UNEP Seeking Solution to Issue of Increased Plastic Waste

Decreasing the usage of plastic and increasing its recycling is the aim of a resolution being presented at a United Nations Environment Program conference that opens Monday in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. According to the UNEP, 300,000 tons of plastic are produced yearly, and only 10 percent recycled, contributing to environmental pollution that, according to the UNEP, is reaching critical levels.

On the Dandora dumping site in Nairobi, visitors can see a hilly landscape full of decades of garbage and plastics generated from the city. People are sifting through the smelly waste with their bare hands, looking for something to sell or eat.

On this particular day, the site gets a visit from Inger Andersen, executive director of the United Nations Environment Program, along with the UNEP assembly president, Espen Barth Eide. They are inspecting piles of blue and transparent plastics that are baking in the sun. According to the UNEP, only 10 percent of global plastic production is recycled, while the rest risks polluting the environment. The UNEP says plastics even enter the human body. Espen Barth Eide took a blood test.

“We found nano plastic traces and also phthalates, a chemical product that we use to soften plastic, in my blood, and I don’t think my blood is unique and I think this is true for all of us on the planet,” said Eide.

The UNEP is looking for a solution to the issue of increased plastic waste collection, preventing it from ending up in nature or on dumping sites.

Twenty-year-old Isaac is a garbage picker on the Dandora dumping site. He collects a lot of plastic here for selling, like bottles, known here as chupas.

“Even bottles, chupas of soda. These plastic papers and plastic chupas like water, Omo, yogurt, all of it,” he said.

The UNEP’s Andersen says a lot more plastic will have to be collected for recycling purposes to keep the environment clean.

“We understand we need plastic. We take it from the belly of the Earth with hydrocarbon, said Andersen. “We make it into plastic. But once it is in the economy, let us not put it back into the environment; let us keep it in the economy.”

At a recycling plant in Nairobi, plastic waste is turned into polythene bags and bricks which are offered on the market. It can be seen as a sign that the process has started, but for the UNEP, it must be accelerated for a cleaner world.

Source: Voice OF America

The 1000 Car Road Show | GAC MOTOR Nigeria Delivers Vehicles for LAGRIDE Project

GUANGZHOU, China, Feb. 26, 2022 /PRNewswire/ — On February 20, 2022, an awe-inspiring parade of 1000 GAC MOTOR vehicles crossed the Third Mainland Bridge into Lagos State, ready to begin service for the LAGRIDE public transport project.

GAC_MOTOR_Lagos_Road_Show

The project, which features a large-scale government-sponsored ride-hailing platform, is the first of its kind instigated by the current Lagos government.

GAC MOTOR’s years of establishing a foothold in the local automobile market have paid off. It has been trusted to provide 1000 vehicles in the project.

Design, Comfort, Quality

As a designated supplier, GAC MOTOR has equipped Lagos with 1000 GS3s and GA4s.

In recent days, a thousand cars have appeared in a visually striking and enormous “roadshow” across the Third Mainland Bridge linking Lagos state to the Nigerian mainland.

The GS3 SUV and GA4 sedan feature intelligent Chinese technology capabilities, reliable quality of materials, and a design that prioritizes comfort. Both have spacious cabins that make them well-suited to extensive use by the public while maintaining a feeling of cutting-edge design and luxury.

Affordable Vehicles Will Boost Transport Business

LAGRIDE is a vital opportunity for GAC MOTOR to build an even stronger reputation through simple visibility and a more profound commitment to local economic development.

The project is designed to boost Nigeria’s public transport services, promote the development of the online ride-hailing sector, assist the Nigerian government in building a world-class online ride-hailing platform, and reform Nigeria’s transportation sector.

LAGRIDE is also a scheme of empowerment for Lagos residents. It will provide a thousand new passenger cars for purchase by eligible unemployed and taxi drivers equipped with perfect safety and insurance systems.

The cars also come with low initial deposits and long repayment periods, which reduce the employment threshold, provide employment opportunities, and reduce pressures associated with car purchases, promoting consumption and aiding overall economic development.

A Clear Commitment to Development in Nigeria

GAC MOTOR, as a brand, has been working to cultivate the Nigerian market for years and has committed to bringing ingenious design, superior quality, and advanced technology to the Nigerian people.

In 2021, GAC MOTOR won Nigeria’s prestigious “Automobile Company of the Year” award. The GS8 also won “Most Desirable SUV.”

