHCHR latest roadmap. This does not reflect Eritrea’s internal dynamics driven by national ownership, priorities, and local capacity.

55. The integrity and effectiveness of the HRC continues to be endangered by the politicization of human rights, which aims to vilify, isolate, and destabilize targeted sovereign countries. Eritrea opposes the misuse of the Council’s mechanisms to make groundless indictments of intimidation. As a member of the Council (2019-2021), Eritrea continues to make its modest contributions and has again been slotted for the election taking place in New York in October 2021.

56. Eritrea’s experience in the last 8 years is symbolic of the aforementioned political ill-intent perpetuated by the core group of western countries with hard-line position against the nation. We oppose the futile campaign to use the HRC as a mechanism to continue the unfair and unjust treatment, including using the unwarranted allegations to scapegoat Eritrea in the pretext of the recent events in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia.

57. Eritrea reaffirms its commitment to improve human rights in the country, while strengthening its modest contribution to depoliticize the Council and advance dignified engagement and cooperation predicated on partnership, in particular through the UPR, to address human right challenges that befit our collective effort to the ideals of humanity. In general, it will continue to expand and consolidate dignified engagement and international cooperation based on partnership.

Eritrea’s engagement and Cooperation with the ACHPR

58. Eritrea is continuously engaged with the ACHPR. It regularly participates in all sessions of the organization and contributes to the functioning and consolidation of the ongoing implementation of the African Charter. Efforts to fulfill regional obligations are also ongoing. In this respect, Eritrea has submitted its Initial and Combined National Report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in May 2018. The 2nd Report on ACRWC has been submitted recently and is awaiting discussion, while the preparation of the 2nd Periodic Report on the Africa Charter is underway.

59. Eritrea acknowledges and respects the African Commission’s efforts and contributions in the promotion of human rights and the implementation of the African Charter. Moreover, it engages with the Commission on numerous matters. This is based on the continuous effort to mainstream human rights in nation-building and is pursued with proper consideration to the African Charter and will be consolidated further. Nevertheless, it opposes any effort to use human rights as a pretext to implement other politically-related aims that threaten its security, sovereignty, and independence.

Other areas of cooperation

60. Eritrea’s fundamental principle on development, including in international and regional development cooperation, is guided by its independent political stance predicated on national ownership, priorities, and implementation. Accordingly, it emphasizes dignified engagement and cooperation based on genuine partnership. Recently, Eritrea embarked on the process of recalibrating its development programmes. Any cooperation, including with the UN through the UNCT (raised in paragraph 12), will be objectively and critically assessed and decided upon in due time.

61. Mention has also been made regarding EU sanctions on Eritrea amid the ongoing discussion to withhold development support in particular in the pretext of the unwarranted and worn-out allegations surrounding National Service and forced labor (paragraph 24) as well as other baseless human rights allegations. Any such pre-condition on development cooperation is unacceptable. Eritrea remains committed to the effective mobilization, higher organization, and creation of national capacity in the implementation of its development programmes. It is, however, equally committed to cooperation predicated on partnership, involving mutual respect and understanding. Thus, it rejects any attempts at intimidation, coercion, or harassment under the veil of human rights and development cooperation.

V. Conclusion and Way Forward

62. The flawed approach, erroneous data, and consequent bleak depiction of the country has led the SR to deliver a poor report filled with unacceptable blanket recommendations. Eritrea requests that the HRC refrain from making decisions based on the unverified allegations emanating from the present report.

63. Moreover, Eritrea cannot accept continued injustices and harassment by the UNHRC. Eritrea remains committed to the full respect and upholding of human rights. In this spirit, it remains committed to the UPR process and to assess its practices and drawbacks with its development partners and to take necessary remedial measures in areas and instances where its practices have avoidable shortcomings.

64. It is time for the HRC to break with its 8-years long unproductive approach by terminating the mandate imposed on Eritrea. On its part, Eritrea will continue to expand and consolidate dignified engagement and international cooperation based on partnership and will continue its modest contribution to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council, while working together with other members to depoliticize the Council and its agendas.

65. Eritrea reiterates its rejection of the resolution extending the mandate for a further year at the 44th HRC Session and reaffirms its position that continuation of the unfair and unjust treatment is unproductive, unacceptable, and will not cooperate with the mechanism. Politicization, selectivity, and double standards led to the failure of the Human Rights Commission, predecessor to the current HRC. Eritrea is concerned that this systemic malaise will once again cast its dark shadow on the HRC as exclusive power blocs continue to undermine the fundamental principles of law and fairness to advance their narrow, political interests under the pretext of human rights. Nevertheless, Eritrea will continue to collaborate with other like-minded countries to address the unjustified state of affairs perpetuated to fulfill the geopolitical agendas and vested interests of certain powers under the mantle of human rights.