The future looks bright for GAC MOTOR. Expect many more years of entrenched development in Nigeria and the broader African continent for the Chinese carmaker.

Photo – https://mma.prnewswire.com/media/1754858/GAC_MOTOR_Lagos_Road_Show.jpg

Chinmay J. Upadhyat torna-se Vice-Presidente Regional, Sul da Ásia para Nikkiso Clean Energy & Industrial Gases Group

TEMECULA, Califórnia, Feb. 25, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — A Nikkiso Cryogenic Industries’ Clean Energy & Industrial Gases Group (“Grupo”), parte do grupo de empresas Nikkiso Co., Ltd (Japão), anuncia que Chinmay J. Upadhyat juntou-se ao Grupo como Vice-Presidente Regional, região do Sul da Ásia.

Chinmay ficará sediado na Nikkiso Cosmodyne India Private Ltd, seu grande centro de fabricação e competências em Gujarat, na Índia.

Esta importante adição à equipe de gestão é resultado do crescimento no contexto de mercado e está em linha com os objetivos da Divisão Industrial da Nikkiso, de melhor atender e dar suporte aos seus clientes no mercado do sul da Ásia.

Chinmay iniciou sua carreira em 1995 como Engenheiro de Produção na Anup Engineering e na Inductotherm India, depois atuou como gerente de contas por dez anos na Dresser Rand Índia. Desde 2008, ele foi Gerente Regional e Assistente Geral da Burckhardt Compression Índia, onde foi responsável pelas vendas e desenvolvimento de negócios de novas máquinas para o mercado indiano.

Com sua vasta experiência nos mercados de GNV, GNL, H2 e gás industrial na Índia, Chinmay liderará as equipes de vendas e serviços da Nikkiso Clean Energy & Industrial Gases nesta importante região e embarcará em uma missão para fornecer crescimento de participação de mercado de forma sustentável e maneira lucrativa.

“Chinmay será um reforço perfeito para nossa equipe de gestão com sua grande competência em desenvolvimento de negócios, equipamentos, serviços, vendas, pós-venda e conhecimento de mercado”, de acordo com Emile Bado, Vice-presidente de Vendas e Desenvolvimento de Negócios do Grupo.

Chinmay é formado em Engenharia Mecânica pela Government Polytechnic, Ahmedabad, bacharel em Tecnologia pela JNRVD University, Rajasthan e possui MBA pela Sikkim Manipal University em Manipal.

SOBRE CRYOGENIC INDUSTRIES
As empresas da Cryogenic Industries, Inc. (agora parte da Nikkiso Co., Ltd.) fabricam equipamentos de processamento de gás criogênico e usinas para serviços de serviços de GNL, poços e gás industrial. Fundada há mais de 50 anos, a Cryogenic Industries é matriz da ACD, Cosmodyne e Cryoquip e o grupo é controlado em conjunto por aproximadamente 20 instituições operacionais.

Para mais informações visite www.cryoind.com e www.nikkiso.com.

ASSESSORIA DE IMPRENSA:
Anna Quigley
+1.951.383.3314
aquigley@cryoind.com

Chinmay J. Upadhyat devient vice-président régional pour l’Asie du Sud de Nikkiso Clean Energy & Industrial Gases Group

TEMECULA, Calif., 25 févr. 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Nikkiso Cryogenic Industries’ Clean Energy & Industrial Gases Group (le « Groupe »), qui fait partie du groupe Nikkiso Co., Ltd (Japon), annonce que Chinmay J. Upadhyat a rejoint le Groupe en tant que vice-président régional pour la région Asie du Sud.

Chinmay sera basé au sein de Nikkiso Cosmodyne India Private Ltd, son grand centre de fabrication et de compétence dans l’État du Gujarat, en Inde.

Cet ajout important à notre équipe de direction est le résultat de notre croissance dans l’environnement de marché et est conforme aux objectifs de la Division industrielle (Industrial Division) de Nikkiso visant à mieux servir et soutenir nos clients sur le marché de l’Asie du Sud.

Chinmay a débuté sa carrière en 1995 en tant qu’ingénieur de production chez Anup Engineering et Inductotherm India, puis a occupé le poste de gestionnaire de comptes clés pendant dix ans chez Dresser Rand India. Depuis 2008, il est directeur général adjoint régional de Burckhardt Compression India, où il était responsable du développement commercial et des ventes de nouvelles machines pour le marché indien.

Fort de sa vaste expérience sur les marchés du CNG, du GNL, du dihydrogène et du gaz industriel en Inde, Chinmay dirigera les équipes de ventes et services de Nikkiso Clean Energy & Industrial Gases dans cette importante région, et s’engagera dans une mission visant à fournir une croissance durable et rentable des parts de marché.

« Chinmay sera un parfait ajout à notre équipe de direction avec ses compétences dans le développement commercial, l’équipement, l’entretien, les services après-vente et sa connaissance du marché », a déclaré Emile Bado, vice-président du développement commercial et des ventes du Groupe.

Chinmay est titulaire d’un diplôme d’ingénierie mécanique de Government Polytechnic, Ahmedabad, d’une licence en technologie de l’université JNRVD, au Rajasthan, et d’un MBA de l’université Sikkim Manipal à Manipal.

À PROPOS DE CRYOGENIC INDUSTRIES
Cryogenic Industries, Inc. (aujourd’hui membre de Nikkiso Co., Ltd) et ses entreprises membres fabriquent des équipements et de petites usines de traitement de gaz cryogénique pour les secteurs du gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL), des services d’entretien de puits et du gaz industriel. Fondée il y a plus de 50 ans, Cryogenic Industries est la société-mère d’ACD, de Cosmodyne et de Cryoquip, ainsi qu’un groupe administré en commun comptant une vingtaine d’entités opérationnelles.

Pour tout complément d’information, veuillez consulter les sites www.cryoind.com et www.nikkiso.com.

Contact auprès des médias :
Anna Quigley
+1.951.383.3314
aquigley@cryoind.com

TheElephant.info: The Crisis in Ethiopia and its Implication for Marsabit County

A lengthy destabilization of Ethiopia’s regime reverse the gains made by security partners and countries in the fight against Al-Shabaab, and create a crisis that Kenya is ill-prepared to face.

The in Ethiopia and its Implication for Marsabit County Download PDFPrint Article From southern Ethiopia to northern Kenya, scenes of euphoria broke out after the swearing in of Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia’s new prime minister on 2 April 2018, when the incumbent Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned unexpectedly. Abiy came to power as the country faced civil unrest, particularly in the Oromia region. In his maiden speech, Abiy promised sweeping changes, from judicial reforms, to the establishment of high-level structured bilateral cooperation with Kenya to the signing of a peace accord with Eritrea to end 20 years of a frozen conflict. Eighteen years after its closure, the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was reopened and siblings were reunited with parents and grandparents for the first time in almost a decade. Phone links were re-established.

• A New Dawn

A new era seemed to have emerged in the Horn of Africa’s most populous country and largest economy following decades of civil wars, drought and famine. Ethiopian youths had high expectations of an improved economy and better working conditions under Abiy’s leadership. In particular, for the larger Oromo population, which had never had one of its own as head of government, the coronation of Abiy was laden with tremendous hope for this historically marginalized majority group. Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize after the peace settlement with Eritrea, electrifying the country and the region. Yet amid all the positive reforms, tensions were brewing within and outside Abiy’s administration as the northern Tigrinya region went to the polls against the federal government’s directives. Dissenting Oromo voices and opposition leaders were detained. Vocal local musician Hachalu Handessa was assassinated in broad daylight.

All these events happened in the blink of an eye, jeopardizing the developments initiated by Abiy in fewer than two years. Slightly over one year into the conflict with Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) insurgents, the intensifying hostility between the federal government forces and the Tigrinya political leadership has produced a dire humanitarian crisis, from malnutrition and food insecurity, the displacement of populations, disease outbreaks to restrictions in the delivery of food aid. The current volatile situation in Ethiopia will have a devastating ripple effect on the neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya, which borders Ethiopia to the south.

• The spillover

From the Italo-Ethiopia war, through the persecution of the TPLF to Ethiopia’s security operation in early 2018 targeting civilians, the ensuing refugee crises have been felt in the Moyale region of Marsabit County. The movement of people from Ethiopia to the Kenyan side of the border takes different forms, from human trafficking, displacement of people due to ethnic conflict or targeted government operations, to “flushing out” of local militia affiliated to Oromo in Ethiopia. The Moyale-Nairobi road has been the route for human trafficking and a smuggling hotspot for those seeking “greener pastures” abroad and those running away from political persecution.