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

Sudan-Ethiopia border, in Hamdayet, eastern Sudan. Huge unknowns persist in the deadly conflict, but details of the involvement of neighboring Eritrea, one of the world’s most secretive countries, are emerging through witness accounts by survivors and others. (AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty, File)

# Reuters

June 22, 2021

GENEVA, June 22 (Reuters) – Eritrea now has “effective control” of parts of Ethiopia’s Tigray region, a U.N. human rights expert said on Tuesday, calling for troops to withdraw and for a prompt investigation into abuses, including the abduction of refugees.

Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, UN special rapporteur on human rights in Eritrea, was addressing the Human Rights Council a day after he presented a report that described violations by Eritrean troops in Tigray, including summary executions and the abduction and disappearance of Eritrean refugees there.

Eritrea sent troops to Tigray after the Ethiopian military launched an offensive in November in response to attacks on federal government bases by regional forces. Eritrea denied for months that its troops were in Tigray, but later acknowledged their presence while denying they were responsible for abuses.

“According to information that I have, Eritrea has an effective control over the Tigray region…especially in the two camps: Hitsats and Shimelba,” Babiker said, referring to camps in Tigray that house refugees from Eritrea.

The United Nations has said Eritrean refugees were attacked and abducted from the camps by armed men suspected to be Eritrean troops.

“The whereabouts of refugees who remain missing is really a matter of great concern,” Babiker said, calling for a full investigation by an independent body into these allegations.

Eritrea’s foreign affairs ministry responded on Tuesday to the report with a lengthy statement in which it said that the Geneva-based council had targeted Eritrea for more than a decade through politically-motivated and flawed reporting.

The ministry said allegations of sexual violence and other war crimes by Eritrean forces in Tigray were baseless. In comments on Monday, the Eritrean delegate told the forum that the Special Rapporteur’s role should be abolished.

During the debate, other countries including the United States criticised the presence of Eritrean troops and referred to “credible reports” that Eritrea was forcibly returning Eritrean refugees to their homeland.

Fighting since November between Ethiopia’s government and the region’s ousted ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), has displaced more than 2 million people.

Eritrea agreed to withdraw its troops from Ethiopian territory along their mutual border, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said in March.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Analysts say Turkey is expected to come under pressure to remove its military from Libya when world leaders gather Wednesday at a conference in Berlin. The meeting will include discussions on elections and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the war-torn north African country.

The Berlin conference is the second international meeting organized by Germany and the United Nations. Discussions will focus on permanently ending the Libyan civil war, and laying the groundwork for December elections.

A key goal of the gathering is the creation of a framework for the withdrawal of all foreign fighters, something Aya Burweila, a visiting lecturer at the Hellenic National Defense College, says is key to restoring stability in the country.

“Good governance is very difficult to establish in Libya. There are arms everywhere, there are militias everywhere. So, the presence of foreign powers really undermines that. Libyans want them all out. They want a normal country. Most of all, they want elections at the end of the year,” Burweila said.

Turkey deployed hundreds of soldiers and thousands of Syrian fighters in support of the Libyan Government of National Accord in its battle against forces of Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Russian and Sudanese mercenaries.

A cease-fire is now in force.

While backing calls for the removal of foreign troops, Ankara says its presence is legitimate because it was invited by the internationally recognized government.

But with conference attendees, including EU members and the United States calling for the removal of all foreign troops, and Turkey seeking to improve ties with its western allies, international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University says Ankara will likely acquiesce, at least in part.

“Turkey will probably eventually come to the terms. They will take those foreign fighters from Libya, the Syrian fighters, the Turkish proxies [out],” Guvenc said.

A U.S. Defense Department report last year said Turkey sent thousands of paid Syrian fighters to Libya. Burweila said the mercenaries are among the most destabilizing forces in Libya.

“These Syrian mercenaries, their behavior in Libya, [is] very much similar to [their actions in] northeast Syria: Looting, sexual assaults, violence. There is something very jarring to natives seeing foreign men with arms driving around their streets with no accountability,” Burweila said.

Ankara denies such claims of misconduct.

Turkey’s wider military presence is also expected to come under pressure. The Turkish military constructed an airbase and wants to establish a naval base in Libya, a plan opposed by Egypt and France, which are also represented at the Berlin conference.

But Guvenc said Ankara sees its Libyan military presence as having strategic importance.

“Turkey has to keep a foot in Africa. That air force base in al Watiya in Libya offers tremendous opportunities in that regard. So, probably, Turkey will bargain very hard to keep that base,” Guvenc said.

Analysts say the Berlin conference sees Ankara working to balance its strategic goals of improving ties with its Western allies while expanding its influence in Africa.

Source: Voice of America