Of the other countries that share a border with Ethiopia, the influx of refugees into Sudan has been the largest, with arrivals into countries like Somalia being modest. Conversely, with the escalation of ethnic fighting and the federal government fighting different factions in new fronts, the situation is fluid, and there is the possibility of people fleeing to Kenya to escape the growing conflicts. Northern Kenya already hosts two of the world’s largest refugee settlements, Kakuma to the northwest and Dadaab to the northeast. A protracted and bloody ethnic conflict causing a steady flow of displaced populations would likely have severe impacts on Marsabit County. The porous borders with Kenya would enable displaced populations to cross into Moyale Sub-County, putting pressure on a region that is already facing drought and resource problems. An influx of refugees from Ethiopia could increase pressure on the county’s scarce resources and provoke a humanitarian crisis that local authorities are not equipped to handle. This would put colossal pressure on public utilities like hospitals, increase food insecurity, cause disease outbreaks and a surge in COVID-19 infections.

“The current volatile situation in Ethiopia will have a devastating ripple effect on the neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya, which borders Ethiopia to the south.”

Kenya being the passage for Ethiopians seeking a better life abroad—in South Africa and elsewhere—the influx of people running away from the crisis will increase human trafficking, which will have a devastating impact on the rights of refugees. The people being trafficked usually pay colossal amounts of money to traffickers to get into Nairobi, transported either by lorry or by van like sacks of potatoes. Immigrants risk their lives in search of better lives and livelihoods and the influx of refugees might affect the rights of refugees as the human traffickers may take advantage of the vulnerable displaced populations. Additionally, the crisis has potentially serious effects on Kenya’s stability and security as it could weaken counterinsurgency efforts against the potent Al-Shabaab jihadist group. Kenya has taken a number of initiatives against terrorism and terror-related activities including security and political measures, and creating awareness and sensitization among the locals. These initiatives could be derailed if the militant group makes a comeback into the border counties.

The intensification of conflict and spill-over into Ethiopia’s other regions like Oromia and Ogaden may oblige Abiy’s government to withdraw Ethiopian forces from Somalia, severely weakening the AMISOM forces. This would splinter the containment model put in place by the Ethiopian government against Al-Shabaab. The security vacuum created will allow the infiltration of Al-Shabaab and other militant groups, and create conditions favouring local recruitment. AMISON was officially scheduled to wind up its operations by the end of the 2021 but the international community has requested an extension of the term from the European Union. The deployment of Ethiopian military personnel remains a lynchpin of the AMISON mission in Somalia; retracting Ethiopia’s contingent could erase the gains made over the years in the fight against the terrorist group. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops would also bolster the Al-Shabaab, enabling militants to spread their tentacles into the vast and volatile parts of Marsabit County.

“An influx of refugees from Ethiopia could increase pressure on the county’s scarce resources and provoke a humanitarian crisis that local authorities are not equipped to handle.”

The political crisis will exacerbate the ethnic and political situation in border counties like Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, among others. Marsabit County has in the past experienced severe ethnic conflict, from the Forolle massacre, the Turbi bloodbath, the Moyale clashes to the current ethnic clashes in Saku Sub-County. The primary triggers of the ethnic conflict revolve around land and boundary issues exacerbated by the influx of small arms and light weapons through the porous Kenya-Ethiopian border. The ease of access to light weapons will be further accelerated by the Ethiopian crisis, enabling a steady flow of guns and other armaments. This could inflame the already fragile situation in Marsabit County. Considering that electioneering in this region instigates ethnic conflict, the infiltration of light weapons might aggravate these ethnic clashes.

Given that Kenya and Ethiopia have several bilateral trade agreements and other trade arrangements at various levels, the crisis in Ethiopia is likely to affect trade between the two countries. Private firms and local traders on the Kenyan side of the border are likely to re-evaluate their business operations, which will affect income tax and cause layoffs. This will have direct bearing on the revenues generated by the state from the export and import of goods. On the flipside, there will be an inflow of illegal goods and products into Kenya, finding their way into the local markets and thus affecting the business environment in Kenya. Such a shadow market system distorts the local market and trade flows, and results in low sales as people shift to cheaper goods. An intensification of ethnic conflict implies disruption of transportation of goods along the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia corridor. Similarly, hard drugs like cannabis sativa could find their way into the lucrative drug market in Kenya.

In brief, a rapid de-escalation in the complex ethnic conflict is vital not just for reinstating equilibrium in Ethiopia, but also to ensure that Kenya is not destabilised. A lengthy destabilization of Ethiopia’s regime will reverse the gains made by security partners and countries in the fight against Al Shabaab, the most lethal terrorist group in the Horn of Africa as well as the economic achievements and bilateral cooperation between these two countries. Should the de-escalation emerge as a result of political diplomacy leading to equitable power sharing, Kenya will not have to deal with a crisis it has not prepared for.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online

Eritrea’s Path Towards Eradicating FGM

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), often referred to as ‘female circumcision ‘, is defined by the World Health Organization as comprising “all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs whether for cultural, religious or other non- therapeutic reasons.”

FGM is a crime that affects young girls physically, psychologically, socially and spiritually. ‘Female circumcision’ is performed on millions of girls, mainly in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Although it has no tangible health benefit, it is still performed not only by societies in the aforementioned continents but also immigrants in North America and Europe.

It was in 2004 that I came to know about the harmful effects of ‘female circumcision’ at a health workshop held in Massawa, which was attended by participants that came from various ministries. During the break, Ghenet Seyoum, a nurse, showed me the picture of a young lady who suffered due to FGM. The lady lived with the scars and hid it from people for years. I was shocked by what I saw and could not hide my hatred for those who inflicted the pain on the young lady. As someone who has an extensive experience working with diverse ethnic groups before and after Eritrea’s independence, Ghenet smiled and told me the best approach to deal with the problem is to raise people’s awareness about the harmful effects of ‘female circumcision,’ which is the policy of the government.

I have recently learned from an informal conversation with members of the National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) that the Union has been working with dedication since the liberation struggle towards the eradication of FGM. The Union recognized FGM as a major problem in 1975 and deliberated on it at its congress held in 1977. In 1979, FGM was recognized as a crime in the Union’s constitution.

After Eritrea’s independence, NUEW has been working along with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and other stakeholders against FGM. Members of the Union have been educating the public, as they did during the liberation struggle, about the effects of FGM.

Although the attitude and perception of the society might have positively changed as a result of the Eritrean revolution, there still are related and lingering practices in some places. For this reason, the first strategy of the Union was to break the silence and create conditions for people to have conversations about FGM and its effects. Women who performed ‘female circumcision’ and women who were ‘circumcised’ came forth to speak about FGM and then became advocates of the movement against FGM. Advocating and conscious raising materials are published and widely spread accordingly.

A proclamation was issued in 2007 to put an end to FGM, a practice of removing part of the body which is against the basic right of a person, and punish those who perform ‘female circumcision.’

The second strategy adopted by NUEW promoted training to employees of public institutions such as the Ministry of Education (MoE), which prepared billboards and banners about FGM and its harmful effects, to raise awareness of the public.

The third strategy involved coopting religious and community leaders to be able to reach out the general public because the society is likely to listen to such leaders whom it revers. With the support of various government institutions, including the MoE and the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare (MLHW), the Union approached religious and community leaders to share experiences and perspectives about the harmful practice of FGM.

Like the women who used to perform ‘female circumcision’ and then turned to advocates against FGM, the leaders have recognized the criminality of FGM and have been playing a great role in trying to put an end to its practice. The leaders emphasized in their teaching the absence of any reference to ‘female circumcision’ in the Bible and the Quran.

In collaboration with the MoH and MLHW, NUEW has published a booklet which is used as a guide to teach people about the rights of girls and children and the eradication of harmful practices. The booklet, which was published in 2018, has valuable information on the rights of girls and children in Eritrea. To increase advocacy to end FGM in Eritrea it is very important to publish the booklet in all Eritrean languages and make it widely accessible

Source: Ministry of Information Eritrea

TheDiplomat.com: Does China’s Horn of Africa Envoy Mean for Its Non-Intervention Principle?

China’s approach to security issues is meant to be in line with African frameworks, in accordance with the principle of non-intervention.

A month ago, during a visit to Eritrea, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi made the sudden announcement that Beijing will create the position of a new peace and security envoy specifically for the Horn of Africa (HOA). Wang framed the announcement as an “Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa.”

Does the appointment mean Beijing is finally shifting its long held non-interventionist stance when it comes to peace and security in other countries? After all, other permanent United Nations Security Council members such as the U.S., U.K., and France do not have such a stance.

To answer this question, it is worth understanding three key points: Why has China held the non-intervention principle? What is China’s record on peace and security in the Horn of Africa? And what are the African demands on development partners, including China, when it comes to peace and security?

Some commentators believe China’s non-intervention policy is self-serving – it “lets Beijing take credit for any potential successes of these processes, while evading full responsibility if efforts are unsuccessful.” However, as the scholar Kerry Brown has pointed out, the principle of non-interference goes back decades and is not China-specific. In particular, it was agreed at the Bandung Conference of 1955, which China’s then-Premier Zhou Enlai attended, as did four of the only five independent African countries at the time: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya (South Africa was not invited due to apartheid), as well as representatives of the Gold Coast (at the time under shared rule with Britain, now modern-day Ghana), Sudan (then under joint British-Egyptian control), and the Central African Federation (modern-day Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Because of this principle, in practice Beijing tends to get behind governments or relevant regional organizations to promote dialogue and diplomacy as a means to settle disputes. In addition, it also means that China tends to provide technical and financial assistance to governments, and channel troops through regional or global organizations, including the U.N., rather than deploying its own resources or forces bilaterally (except to defend its borders).

• So how has this worked in the Horn of Africa so far?

In fact, a special Chinese envoy working in the Horn of Africa is not new. In 2007, Ambassador Liu Guijin was appointed a special envoy for African affairs, and immediately deployed to help resolve the then conflict in Darfur, Sudan. China had a clear economic interest in doing so. As scholar Luke Patey has outlined, Sudan was China’s sixth largest foreign oil source, supplying 5.5 percent of its needs. As a result of the envoy, the Crisis Group noted that China’s intervention, including through the Security Council, helped ensure the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the region in 2008. Of course, China’s links to Sudan have since changed, given South Sudan’s independence in 2011, but China’s overall economic engagement in the entire region has simultaneously risen, especially in trade and foreign direct investment, as well as loans. Kenya’s business environment is welcoming to foreign investors. Ethiopia is generally considered to be China’s pilot for low-cost manufacturing offshoring to Africa. South Sudan still exports oil to China.

Furthermore, peace and security in the Horn of Africa region is directly and indirectly crucial to the stability of international development and trade, which China depends on. The conflict between the Ethiopian and Tigrayan security forces, rising drone strikes in the Somali region, the disputes between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and other energy resources all make the region crucial geoeconomically and geostrategically. Hence, China has since 2017 operated its only overseas military base in the Horn – in Djibouti, just like seven other G-20 countries and Spain. Indeed, perceived inaction on these various crises can have an adverse effect: Chinese companies could decide against continued investments due to insecurity.

That said, and coming to my third point, this does not mean China will become interventionist, nor is this what Africans want.

During a press conference at the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021, Senegalese host and Foreign Minister Aïssata Tall Sall presented journalists with the following announcement: “We would like China’s influence to be a strong voice in support of Senegal and all the countries involved in the problem of insecurity in the Sahel, so that our forces there have even more legal means to fight against terrorists and irredentism, and we hope that China will accompany us.”

This was not surprising. As I have written elsewhere, while peace and security were not initially on the agenda of FOCAC when it started in 2000, in line with the non-intervention principle, over time, with experiences such as in Darfur, this has changed. In 2015, China pledged to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis, plus a total of $100 million of military assistance to the African Union, focused on four areas: first, direct military assistance on a regional (vs. bilateral) level as mentioned above, second, bilateral and multilateral exchanges of high-ranking defense officials for training workshops, joint drills, and navy patrols; third, anti-piracy and mediation efforts and patrols off the Gulf of Aden; and fourth, a security policy that acknowledges that underdevelopment and poverty are root causes of conflicts from piracy and trafficking to war and internal displacement. These four approaches are meant to be in line with African frameworks, boosting the continent’s internal capacity rather than parachuting in.

If China maintains this approach, the recent decision to select an envoy will be a proactive step within the principles of non-intervention. That said, the stance equally means that while the Horn of Africa envoy could be helpful, his or her success will be highly dependent on Africans. Is China ready for that, when Beijing has a proportion of its economic futures tied to the region? Perhaps. Wang has reiterated that “Horn of Africa nations should decide their own destiny and convene a peace conference.” But a dependence on African agency is a risk that other U.N. Security Council members have not been so willing to take.

Source: Dehai Eritrea Online